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Abstract 
Islamic Law in Canada: Marriage and Divorce provides an analysis of how Canadian 
society and the Canadian judicial system have responded to the use of the Shar1'a to 
resolve issues relating to Islamic marri age and divorce in Canada. This dissertation 
explores two instances where Canadian society has been forced to address the role of the 
Sharl'a in Canada and its interaction with Canadian laws and values. The first involves 
the debate that took place in Ontario over the last decade conceming the use of Islamic 
arbitration in family matters. This public debate ultimately led to the rejection of faith-
based arbitration in that province, a dec:sion apparently consistent with traditional 
Canadian attitudes towards multiculturalism. The second area of interaction between 
Canadian and Islamic law is within the Canadian court system itself. In particular, 
Canadian judges are occasionally required to grapple with Islamic family law issues 
when rendering judgments on certain cases that appear before them. This dissertation 
will examine a number of such cases in order to illustrate how the Sharl'a has been 
addressed by Canadian judges. The overall aim of this work is to situate Islamic law 
within Canada's liber al framework. It is argued that although Canadians are amenable 
to certain levels of diversity, values that fall outside mainstream liberalism are not 
granted recognition. This dissertation will also demonstrate that the failure to 
legitimize Islamic arbitration represents a lost opportunity that would have broadened· 
the scope of Canadian justice to inc1ude minority voices. The decision to reject faith-
based arbitration will motivate sorne Muslims to seek justice from ad-hoc bodies of 
authority. Devoid of government oversight, these forms of underground Islamic justice 
may negatively affect certain members ofCanada's Muslim community. 
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Résumé 
La loi islamique au Canada: du mariage et du divorce analyse la façon dont la société 
canadienne et le système juridique ont réagi face à l'application de la sharl'a au Canada, 
ce dans le but de résoudre certains litiges reliés aux mariages et aux divorces musulmans. 
Cette dissertation examine deux instances particulières où la société canadienne se vu 
forcée de se questionner sur le rôle de la shad'a au Canada, et ce, tant face aux lois 
canadiennes qu'avec les valeurs du pays. Le premier incident eu lieu en Ontario au cours 
des deniers années alors qu'il fut question d'utiliser l'arbitration islamique dans les litiges 
impliquant la famille. Un débat en découla, ultimement optant contre l'implication de la 
religion lors des cas d'arbitration dans cette province. Cette décision représentait en effet 
les attitudes canadiennes quelque peu conservatrices face à l'approche 
multiculturaliste.Le second cas où la sharl' a et le droit canadien ont interagit ensemble 
est au sein même du système judiciaire canadien. Les juges, tout particulièrement, 
doivent à certains moments considérer les principes islamiques du droit de la famille 
lorsqu'ils rendent un jugement au sein de membres de la communauté musulmane. Cette 
dissertation examinera donc certains cas particuliers où il fut clair que les juges 
Canadiens ont fait référence à la sharl' a dans leur jugement. Le but de ce travail est de 
situer la loi islamique dans le contexte d'un Canada libéral. Cette dissertation démontrera 
que, bien que les Canadiens soient ouverts aux changements et à la diversité, lorsque 
certaines valeurs sortent du contexte du libéralisme traditionnel, il y a une forte 
résistance. Du plus, la démonstration sera faite que le fait de ne pas avoir permis 
l'arbitration islamique au Canada ferme la porte à une plus grande ouverture du système 
juridique canadien tout en ne permettant pas aux minorités d'avoir une voix au sein de ce 
système. Cette décision, ultimement, pourrait encourager certains Musulmans à recourir à 
des instances qui seraient en marge de la légalité canadienne. Hors du control du 
gouvernement, ces instances pourraient en fait avoir un impact négatif sur la communauté 
musulmane canadienne. 
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Islamic Law in Canada: Marriage and Divorce 
Introduction 
ln light of Canada's need to augment its population through immigration, the 
demographic footprint of the nation is increasingly becoming more pluralistic. Within 
the population, many Canadians carry cultural and religious markers that are intrinsic to 
their pursuit of happiness. At times, these substantive characteristics are at odds with 
the majority's prevailing values and laws. Rules governing Islamic marri age (nikiilJ) and 
divorce (faliiq) represent a set of norms certain Muslim-Canadians wish to maintain in 
conjunction with mainstream Canadian values and attitudes. 
Canadian society appears to be uncomfortable with the prospect of recognizing 
principles of Islamic law (Sharl'a) that inc1ude rules associated with marri age and 
divorce. This attitude was c1early evident during the recent debates over the proposed 
use of Islamic family arbitration that transpired in Ontario between 1991 and 2005. 
Although various religious groups had been using private arbitration to settle family 
matters in that province, a public uproar emerged following a Muslim group's 
announcement c1aiming that they would begin operating Islamic alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) panels. The various fears that emerged (inspired to a large extent by 
Islamophobic rhetoric) led the Govemment of Ontario to outlaw aU forms of faith-based 
family arbitration. Despite Ontario's rejection of Islamic arbitration, matters dealing 
with the Sharl'a occasionaUy appear before Canadianjudges. Often, these cases require 
the courts to pass judgment on matters related to the Shan'a. By analyzing how 
Canadians have addressed Islamic law in two specifie instances, the Ontario debates 
over the use of Islamic arbitration and the appearance of Shan' a cases in the courts, this 
work will position Islamic law within the liberal and multicultural framework of 
Canadian society. Recognizing principles of Islamic law in Canadian courts represents 
an example of how the justice system can be broadened to accommodate minority 
voices. This will help draw individuals, who wish to settle their affairs via Islamic law, 
into mainstream legal institutions. However, the decision to ban Islamic family 
arbitration in Ontario represents a lost opportunity to integrate certain Muslims into the 
Canadian legal community. Moreover, the rejection may push sorne people into 
unofficial arbitration placing vulnerable members of society, particularly women, at risk 
due to the unregulated nature ofthese panels. 
North American policy specialists and researchers have long assumed that immigrant 
groups would integrate into the prevailing secular society and fully identify with 
mainstream nation-state liberalism. I However, it is becoming apparent that identity 
politics, which includes religious convictions, are playing important roles in diasporic 
communities throughout the world. The demand on the part of certain segments of the 
Muslim community to have Islamic law recognized by the govemment belies the notion 
that everyone will uniformly accept the nation-state's model of citizenship. Moreover, 
society appears unwilling to cede greater recognition to cultural and religious groups for 
fear that the state's social fabric will unraveL However, the failure to recognize the 
substantive needs ofvarious minority communities can lead to alienation. For instance, 
the riots by disaffected youth throughout France in 2005 demonstrate that alienation is 
not without its consequences. Although Canada's attitudes towards diversity are not as 
1 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, "Rethinking Assimilation TheOly for a New Era of Immigration," 
Intemational Migration Review. vol. 31 (1997): pp. 826-827. 
2 
rigid as the French project of assimilation, Canadian society cannot become complacent 
in its treatment of minority groups. In the past, an Anglo-Canadian cultural elite 
frequently portrayed diversity as a negative problem. Recently, Native and French 
Canadian communities have demanded greater recognition and autonomy. Their voices 
have effectively challenged the hegemony held by the English-Canadian political, 
military and economic elites. Today, members of immigrant groups and religious 
communities have joined this chorus bringing to light further challenges to the Canadian 
elite. 
In a 1993 case that appeared before Justice J. Wright of the Manitoba Provincial 
Court, a 14-year-old Canadian female and her father sought permission from the courts 
to allow the girl to marry a Jordanian man of27.2 Both the prospective bride and groom 
were Muslims and argued that their faith permitted such a union. However, under 
Canada's Marriage Act, individuals who are below the age of majority cannot be 
married unless they obtain court approval? In pleading the case, the applicants argued 
that Islamic law permits individuals who have reached the age of puberty to marry so 
long as there is parental consent, which in this particular case was provided by the girl's 
father. Under Islamic law, the capacity to marry is subject to a number of different 
interpretations. These differing interpretations are dependent on, but are not limited to, 
the location where the marri age is being convened, the sectarian affiliation of the 
individuals being married, and the particular legal school to which the couple belong.4 
Despite the arguments supporting the girl's desire to wed based on Islamic law, as weIl 
2 A. (E.) (Next Friend of) v. Manitoba (Direct or ofChild & Family Services): 1993 CarswellMan 290 
(M.Q.B.). 
3 Canadian Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, cM. 3, section 5 (2). 
4 David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998): pp. 141-143. 
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as the girl's father's wishes that she be married, the Manitoba judge refused the request. 
His reasons inc1uded the following: the need to uphold the provisions of the Canadian 
MaITiage Act; uncertainty regarding the girl's consent to marry; the possibility that the 
marriage was one of convenience to provide the groom with quicker access to Canadian 
citizenship; and an evaluation of whether or not the marriage would be in the best 
interests ofthe 14-year-old girl.5 
This case brings to light an important issue that Canadian society and the courts have 
been grappling with over the years: namely how to respect the cultural and religious 
identities of Canadians while ensuring that the 'law of the land' is respected. Justice 
Wright himself asserts that 'Canada is indeed a pluralistic society and the rights of aIl 
people are recognized and carefully protected.' He go es on to state that 'certain basic 
values and standards now exist that are the product of hundreds of years of 
development. Their aim is to protect aIl citizens and to provide the foundation upon 
which our successful Canadian democratic system is based. From time to time they may 
conflict with specific religious, moral or cultural practices and beliefs. Subject to 
reasonable compromise any such conflict must be resolved in favor of that general 
public interest:6 In his deliberations, the judge is attempting to balance Canada's 
respect for multiculturalism with the precepts of Canadian laws. By walking the fine 
line between recognizing principles of Islamic marriage and respecting existing 
legislation goveming marri age, Justice Wright is engaging an issue that is fast becoming 
a hot topic in Canada - that of group-differentiated rights. 
5 A. (E.) (Next Friend of) v. Manitoba, paragraph 8. 
6 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
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Group-Differentiated Rights 
Group-differentiated rights are privileges demanded by specifie communities that faH 
outside the familiar schedule of rights guaranteed to individuals in a country's 
constitution, bill of rights or national charter. These demands often emanate from 
immigrant groups and conservative religious communities who wish to maintain their 
distinctive ways of life and ensure that the majoritarian society recognize their 
differences. Examples include the demands concerning the right for Sikh men to forgo 
motorcycle and safety helmets in favor of turbans, Jewish men to wear skuHcaps in the 
work place, and Muslirn women to wear the headscarf (lJijiib) in secular public 
institutions. If granted, these privileges would open the door for rninorities living in 
multicultural societies to have equal access to employment and other opportunities that 
the majority enjoys without having to make significant sacrifices. However, many have 
raised the concern that permitting these and other group differentiated rights might 
create cultural ghettos that limit unit Y amongst aIl Canadians. But, if group-
differentiated rights were deemed inappropriate, the ability of certain groups to enjoy 
the same opportunities as members of the majority would be put into question. Thus, 
when aIl citizens are treated in a uniform or 'color-blind' manner by not taking into 
consideration the substantive differences among them, sorne individuals would be 
disadvantaged while others, the majority, would not face similar challenges. 
In France, for instance, Muslim women and girls who wear the lJijiib are barred from 
attending public educational institutions of their choice. Because the French seek to 
create a citizenry that is culturally based on secularism (laïcisation), wearing religious 
symbols in public institutions is regarded as outside the norrn. Sorne would argue that 
5 
equal opportunity is being hindered in France for those who wish to practice their faith 
in public while attending educational institutionS to which the members of the majority 
have little difficulty gaining admission. In Canada, there is no such legislation, in large 
part because the level of acceptance of multiculturalism is quite high.7 However, in the 
pursuit of justice, how far should a society go in recognizing group-specific rights? 
Should multiculturalism entail a form of tolerance that goes beyond laws that simply 
grant each citizen equal rights that are 'color-blind' to difference? Altematively, should 
legislation be expanded to allow minority groups the right to maintain their distinctive 
ways of life that do not conform to liberal values articulated in societies such as 
Canada?8 As this work progresses, 1 will point out the advantages and disadvantages of 
recognizing Islamic principles of marri age and divorce. Briefly, the main argument in 
support of the recognition of Islamic law in Canada and the formation of ADR panels is 
that they provide the Muslim community with important markers of cultural identity. 
The strongest argument made against group-differentiated rights is that they threaten 
7 A recent survey, released by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada (CRIC) in July of2004, 
found that Canadians are open to multiculturalism. According to the study, 96% of Canadians agreed 
with the statement "young Canadians today are fortunate to grow up surrounded by friends from all 
different races and religions." Furthermore, unlike France, which has banned religious clothing in school, 
Canadians are more open to the practice. The study found that 65% of Canadians rejected the idea of 
passing legislation banning things such as lJiJibs in the classroom. However optimistic these findings are, 
the study also found that there is a growing anti-Islamic sentiment in the country. The study found that 
45% of Canadians claimed that anti-Islamic sentiment is rising amongst people they know. Finally the 
study discovered that 30% ofCanadians would be less likely to vote for a party whose leader was a 
Muslim. See, Centre for Research and Information on Canada, "Canadians Reject Ban in Religious 
Symbols or Clothes in Schools" (2004): 
http://www.cric.ca/pdCre/new_canadaJeduxlnew_canada _redux _summary.pdf. 
8 Naomi Klein has maintained that the kind ofmulticulturalism practiced in Britain, France and Canada 
'has little to do with genuine equality. It is instead a Faustian bargain, struck between vote-seeking 
polit ici ans and self-appointed community leaders, one that keeps ethnie minorities tucked away in state-
funded peripheral ghettoes while the centres of public life remain largely unaffected by seismic shifts in 
the national ethnie makeup. Nothing exposes the shallowness of this alleged tolerance more than the 
speed with which Muslims deemed insufficiently "British" are being told to "get out" (to quote the 
Conservative MP Gerald Howarth).' See Naomi Klein, "Racism is the Terrorists' Greatest Recruitment 
6 
the cohesion of Canadian society by compartmentalizing certain segments of society 
into ghettos and thereby unravel the 'civic solidarity' needed to maintain a common 
culture that is based on liberal principles.9 
Summary of Goals 
The first and second chapt ers of this work offer a brief overview of Islamic law and 
highlight the way in which the Shan'a developed and functioned. Special attention will 
be given to marriage and divorce. Although the discussion will be general and touch on 
various regions of the Muslim world, the two chapters will periodically focus greater 
attention on legal practices in Egypt. This country offers an excellent point from which 
to view Islamic law in part because of the availability of source material as well as the 
various changes that have affected Egyptian legislation over the years. By contrasting 
sorne pre-modem Egyptian legal practices with modem laws, we can better assess how 
the law actuallY interacts with society. The central aim of the first two chapters is to 
dislodge sorne of the popular notions regarding Islamic law held by Western audiences. 
During the debates over the use of Islamic arbitration, the Shaii'a was regularly 
portrayed as a form of law incapable of change owing to its Divine origins. These 
reductive assumptions were not challenged in any meaningful way, thereby resulting in 
a very skewed image of what Islamic law was and what it currently represents. The first 
chapter will demonstrate that Islamic law is not only flexible, but also derived from 
human minds who frequently made changes in the way the law was expressed. This 
chapter will specifically analyze women's access to divorce and demonstrate that 
Tool," Guardian Unlimited, Saturday August (2005): 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/Columnists/Column/O,5673, 1548480,OO.html. 
9 Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," Dissent, Winter (1994): p. 77. 
7 
contrary to popular opinion, women had various me ans of initiating divorces in the pre-
modern Islamic world. Furthermorè, in challenging the notion that Islamic law is a 
chaotic and arbitrary legal system, the first chapter will demonstrate that the Shaii'a 
was applied in a systematic manner by highly trained individuals. 
The second chapter of this work will briefly survey sorne of the CUITent marriage and 
divorce legislation in use today in countries that apply Islamic family law. In doing so, it 
will point out that many laws governing marri age and divorce no longer follow the 
traditional methods of Shaii'a justice. Rather, the tradition al methodology has been 
shattered and in its place has emerged various codified systems of law controlled by 
national governments. This has created a hybridized system of law whereby European 
legal principles frequently intermix with Islamic norms. These new codes of law have 
greatly affected issues dealing with marriage and divorce. In particular, this chapter will 
discuss how women's access to divorce in Egypt was reduced following the modern 
reforms. Those seeking to implement a system of Islamic family arbitration in Ontario, 
specifically the Institute of Islamic Civil Justice (IlCJ), did not acknowledge the 
changes that have altered the practice of Islamic law throughout the world. Nor did the 
IlCJ address the dynamism and flexibility inherent in pre-modern forms of Islamic 
jurisprudence. These two shortcomings raised serious questions as to the ability of the 
IlCJ to offer Islamic arbitration. 
The demands for recognition of the Shaii'a in Canada have been met with 
opposition from various individuals and groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim. lO What 
10 One of the most vocal opponents of the implementation ofIslamic arbitration in Canada cornes from 
Margaret Wente, a former business columnist who writes opinion pieces for the Globe andMaiJ. 
According to her, permitting the use ofIslamic law in Canada would violate the rights ofwomen. In one 
ofher editorials she maintains that '[i]mmigrant women are among the most vulnerable people in Canada. 
8 
is interesting is that these voices of caution come from within a liberal society that 
places a premium on individual choice and personal freedom. The philosophie al 
principle of liberalism will be dealt with in more detail in the third chapter; for now it 
will suffice to say that the goals of liberalism are centered on personal freedoms as a 
measure of both societal and individual happiness. In this regard, liberals have great 
difficulty accepting conservative societies and cultures that place more emphasis on 
social conformity than on individual rights and freedoms. According to Bhihku Parekh, 
'the modern state is suspicious of, and feels threatened by, well organized ethnie, 
religious and other communities lest they should mediate the relations between it and 
the citizen and set up rival foci ofloyalty.' Il Sorne liberals have even expressed a desire 
to alter the ways in which conservative societies function in the West in order to re-
align these traditions within a liberal framework. 12 So, although liberal philosophy 
encompasses a certain level of freedom of choice, the philosophy also has a paradoxical 
undercurrent that seeks to assimilate non-liberal societies within its fold. By analyzing 
the views of a number of prominent liberal thinkers, the third chapter will highlight the 
philosophie al context within which to view the level of acceptance Canadian society is 
willing to offer Islamic law. 
Many don't speak English, are poorly educated, and are isolated from the broader culture. They may live 
here for decades without learning the language, and stay utterly dependent on their families. They have no 
ide a oftheirrights under Canadian law.' See Margaret Wente, "Life under Sharia, in Canada?" Globe and 
Mail. May 29th (2004): p. AlI. 
Il Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturaiism: Cultural Diversity and Political TheOly(Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000): p. 182. 
12 Raz explains that a 'positive attitude to multiculturalism can be thought to lend support to the 
conservative strands in various communities. But to my mind this is a mistake. Cultures are bound to 
undergo changes within a multicultural society. The fact that members of cultural groups intermix to a 
considerable degree is bound to have its impact on the different groups in the society. The preservation of 
their culture is justified only in terms of its contribution to well-being. This requires an adjustment of 
each of the groups to the conditions of a relatively harmonious coexistence within one political society.' 
Italics added for emphasis. See Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 77. 
9 
The fourth chapter of this work will discuss the principle of multiculturalism as it 
exists in Canada. An understanding of Canadian multiculturalism will help us assess 
whether the demands for the recognition of Islamic law fit the country's expectations. 
It will become apparent that Canada, from the mid-1700's onwards, has projected itself 
as a predominantly English society despite the existence of other groups that include the 
First Nations communities, French-Canadians and various European, African and Asian 
immigrants. Historically, an assimilationist approach, predicated on liberal assumptions 
has prevailed in the country as non-English groups were expected to integrate into 
Anglo-Canadian modes of life. It is fair to say that English-Canada has exercised 
hegemonic powers over minority groups via its control of economic, political and 
military power. Recently, various scholars have questioned the monopoly held by 
English Canada.13 Despite the recent appearance of deconstructionalist Canadian 
scholarship, historical precedent and current attitudes towards multiculturalism in non-
academic circles allow Httle room for the acceptance of Islamic law in Canada. By 
100 king at the goals of official multiculturalism, as articulated by the federal 
government under Trudeau and enacted into law under the Mulroney government, it will 
become apparent that recognizing Islamic law in Canada goes beyond the realm of what 
the actual policy stands for in this country. 
The fifth chapter will highlight sorne of the more recent theories surrounding 
multiculturalism that have opened the door to sorne recognition of cultural and religious 
needs. By discussing the ideas conceming the future of multiculturalism of two 
prominent Canadian thinkers, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, it will become evident 
13 Richard J.F. Day, Multiculturalism and the History ofCanadian Diversity(Toronto: University of 
10 
that the recognition of substantive needs amongst Canada's minority communities can 
be accommodated, to sorne extent, within the public sphere. For instance, although 
Canadian law is secular in orientation, religious matters are often decided in courts. 
This has created, according to one legal expert discussed in the fifth chapter, a de-facto 
system of legal pluralism. Broadening Canadian multiculturalism to include substantive 
needs ofminority groups will help integrate segments of the Muslim population into the 
mainstream in a more cooperative manner and he1p alleviate problems associated with 
ali enati on. Towards this end, this chapter will highlight sorne of the theories put 
forward by Jürgen Habermas who has advocated the need for the increased participation 
of minority groups in legal affairs. 
Although sorne theorists have pointed out the advantages of allowing religious 
groups the ability to apply their normative systems within their communities, public 
opinion in Canada appears to be against granting such privileges. The sixth chapter will 
discuss five issues re1ated to the recent debate in Ontario over the use of Islamic 
arbitration. First, a brief description of ADR will be provided. Second, the chapter will 
review the Boyd Report, a study commissioned by the Government of Ontario which 
sought to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of Islamic arbitration. Although the 
report favored the broadening of the justice system to include Islamic ADR panels, the 
public remained wary of the proposaI. Third, the chapter will demonstrate that the 
advocates of Islamic ADR, specifically the nCJ, did not have the adequate training 
required to deliver the kinds of services they advertised. Fourth, this chapter will 
demonstrate that groups and individuals who lobbied against the use of Islamic faith-
Toronto Press, 2000). 
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based arbitration also displayed an ignorance of the Shaii'a. This lack of understanding 
frequently employed a discourse that was laden with Isalmophobic rhetoric. These 
attitudes ultimately curried favor with the Government of Ontario that cancelled the 
enforceability aIl forms of faith-based family arbitration inc1uding Islamic forms. 
FinaIly, the chapter will conclude that although the government will no longer recognize 
faith-based family arbitration, the practice will continue and may negatively harm those 
who participate in 'underground' forms of justice. 
The seventh chapter of this work will point out three reasons why Islamic marriage 
and divorce law will have great difficulty gaining acceptance in the Canadian judicial 
system as weIl as within society in general. They inc1ude: 1) the legal violations in 
matters related to equality that occur when applying certain principles of the Shaii'a in 
Canada; 2) the procedural differences in approaches to marriage and divorce; and 3) the 
desire by the majoritarian community to maintain social cohesion through a unified code 
oflaw that is predicated on Western liberal values. 
FinaIly, the eighth chapter of this work will analyze actual cases of marriage and 
divorce that have appeared before Canadian courts and describe the manner in which 
these conflicts have been resolved by local judges. The cases that will be discussed 
center on the validity of marri ages and divorces, telephone marri ages and divorces, 
polygamy, and unpaid dowers. By describing the decisions rendered in these cases, this 
dissertation will demonstrate that Canadian courts allow for the recognition of certain 
Islamic values pertaining to marriage and divorce that do not violate Canadian law 
while closing the door on those practices that fall outside the purview of Canadian 
legislation. 
12 
Postnational Challenge 
With the rise in the demand for group-differentiated rights, a number of social 
commentators have begun to eulogize the modern nation-state that has evolved in the 
West following the triumphs of the Enlightenment. One manner used to describe the 
nation-state is the idea of a territory that possesses a common 'societal culture' which 
helps shape the society in which citizens actively participate. 14 Sorne fear that this 
societal culture is at risk if conservative Muslims living in Canada obtain group-
differentiated rights. Habermas, has identified a number of factors that have led to the 
challenges facing modern nation-states today.15 First, various forces of globalization, 
namely easy access to mass migration, have demographically transformed relatively 
homogenous societies into multi-ethnic societies. Second, according to Habermas, with 
easy access to mass communication, cultural communities in countries such as Canada 
are able to keep abreast of the goings on in their ancestral homelands. Canadian 
Muslims, for instance, have a vast array of sources such as the internet that keep them 
up-to-date with the Muslim world. The Islamic diaspora in Canada is able to maintain 
ties not only to various regions of the Muslim world but also to a religious tradition that 
is distinct from the Judeo-Christian worldview familiar to North American society. 
Communal feelings, primarily associated with identitying oneself with the world-wide 
Muslim community (umma), act as a unitying force for Muslims around the world. 
Thus, migration and telecommunication have placed sorne strains on the nation-state's 
14 Will K ymlicka, Finding Our Way- Rethinldng Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1998): p. 29. . 
15 Jürgen Habennas, "The European Nation-State-Its Achievements and its Limits: On the Past and 
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship." in Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., Mapping the Nations (London: Verso, 
1996): pp. 281-294. 
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role as the primary focal point of social organization and cultural identification. 
Whereas in the past access to one's culture was limited by time and space, today's 
advances in communication have allowed individuals to maintain a virtual association 
with their homelands. Thirdly, following Habermas' logic, pluralization in Western 
societies has witnessed groups, such as certain segments of the Muslim community in 
Canada, requesting rights and privileges that do not correspond to the traditional norms 
of these liberal societies. Sorne authors have labeled the demand for group-
differentiated rights as the 'postnational challenge.' 16 The main concern with this line of 
thinking is that the religious daims made by sorne Muslims appear to be eroding the 
importance of the nation-state and the societal culture within the state. 17 
Along with the alleged demi se in nation-state identification amongst immigrant 
populations exist the threat that liberal values such as freedom of choice, freedom of 
conscience, equality of the sexes and a separation of church and state will also erode. 
These concepts can be viewed as the cornerstones of a liberal society along with the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, religious toleration and natural justice.18 
During the course of the 20th century, and especially following the Second World War, 
Western societies witnessed the triumph ofindividual freedoms as liberal values became 
enshrined in documents such as the United Nations' UniversaJ Declaration of Human 
RightS.19 
16 Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, "Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, 
Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and 
Germany," American Journal ofSocioJogy. voU05 (1999): pp. 652-696. 
17 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Towards a Postnational Model ofMembership," in Gershon Shafir, ed., The 
Citizenship Debates: A Reader(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998): p. 210-211. 
18 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity. Law and Human Rights (London: Oxford University Press, 1998): p. 23. 
19 Universal Declaration ofHumanRights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN 
Doc, A/8IO (1948). 
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Sorne observers see Islam as a religion at odds with Western notions of liberalism 
and personal freedom. 20 This is partly the result of the fact that individual freedom 
within Islamic society holds a very different meaning than it does in the West. During 
the classical and medieval periods of Islamic history (roughly 630-1700), freedom 
(lJuniyya)was a term used to describe an individual's status as a free person as opposed 
to that of a slave ('abd). Personal freedom, in the modem Western-liberal sense, was 
not a philosophical concern for Muslim subjects during this period; rather freedom for 
Islamic societies translated to the freedom to worship God and be ruled under Islamic 
law.21 Those who oppose the recognition of Islamic law in Canada fear that if group-
differentiated rights are recognized, the non-liberal traditions often associated with the 
Muslim world would gain tacit approval in Canada. 
From time to time, the incongruence between the Western notion of equality 
between the sexes and Islamic gender relations plays itself out in the international 
forum. When the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of AlI Fonns of 
Discrimination Against Women was issued in 1981, a number of Muslim countries that 
signed the document did so only after voicing reservations concerning Article 16.22 This 
article sought to eliminate matrimonial discrimination between the sexes. Egypt 
maintained that "[t]he shari'ah [sic] ..... restricts a wife's right to divorce by making it 
contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of 
20 For a review of Western literary views on Islamic civilization see Edward Said, OrientaIism (New York: 
Vintage 1994). 
21 "lfurriyya, "in EncycJopedia of/sIam, vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2003): p. 589b. 
22 Convention on the Elimination of Ail Fonns of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN 
GAOR, 34th Sess. Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN. Doc. A/34/46 (1981). 
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the husband."23 The Egyptian de1egation went on to say that certain provisions 
regarding equality in marri age 'eonfliet with shari'ah [sic] law based on the Holy Qur'an 
[sic] and Sunna. ,24 This sort of confliet is precise1y what worries Western liberals who 
wish to uphold the principles oftoleration, but have difficulty upholding certain unequal 
practices that are incorporated in the Shaii'a. However as will be pointed out in the 
second chapter, the modern gender role stratification that exists in countries sueh as 
Egypt is more a reflection of modern reforms rather than a refleetion of traditional 
Islamic legal methodology. 
Another area of coneern for liberals seeking to preserve the Western nation-state is 
the maintenance of the separation between ehurch and state. Despite historical fusions 
of the roles of ehurch and state - in the province of Quebec the role the Catholic Church 
played in running social services in the early twentieth Century cornes to mind here -
present day delivery of education, we1fare and health are now (theoretieally at least) 
divorced from religion. For the most part, religion has been relegated to the private 
sphere and one's public persona is mostly experienced in a religious vacuum. Although 
the majority religion in Canada is Christianity, the government attempts to foster an 
ecumenical approach to religion by not endorsing any particular faith. The split between 
private and public life is a major feature of modern liberal democracies where it fosters a 
degree of anonymity. Thus, modern society is marked by a certain freedom from the 
prying eyes of neighbors and the communal standards that in the past would have 
influenced behavior. In contrast, under Islamie values, the required duties to God and 
23 Poulter, Ethnicity> Law and Human Rights, p. 220. 
24 Ibid. 
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community are such that many practicing Muslims would find it hypocritical to 
maintain a strict separation between their religion 'and the public life they pursue.25 
Thus when Muslims in Canada enter into a marriage they often do so under the auspices 
of local prayer leaders (imams) who provide a religious foundation to the individual's 
public pronouncement of marri age. In matters relating to divorce, certain Muslims may 
wish to pursue Islamic formulas for the dissolution of their marriages. However, in the 
Canadian context, offering Muslims access to religiously prescribed divorce is seen as 
problematic because it provides a religious solution to a civil affair and therefore blurs 
the separation between church and state. 
However troubled Western liberals are when it cornes to various provisions within 
Islamic law, the Shan'a remains a crucial conveyor of cultural identity for the world-
wide Muslim community. The word 'shan'a' itself means pathway and the projected 
destination on the road oflife is Paradise. For millions ofMuslims around the world, the 
pursuit ofhappiness therefore revolves around the Shaii'a. Abandoning this allegiance is 
akin to abandoning the promise of Heaven for certain devout Muslims. Despite the 
importance of the Shan'a in the eyes ofmany Muslims, it is incorrect to simply assume 
that religion alone acts as the central catalyst for individual human behavior. 
Subscribing to such a deterministic view of religion serves to discount local customs as 
well as social, political and economic conditions that heavily influence the behavior of 
25 A good ex ample ofthis principle in action is the notion ofusury. In Medieval Europe usury was 
regarded as sin and avoided by practicing Catholics. Today's financial systems that operate in the West 
apply interest with little regard for religious sanction that exist within Christianity. The same admonition 
against taking interest is also found in Islam. Modem Muslim banking functions in such a way as to 
respect the religious sanctions against usury. In Canada, sorne Muslims have established cooperatives 
that offer mortgages that closely follow thé traditional Islamic approach to finance. See Islamic Co-
Operative Housing Corporation Ltd., "An Interest-Free Housing Scheme and a Good Investment 
Opportunity for Muslims," May (2006): http://www.isnacanada.comlichc.htm. 
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individuals around the world. Romi Bhabha has correctly pointed out that 'cultural 
engagement, whether antagonistic or affiliative, are produced performatively. The 
representation of difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of pre-given ethnie 
or cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition. ,26 Thus, when members of 
minority groups in the West articulate their personalities, their actions should be seen in 
a manner that seek 'to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of 
historical transformation.'27 This characterization is appropriate in describing how 
Muslims living in Canada use various points of reference in piecing together their 
identities. 
For sorne Muslims living in the West, the pressures associated with secular society 
enhance the Shaii'a's appeal. Thus, sorne Muslims view pre-marital sex, low-rise jeans, 
faltering family relations and the absurdity of reality TV as Western phenomena that 
threaten their well-being as devout Muslims. Maintaining an ethieal world-view that is 
associated with the Shaii'a is one way in which to preserve the conservative values 
espoused by sorne Muslims. Moreover, the racist and discriminatory attacks sorne 
Muslims encounter may direct them to seek a more religiously organized world-view as 
a me ans of alleviating the alienation they may feel. The importance of the Shaii'a is 
further accentuated by the fact that in modern Muslim societies themselves, Western-
styled laws in matters of cri minai and commercial law have replaced traditional Islamic 
practices?8 Thus, in a world of rapidly changing rules that frequently reflect pervasive 
26 Romi Bhabha, The Location of Culture ~ew York: Routledge, 1994): p. 3. 
27 Ibid. 
2& J.N.L. Anderson, Law Remnn in the Muslim World(London: Athlone Press, 1976). 
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Western values, maintaining sorne elements of the Shaii'a is perceived as essential to 
cultural survival. 
Issues such as these are frequently raised during discussions that revolve around the 
recognition of group-differentiated rights. Although there are a host of different topics 
that come under the banner of Islamic group-differentiated rights in Canada, the present 
work willlimit itselfto matters pertaining to Islamic marri age and divorce. In 
addressing this subject, 1 will not question whether non-liberal traditions such as Islamic 
rules governing marriage and divorce should be outlawed in Canada. Because Canadian 
liberalism affords individuals the right to make their own choices, the state cannot 
easily censure someone's desire to define their interpersonal relationships as they wish. 
With regards to marriage at least, a couple can enter into a contractual agreement prior 
to or after their exchange of vows that endorse certain Islamic values. So long as these 
anti- and pre-nuptial contracts do not contravene Canadian law, there is very little to 
stop a couple from entering into such an agreement. Canadian liberalism has evolved to 
a point where people engaged in illiberal practices are granted a certain measure of 
freedom to do as they see fit so long as they do not infringe on the rights of others. This 
justification for allowing illiberal religious practices is ironically rooted in a humanistic 
concern that gives ascendancy to personal freedoms, rather than in a theological concem 
for what God desires.29 
29 Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 74. 
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The controversy arises when the demands for substantive norms are made by 
organizations representing different communities, since their desire to preserve a way of 
life for the community may infringe on the individual rights of others. Liberal values 
place rights in the hands of the individual, not with the group. Capturing the liberal 
point of view on this issue, Steven Rockerfeller explains that '[o]ur univers al identity as 
human beings is our primary identity and is more fundamental than any particular 
identity, whether it be a matter of citizenship, gender, race, or ethnie origin.' 
Rockerfeller goes on to say that elevating 'ethnie identity, which is secondary, to a 
position equal in significance to or above, a person's univers al identity is to weaken the 
foundations of liberalism and to open the door to intolerance. ,30 The force of this daim 
underlies a particular weakness in the liberal doctrine; namely, its attempt to appear 
neutral when, in fact, it is not. Rockerfeller's endorsement of a 'universal identity' is 
itself a product of a particular identity - that of the liberal world-view that seeks to 
impose its values on societies throughout the world. On the international scene, these 
efforts have been the focus of European colonialists who in the past sought to instill 
their values on non-Western societies. Today, new proponents of neo-imperialism, 
induding Canadian's political, military, and economic elite, are carrying on this 
tradition abroad. However, the attempt to impose liberal values is not limited to foreign 
affairs alone. Due to the high levels of immigration from non-European lands, a 
hegemonic drive is currently afoot in Canada in an effort to homogenize the country's 
population. Throughout the course of this work, 1 will demonstrate how this attempt to 
neutralize diversity in favor of an Anglo-Canadian identity has transpired in Canada in 
30 Steven Rockerfeller, "Comment," in Amy Gutmann, ed., MulticulturaIism (Princeton: Princeton 
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relation to the use of Islamic legal principles. For now, it is safe to say that many 
liberal-minded individuals have grave reservations about the prospects of using Islamic 
law as a tool in conflict resolution for Muslims living in Canada. 
University Press, 1994): p. 88. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
Understanding Islamic Law 
Recent Western media representations of the Muslim world have often focused on 
violent forms of punishment perpetrated against individuals under the banner of Islamic 
justice. These mainstream reports are often products of joumalists who have limited 
legal training as well as a cursory understanding of the Muslim world. 1 The cruel forms 
of punishment associated with Islami~ law have certainly contributed towards fostering 
negative attitudes against its appearance in Canadian arbitration. In proceeding with 
this study, an understanding ofwhat Islamic law represents is in order to separate fact 
from fiction. 
In the following pages, a brief survey of how Islamic law deve10ped and functioned 
in pre-modem societies will be offered. Special attention will be given to matters 
relating to marriage and divorce. During the recent debates surrounding the use of 
Islamic arbitration in Ontario, opponents dismissed the Sharl'a as an inflexible God-
given legal system. Meanwhile, other critics portrayed the Sharl'a as a chaotic code of 
law lacking in both structure and organization. This chapter will dispel these myths by 
demonstrating that the Sharl'a has constantly changed over time. Moreover it will point 
out that the Sharl'a, as practiced in certain medieval societies, was a highly organized 
legal system which employed specialized functionaries who interpreted law to meet the 
needs of their societies. Another misconception articulated by the opponents of Islamic 
faith-based arbitration maintained that societies governed by the Sharl'a are marked by 
1 Margaret Wente states that 'Sharia Iaw is based on the Koran, which, according to MusIim beIief, 
provides the divine ruIes for behavior.' This description is not a correct assessment of the Sharl'a; rather as 
22 
an overwhelming male-dominated conservatism which all but limits a woman's power in 
matters related to marriage and divorce. Although this notion may be supported in 
certain juridical literature, social practice found throughout the Muslim world suggests 
otherwise. As will be demonstrated below, gender in the Muslim world is far more 
complex than has been reported by Western Orientalist and popular literature. 
Origins oflslamic Law: the Qur'an and the Prophet 
The term 'Islamic law,' used so frequently in both academic and non-academic 
lit erat ure, is a phrase fabricated by the Orientalist tradition. Nowhere in the Arabic 
language do we find such a term in usage until the 19th cent ury. 2 Furthermore, the 
accuracy of Orientalist and Euro-centric scholarship has traditionally been lacking when 
pressed to provide an adequate description of Islamic law. This school of thought has 
long viewed Islamic legal institutions as whimsical and arbitrary. The general ignorance 
can be seen in the oft-quoted description of Islamic law offered by the British Lord 
Justice Goddard in 1940. When faced with a piece of imprudent legislation in his 
chambers, the British judge commented that the court was 'very much in the position of 
a qiiç/i under a palm tree. There are no principles on which he is directed to act. He has 
to do the best he can in the circumstances, having no rules of law to guide him.,3 
Unfortunately, this simplistic view is the one which members of the media are most 
likely to parrot in their coverage of Islamic law - resulting in a rather skewed 
this chapter will demonstrate, other components also influence Islamic law. Wente, "Life under Sharia," p. 
A2I. 
2 Haifaa Khalafallah, "The Elusive 'Islamic Law': Rethinking the Focus of Modern Scholarship," Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 12 (2001): p. 144. 
3 Lord Justice Goddard in Metropolitan Properfies Co. Ltd v. Prudy, 1940. Quoted by Noel Coulson in 
Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969): p. 40. 
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understanding of the Muslirn world.4 For the most part, this same view typified the 
level of discourse in Ontario during the debates over the use ofIslarnic arbitration. 
The legal tradition historically found in the Muslim world was quite different from 
the one put forward by Lord Goddard. At its core, the Shaii'a encornpasses legal, moral' 
and behavioral norms which ultimately help guide Muslims in both religious and non-
religious pursuits. Issues as mundane as hygiene and as important as the political 
legitimacy to rule over Muslim societies are both components of the Shan'a. Activities 
which individuals and society participate in are classified as falling within the following 
range of characterizations: obligatory (wiijib), recommended (mandiib) , permissible 
(mlibiiiJ), prohibited (IJariïm), and repugnant(maknlh). For instance, it is obligatory for 
Muslims to pray five tirnes a day, recommended that Islamic leaders maintain roads 
properly, permissible for Muslim men to marry Christian or Jewish women, prohibited 
for Muslim women to rnarry Christian or Jewish Men, and repugnant (albeit permissible) 
for men to divorce wornen via triple repudiation. Ultimately, the Shaii'a points the way 
in which individuals living in the Muslim world should interact with society 
(mll'amaliit) as weIl as stipulating duties individuals owe God ( 'ibiidiit)5. 
4 Ray Conlogue argues in the Literary Review of Canada that Canadian newspapers have followed the 
lead of American media outlets in their portrayal of the Muslim world as a threat to Western society. The 
National Post and other Can-West newspapers such as the Montreal Gazette have frequently published 
opinion pieces by Daniel Pipes who is a firm believer that 'Muslims intend to start a revolution in the 
US.' At a time when the population needs a c1ear and serious understanding of the Muslim world, 
Conlogue argues that the print media have focused their efforts on titillating and frightening their 
audience in order to maxirnize their profits. See Ray Conlogue, "Sku1king to the Right," Literary Review 
ofCanad14 May (2006): p. 19. 
5 Rules governing interpersonal re1ationships are referred to as mu'iimliit and inc1ude social relations such 
as marriage and divorce. Meanwhile, the duties one owes to God are referred to within the corpus of 
Islamic law as 'ibiidiit and inc1ude such things as dec1aring a singular devotion to God (shahiida), prayer 
(~aliit), aIms giving (zakif), pilgrimage (J;.aJJ), and fasting (~awm). 
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The historie origins of the Sharl'a ean be traeed baek to the life of the Prophet 
Mu4ammad and the revelations he reeeived that make up the text of the Qur'an. Most 
people would agree that at its core, the text is a manifesto for change and reform.6 The 
Qur'lin represents a break from the social dynamics of Arabia that positioned individuals 
within a relatively fixed social hierarchy based on family and clan affiliations. 
Throughout the text of the Qur'an, people are urged to establish a more egalitarian 
. . 
social structure whereby individuals would have status based on their membership 
within the Muslim community as opposed to family and tribal connections.7 
Furthermore, the normative system made evident in the Qur'an advocated a puritan shift 
away from the cultural practices of the pre-Islamic Arabs which, aceording to the poetry 
of the time, entailed an appetite for gambling, drinking and sexual gratification.8 
The excesses in behavior of the pre-Islamic Arabs should not leave the reader with 
the mistaken view that the population of Arabia was 'primitive' in its outlook and 
isolated from the goings on in the Near-East. Quite to the eontrary, pre-Islamic Arabia 
should be seen as part of the general culture of the region owing, in part, to the trade 
routes that linked the Arabian Peninsula to Syria, Egypt and Mesopotamia. Thus the 
legal traditions of Arabia prior to the arrivaI of the Qur'an were, in sorne ways, similar 
6 When reading the Qur'an it is important to note that the document was revealed at a specific time and 
place. As such, the improvements and reforms in matters ofpersonal status spelled out in the document 
need to seen in light of the existing realities of Arabia during the i h century. Although by modem 
standards the normative reforms appear bare, they were quite revolutionary for the time, a fact bom out 
by the immense opposition Mu4ammad and his followers faced when attempting to implement the 
Qur'an's programs. 
7 Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution oflslamic Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 
f· 22. 
Kamal Abu-Deep, "Towards a Structural Analysis ofPre-lslamic Poetry," IntemationaJ JoumaJ of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 6 (1975): pp. 148-184. 
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to those found in other parts of the Near-East. Exacting blood money, for instance, was 
a legal procedure employed by both the tribal and sedentary Arabs during the pre-
Islamic period.9 When MlÙ}.ammad began preaching his message in Mecca, his goals, as 
inferred from his biography, appeared to be centered on improving the morality of the 
community in which he lived. He also sought to influence the Jews and Christi ans who 
inhabited various urban cent ers of Arabia and impress upon them his connection to the 
Abrahamic tradition. 
MlÙ}.ammad's prophetic mission was not initially successful. The polytheistic Arabs 
of Mecca rejected his monotheistic message considering it to be a threat to their 
commercial, religious and social standard of living. In maintaining their control over 
Mecca, the leading clans of that city intimidated the fledgling Muslim community 
through violence. Seeking to shield his followers from danger, MlÙ}.ammad moved the 
Muslim community to the nearby city of Medina. That city had a Jewish and Christian 
population which refused to acknowledge MlÙ}.ammad's prophetic mission - though he 
was acknowledged as a powerful political figure. This dismissal started a process 
whereby MlÙ}.ammad began to distance the Muslim community from the other 
monotheistic faiths of Arabia. MlÙ}.ammad's primary mode of bringing about this split 
was to adopt a separate legal structure. Scholars point to the fifth Siffa (chapter) of the 
Qur'an, revealed to the Prophet during his time in Medina, as a clear sign of this legal 
paradigm shift. lO 
(~ 9 Hallaq, Origins, p. 18. 
10 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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What was revolutionary about the norms being proposed by M$ammad was the 
new legal status granted to individuals. Prior to the Qur'an's arrivaI, women, children 
and other 'peripheral' members of society were placed at a lower hierarchical stratum 
than people who belonged to the strongest tribe and curried favor with the nomadic and 
urban elite. The Qur'an effectively challenged these predetermined roles by offering 
individuals equality within the Islamic community or umma. 11 Most noticeable 
amongst the new principles were regulations offering women personai and financial 
status unheard of at the time. Women were allotted property rights granting them 
control over their assets - this included the practice of granting women a portion of their 
family's inheritanceover which they had exclusive control. 
Along with these improvements were numerous references in the Qur'an to marriage 
and divorce. These legal directives must be read in juxtaposition to the pre-Islamic 
practices found in Arabia. During MlÙ).ammad's life, the tribal dynamics that govemed 
marriage and divorce provided little legal status to women who were regarded as the 
possessions of the male members ofthe community. In this respect it was common for a 
girl or woman's guardian (wall) to force her into marriage without obtaining her 
consent. 12 
Although the Qur'an did not do away with the overt patriarchy that existed in pre-
Islamic Arabia, improvements were introduced conceming the status of women within 
Il The kind of equality granted to individuals in the Qur'iin is not one based on functionalist goals. Rather 
the equality promised is spiritual in orientation. Thus while men and women are encouraged to perform 
separate tasks, their spiritual reward, ifthose respective tasks are fulfilled, will be equal. See Qur'iin 
33:35. 
12 There are exceptions to this rule, the most noteworthy being the Prophet MlÙ}.arnmad's first wife 
(~ Khadija, a wealthy widow who, because ofher elevated position within society, chose to marry 
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the marital union. For instance, the Qur'an introduced new rules specifying who could 
marry whom, .a provision which would protect women who were sometimes forced into 
marrying family members in order to maintain wealth within the tribe or clan. In Siira 
4:26 of the Qur'an one reads the following: -
Prohibited to you (For marri age) are: your mothers, daughters, sisters; 
father's sisters, mother's sisters; brother's daughters, sister's daughters; 
foster-mothers (who gave you suck), foster-sisters; your wives' mothers; 
your step-daughters under your gu~dianship, bom of your wives to 
whom ye have gone in, - no prohibition if ye have not gone in; - (those 
who have been) wives of your sons proceeding from your loins; and two 
sisters in wedlock at one and the same time, except for what is past; for 
Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. 
The Qur'an is replete with passages ushering in new ethics for society. Sorne of the 
guidelines are quite precise such as the one mentioned above, while others are less clear. 
For example, the rules goveming the number of wives a man can take are discussed in 
the following passage: 
If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry 
women of your choice, Two or three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall 
not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that 
your right hands possess, that will be more suit able, to prevent you from 
doing injustice.13 
Unlike the previous verse conceming whom a man may marry, this Siira leaves the 
appropriateness of a polygamous marriage to the discretion of the husband, depending 
on his particular circumstances. Although taking on more than one wife is legally 
permissible according to the Qur'an, the concem for treating each wife equally places 
M lÙ}.ammad without a guardian. See F .E. Peters, Muhammad and the Origins of Islam (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1994): pp. 136-138. 
13 Qur'an, 4:3. 
28 
moral injunctions on the practice by limiting polygamy to those men who are able -
financially, physically or emotionally - to provide such equality.14 
Another marital prescription made in the Qur'an, expressed in language that is quite 
c1ear, is the principle concerning the reform of the bridaI price known as the mahr or 
~adiq. In Szïra 4:4 one finds the following passage: 'And give the women (on marri age ) 
their dower as a free gift'. Whereas in the past the mahrwas deposited with the bride's 
family, the Qur'an introduced the notion of providing the fund directly to the wife. 
Moreover, the emerging normative order made it very c1ear that a wife had financial 
independence. The mahr and other assets obtained by the wife during her marriage were 
hers to use as she saw fit - the husband had no rights to the wife's propertyY The 
purpose of the mahr was to compensate a wife for her sexual accessibility to her 
husband. Furthermore, the contractual nature of the marriage agreement stipulated that 
in return for a wife's availability, the husband was required to provide her with support 
in the form of a shelter, food and c1othing. Although these principles may appear stark 
for a twenty-first century audience, these rights were quite revolutionary for the seventh 
century and offered women legal rights previously unavailable. 
14 Polygamy seems to be a pre-Islamic practice that was carried over into Muslim society. Another pre-
Islamic practice concerning marriage and divorce that appears in the Muslim world is the institution of 
temporary marriage or mut 'a. Today temporary marri ages are still considered legal by the Sh1'a who do 
not recognize the various iJadlthsthat abrogate the practice. The Sh1'a community maintains the 
observance of SUra 4:24 which reads; 'Apart from these, you are permitted to desire your possessions 
(wives), honorably and not in the manner of fornication, and as for those ofthem that you have enjoyed 
give them theirreward (dowry) in the measure prescribed by law ... ' The matter oftemporary marriage is 
often considered to be the deepest legal fissure between the Sunn1 and Sh1'a branches ofIslam. See Ignaz 
Goldziher, Introduction to IsJamic TheoJogy and Law(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): pp. 
208-209. 
15 Qur'ïin, 4:19. 
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The Qur'an also increased the status of women with respect to divorce (faliïq) by 
giving women the power to initiate a dissolution of the marri age, subject to the 
husband's willingness to come to a settlement. This form of divorce is referred to as a 
khul'. In Sw-a4:128, the Qur'an states: 
If a wife fears cruelty or desertion on her husband's part, there is no blame 
on them if they arrange an amicable settlement between themselves; and 
such settlement is best; even though men's souls are swayed by greed. 
But if ye do good and practice self-restraint, Allah is well-acquainted 
with all that ye do. 
Although women who arranged for their husbands to divorce them would forfeit their 
dower, the practice whereby only men could initiate divorces had come to an end. 
During the pre-Islamic period of Arabia, men were able to invoke a divorce by simply 
uttering the statement 'antj !iïliq' (you are divorced) three times whereupon the woman 
would be irrevocably divorced. Although this method of divorce persisted, the Qur'an 
instituted certain limits on the triple divorce. For instance, this kind of divorce is 
regarded as repugnant and is therefore to be avoided. Moreover, the Qur'an introduced 
other innovations such as the waiting period ( 'jdda) of three months following a man's 
dec1aration of divorce which would have to transpire before a divorce could come into 
full effect. The 'jdda allowed the man to reconsider his actions as weIl as allow for 
reconciliation between the couple. Furthermore, the 'jdda helped determine the 
parentage of any child born of the woman, thereby avoiding any ambiguity concerning a 
child's lineage.16 Finally, during the 'idda period, the husband was required to provide 
16 In the Qur'an, one frnds the foHowing verse which defines the parameters for 'jdda: 'Divorced women 
shaH wait conceming themselves for three monthly periods. Nor is it lawful for them to hide what Allah 
hath created in their wombs, ifthey have faith in Allah and the Last Day. And their husbands have the 
better right to take them back in that period, ifthey wish for reconciliation. And women shaH have rights 
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financially for the divorced wife. Whereas in the past a divorced woman was left to 
fend for herself immediately following a divorce, Islamic regulations offered sorne, 
albeit measured, security. Although the norms introduced to the Arabs by Mu4ammad 
did not constitute a complete 'system oflaw,' Qur'anic regulations clearly pointed to a 
reformative spirit that challenged pre-Islamic society.17 It is crucial to point out, at this 
j unct ure, that relying exclusively on the Qur'an as a basis for understanding Muslim 
. . 
societies is problematic. To embark on such a hermeneutic would effectively reduce 
Islamic society to a static and ahistoric construct. Although the Qur'an played a pivotaI 
role in transforming pre-Islamic societies, various other factors contributed towards 
shaping the different societies that constitute the Muslim world. 
Evolution of the Law: Emergence of lfadith 
With the death of the Prophet in 111632, a gap in the leadership of the Muslim 
community appeared. This was mitigated to sorne extent by the election of 
Mu4ammad's successors, the Caliphs, who acted as political and religious leaders for the 
emerging Muslim society. It was during the Rashidiïn that a clear precedent was set 
whereby law would be formulated on the basis of what was revealed in the Qur'an as 
weIl as what the Prophet's example showed. The Prophet served as the embodiment of 
God's Will or the 'living Qur'an.' When the third Caliph, 'Uthman (r. 23-35/644-655), 
similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable; but men have a degree (of advantage) 
over them.' Qur'iin, 2:228. 
17Hallaq, Origins, p. 24. 
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produced a standardized text of the Qur'an, the Muslim community had at its disposai a 
vulgate from which they could extract legal information. 
As Islamic culture and political rule expanded beyond Arabia during the first century 
following the death of the Prophet, a scholarly c1ass, the fuqahiï: activeiy participated 
in interpreting moral. and ethical regulations for the community in order to provide 
religious guidance in accordance with God's Will. Their concem for formulating a legal 
. . 
doctrine emerged in part because they were uneasy with the Umayyad Caliphate's (41-
132/661-750) attempts to interpret law and act as arbiters in religious matters.18 In 
order to establish a law that was not influenced by political concems, the scholars began 
seeking out sources beyond the Qur'an from which to interpret matters of law. This 
search for legal knowledge (fa/ab aJ- 'ilm) led back to Mu4ammad's actions and words as 
a reference point. 19 These deeds and sayings, collected in oral and written format by 
the fuqhahiï'made use of the Prophet's Companions' (~alJiïba) testimonies and provided 
the early Muslim community a model for legal, moral and ethical behavior.20 The 
entirety of these traditions. were known as the iJadlth. In practical terms the fJadlth, 
along with the Qur'an were the authority on which legal opinions or fàtiïwiïwere based. 
A number of the iJadlth which emerged focused on matters pertaining to marriage 
and divorce. For instance, in one well-known iJadlth, a scenario is presented wherein a 
18 Ibid., p. 68. 
19 Members ofpre~Islamic Arabian society who distinguished themselves for their behavior offered a 
sunna, or normative example, which was to be followed by their peers. This principle would transfer to 
Islamic society in the person of MlÙ}.ammad who acted as a role model for ethical and moral behavior. See 
Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: an Introduction to U~üJ al~Jjqh (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999): pp. 1 O~ Il. 
20 In certain cases, the decisions the Prophet took in resolving matters derived from pre~Islamic principles . 
One such example is the manner in which surplus property (fa41 al-mil) is distributed as charity within the 
community. Ibid., p.13. 
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Companion of the Prophet of limited means, Sahl b. Sa'd al-Sa'idi, sought to marry a 
woman, but had little to offer her in the form of the mahr or bridaI dowry~ For this 
predicament, the Prophet had the following advice; guidance that was recorded in the 
fJadith collected by Muslim Abu al-I:Iasan b. al-ijajjaj al-Qusharyl: 
Do you know any part of the Qur'an? He [Sahl b. Sa'd] then said: 1 know 
such and such Siïras (and he counted them). Then he [Mu4ammad] said: 
Can you recite them by heart? He said: Yes, whereupon he (Mu4ammad) 
said: Go, 1 have given her to you in marriage in exchange for the part of 
the Qur'an which you memorized.21 
As the need arose to have Islamic rulings coyer different social scenarios, individual 
fJadlth like the one quoted above began to appear throughout the Muslim world and 
would eventually number in the hundreds of thousands. With the growing corpus of the 
fJadith literature, questions arose concerning the authenticity of individual traditions. 
Through the process of confirming the chain of transmission (isniïd) which traced the 
genealogical data of the individuals who recited each particular tradition back to the 
Prophet, an authentic or correct (~alJJfJ) body of fJadith emerged by the end of the 
thirdlninth century of Islamic civilization. 
The standardization of padith literature was preceded by various other intellectual 
developments in the Islamic legal tradition. In the two centuries following the death of 
Mu4ammad, individual jurists (mujtahids), living as far afield as the Hijaz, Egypt, Iraq 
and Syria, were formulating rulings (alJkiim sing. fJukm) that were influenced by the 
Qur'an and the emerging fJadith. However, during this time, the alJkiim produced by 
21Abü al-Basan b. al-Bajjaj al-Qushayrl Muslim, $afJfh, ed. Ml$ammad Fu'ad 'Abd al-Baq1, 5 vols. 
(Cairo: 'Isa Bab1 al-Balab1, 1374-1375/1955-1956): 2: 1401. 
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these early jurists were not uniquely based on these two textual sources; rather sorne 
jurists, often referred to as the folk of reason (ahl al-ra y), employed discretionary 
reasoning or ra y based on their own Interpretative skills.22 It is crucial to point out that 
the methods devised by these scholars did not emanate from the Qur'an, rather they 
flowed from the minds of individuals who sought to live in accordance to their faith. 
Because of the fluid nature of legal hermeneutics being employed during this formative 
period, it was not uncommon for different jurists living in the same region to articulate 
divergent rulings on similar matters. These differences or ikhtiliïfwere partly a result of 
the use of ra y by individual scholars along with regional differences that often shaped 
the biases of those scholars who interpreted the law. Over time, the use of independent 
reason as a source of law lost favor to the reliance on textual sources found in the 
growing corpus of fJadIth literature. 
The heightened reliance on sacred texts as a source of law did not necessarily mean 
that rational thought was entirely eliminated in the formation of Islamic law. One form 
of reasoning that survived throughout the classical and medieval periods was the use of 
qiyiïs an interpretive tool used in dealing with scenarios that were not explicitly covered 
in the Qur'an or fJadIth. 23 One of the earliest uses of qiyiïswas during the firstlseventh 
century with respect to the matter of the mahr. Although the textual sources stipulated 
the moral obligation for Muslim grooms to provide their brides with a dower, practical 
questions arose as to what the minimum payment should be. Jurists living in the cities 
22 Hallaq, Origin~ pp. 74-78. 
23 Wael Hallaq, "Non-Anological Arguments in Smmi Juridical Qiyas, " Arabica. vol. 36 (1989): pp. 286-
306. 
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of Kufa in Iraqand Medina in the Hijaz (western Arabia) deduced, through analogy, that 
the loss of a woman's virginity was comparable to a loss of a limb. In this deductive 
reasoning process, jurists sought to decipher common attribut es ('iJia) found amongst 
different scenarios. By employing qiyiis~ the mujtahids were able to determine that the 
minimum amount to be paid to a bride should be equivalent to the minimum amount a 
convicted thiefwould have to steal before having his/her hand amputated.24 Using this 
formula, jurists in Kufa determined that this minimum amount was ten dirhams while 
those in Medina put the number at three dirhams. The divergent figures highlight how 
different local customs affected the expression of the Shaii'a in different regions 
throughout the Muslim world?S This difference in jurisprudence is proof that Islamic 
law was not a monolithic construct but rather a dynamic system of law that paralleled 
local customs and the personal hermeneutics of disparate scholars.26 Furthermore, 
owing to the fact that in the pre-modem Islamic world there existed no catholic or 
orthodox expression of Islamic law, the Shaii'a was built up by individual jurists who 
employed systematic methods of legal interpretation in the effort to articulate God's 
Wil1.27 Concerns such as these seldom find their way into contemporary discussions in 
24 Pearl and Menski, Muslim Family, pp. 179-180. 
25 Hallaq, A History. p. 16. 
26 The second/eighth century scholar, Mu4ammad b. IdDs al-Shafi'I, in his text Kitiib IkhtiliifaJ- 'Iriiqiyyln 
catalogues the different ruIings articulated by two well know Iraqi jurists, al-Nu'mân b. Thiibit Abü 
lJan1fa (d. 150/767) and Ibn Ab1 Laylii (d. 148/765). See Wael Hallaq, "From Regional to Personal Schools 
of Law? A Reevaluation," Islamic Law and Society, vol. 8 (2001): p. 6. 
27 Although the Qur'ân and the Sunna remain the basis for Islamic law, mujtahids had at their disposal 
various tools that allowed for a certain amount offlexibility in interpreting the law. One such legal 
device was the principle of istilJsiin or juristic preference used during the process of qiyiis. This tool 
permitted jurists to weight the strengths and weaknesses of different ratio decidendi derived from the 
sacred texts before making a ruIing. RecalIing that the Qur'ân advocates justice and the promotion of 
good and the forbidding evil (ml1$lafJa) based on Qur'ân 2: 185 'He desires for you ease, and He desires no 
hardships'), scenarios that are illegal in the sacred script ures could be deemed appropriate in certain 
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the media relating to the Shan'a. Rather terms such as 'medieval' are often employed 
to demonstrate how inflexible and rigid Islamic law has been. As we shaH shortly see, 
this attitude is off the mark. In fact, medieval jurisprudence, as practiced in different 
parts of the Muslim world, represented an organized and systematic intellectual 
tradition. 
Amongst the first to lay down a systematic approach towards legal interpretation was 
the secondleighth century jurist MUQ,ammad b. Idrls al-Shafi'i who put forward his 
views in his text aJ-Risiila.28 Al-Shafi'i's primary concem was curbing the excessive use 
ofreason or rayin favor of the Qur'an and iJadIth in the formation ofIslamic law.29 In 
time, texts such as the RisiiJa came to be regarded as canonical amongst jurists who 
based their personal interpretations on information and methodologies gleaned from 
these texts.30 By the thirdlninth century, the personal nature of legal interpretation was 
beginning to give way to a more binding legal methodology grounded in an interpretive 
logic found in texts such as the RisiiJa. In honor of the interpretive logic espoused by the 
authors of these early texts, many of the emerging schools of law (madhiihib) were 
named after their so-called intellectual founders. These included the weIl known Sunnl 
schools such as the lianafi, Malikl and Shafi'i madhiihib. In order to protect the 
situations in order to protect and preserve life, private property, mind, religion and offspring. See Hallaq, 
A History, pp. 107-113. 
28 Mul].ammad b. Ioos al-Shiifi'I, aJ-Risiila, ed. Mul].ammad Sayyid Kilïinl, (Cairo: Mu~tafii Babl al-ijalibl, 
1969). Contemporary scholarship often points to al-Shiifi'i as the archetype ofIslamic legal methodology. 
This view has come under sorne suspicion recently as new research has uncovered the fact that the Risiila 
did not garner a great deal of attention during the author's lifetime. Rather students who followed the 
works of al-Shafi'I, such as the jurist Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918), used the formulas articulated in the Risiila 
as a guide for their legal interpretation. See Hallaq, A History, p. 31-33. 
29 Ibid., p.32. 
30 Hallaq, "From Regional to Personal," p. 20. 
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methodological soundness of these schools and preserve the external modes of legal 
expression, juristic imitation (taqDd) emerged by the third/ninth c ent ury. Thus a 
recognizable corpus of authoritative opinions (~alJJlJ) emerged along with standardized 
legal methodology (u~ül al-fiqh) for formulating law. Towards this end, scholars 
throughout the Muslim world would strive to interpret law (ijtihiïd) in a manner that 
was consistent with the methodology used by the school of law to which they belonged. 
One notable feature of the Sharl'a which appeared during pre-modem times was the 
scholars' independence from government in the process of interpreting the law. 
Although governments may have funded the education of legal practitioners, technicaIly 
they did not interfere with the formulation of law. Furthermore, what marked Islamic 
jurisprudence during this time was the 'individualistic character' of the law?l The 
result was a great diversity or ikhtiliifin the expression of the Sharl'a on certain 
matters such as marriage and divorce while, at the same time, a consensus (ijmii' 
emerged regarding matrimonial rules and procedures. Thus, aIl schools of Islamic law 
will concur that a marriage is a contractual agreement whereby a husband and wife can 
lawfully engage in sexual relations. A marriage cornes into effect once a contract 
(nikii4) is agreed upon by the marrying parties and witnessed by members of the 
community. Furthermore, the schools aIl agree that the primary purpose of an Islamic 
marriage was to legitimize sexual relations as weIl as foster procreation - though sexual 
gratification was, and still is, regarded as a complementary component of a marriage 
31 Ibid., p. 26. 
37 
union.32 Furthermore, aIl schools of Islamic jurisprudence offer divorce as an option -
albeit one of last resort which is considered to be makriïh or repugnant. Between these 
poles of consensus lies a vast field of diversity or ikhtiliifin the manner in which Islamic 
law has been practiced. 
A detailed description of the differences that existed between each school oflaw in 
matters relating to marriage and divorce exceeds the scope ofthis work. Suffice it to say 
. . 
that the Islamic norms emerging subsequent to the death of the Prophet were highly 
divergent due to the fact that legal scholars employed different formulas of ijtihiid33 
For instance, in the I:Ianafi doctrine found in the Levant, women are capable of 
conc1uding their marriage contracts without the consent of their guardians (waJJs). 
Meanwhile, according to the MaIiki school, based in Medina, women were required to 
have guardians approve of their marriages.34 
In sorne cases, the differences in jurisprudence resulted from interpretations that did 
not strictly follow the official legal methodology put forward by the schools of law. 
Early Islamic marriage contracts in Egypt, for instance, c1early demonstrated how local 
customs prevailed over the official Maliki doctrines being used in matters pertaining to 
the payment of the mahr.35 This exchange of money is regarded as a transaction (iins 
min al-ijara) in which the husband has effectively paid for the 'sexual enjoyment of his 
32 Vardit Rispler-Chaim, "Islamic Law ofMarriage and Divorce and the Disabled Person: the Case of the 
Epileptic Wife," Die WeIt des IsIams, vol. 36 (1996): p. 92. 
33 Hallaq, "From Regional to Personal," p. 26. 
34 Ibid. 
35 YossefRapoport, "Matrimonial Gifts in Early Islamic Egypt," IsIamic Law and Society. vol. 7 (2000): 
p.6. 
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wife's body.'36 According to the original Malild ruling, the mahrshould be paid in full at 
the time of the marri age. Deferring payment of the dower was regarded as an 
innovation (bid'a) by Malik b. Anas who commented that '[i]n the past, the entire ~adiïq 
[malnj was payable upon demand. If any portion of it is deferred, 1 do not like its 
postponement for a long time. ,37 Despite the view of this foundational figure of 
jurisprudence, Egyptian marriage contracts dating back to the third/ninth centuries 
frequently stipulated that the mahr would be deferred. In a number of contracts, the 
remaining portion of the mahr was payable upon the dissolution of the marriage either 
by way of divorce or death. This practice of deferring the payment of the mahr has now 
become a univers al feature of Islamic marriage contracts around the world despite the 
'fact that it offended individuals like Malik.38 The fact that the practice of deferring the 
mahrwas at odds with 'official' MaIild doctrine as set out by the school's namesake is a 
reflection of the flexibility inherent in the Sharl'a as it was practiced in the pasto In this 
particular case, the ikhtiliïfreflected local customs in Egypt which existed during 
the formative period of Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, it was not only Muslims who 
deferred portions of their wedding dowers; members of the Jewish and Christian 
communities also employed this practice for the same reasons as their Muslim 
neighbors.39 
36 Rispler-Chaim, "Islamic Law ofMarriage and Divorce," p. 92. 
37 Quoted from Rapoport, "Matrimonial Gifts," p. 8. 
38 Ibid., p. 7. For information regarding the universal application of the deferred dower see "Mahr"in 
EncycJopedia of Islam, vol. 6, (Leiden: Brill): p. 79b. 
39 Ibid., p.ll. 
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Despite these variable interpretations, the norms of all the different schools were 
always grounded in the Qur'an and /lad/th. Thus, although particulars in law may have 
differed based on the intermediary role played by jurists, their understanding of the law 
was ultimately inspired by the notion that the law which emerged would best fit God's 
Will. The idea that the Sharl'a represents a code of law etched in stone and handed to 
humankind by way of sorne fantastic miracle is utterly false. Rather, Islamic law 
represented a legal system where different jurists sought to provide individuals with 
legal and moral guidance based on their particular schools' methods of interpretation. 
Given the role as mediator, scholars often concluded their legal arguments with 
statements such as 'God knows best. ,40 Malik, for instance, made such a conditional 
qualification by stating '1 am but a human being, 1 [sometimes perceive] wrongly and 1 
[sometimes perceive] rightly. Examine my opinion. AlI that is in agreement with the 
book [the Qur'an] and the Sunna then, follow it, and aIl that is not, abandon it.'41 
Clearly, what Malik and the other fuqahi' who foIlowed in his footsteps are stating is 
that the Shaii'a is an attempt to interpret God's Will and that their efforts are fallible 
and open to reinterpretation. 
Islamic law in Practice 
Before turning to the actual practice of Islamic marriage and divorce in the classical 
and medieval periods, a general comment on the role women played in Islamic societies 
is in order. The Orientalist tradition has long portrayed Muslim women as severely 
marginalized and lacking in power. Chandra Talpade Mohanty estimates that Western 
40 Khalafallah, "The Elusive 'Islamic Law'," p. 148. 
41 Ibid. 
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observers often place an undue emphasis on Islamic theology as an interpretive tool in 
understanding the role women had in Muslim world. Defining the social structure solely 
along religious lines serves to negate the actual social relations that existed in the 
Muslim world and contributes to the portrayal of Muslim women as a static group 
uniformly subjugated by faith.42 Adding to this analysis are accounts pieced together by 
pre-modern European travelers who had very limited access to women's lives and 
spaces. Their descriptions also offer a na~ow perspective on women.43 A better 
understanding of the role women played in Muslim societies can be gleaned from 
reading a diverse array of material that inc1udes court records, biographical works, 
chronic1es, poetry, and popular literature. From these texts, scholars are now 
uncovering data suggesting that women occupied an active role in the public sphere 
despite the overall patriarchal social order.44 However, despite this and other evidence, 
the standard stereotypical attitudes towards Islam and Muslim women persist. 
For instance, due to the conservative nature of the tradition along with the notion 
that according to Islamic law divorce is repugnant, many have assumed that divorce was 
a rare phenomenon during the c1assical and medieval periods. Moreover, based on the 
perception that Islam is a male-dominated religion, it is further assumed that women 
have little say in pursuing and initiating divorces themselves. In a recent study 
42 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," 
Feminist Revie~ vol. 30, Autumn (1988): pp. 70-72. 
43 Dror Ze'evi, "Women in lih-Century Jerusalem: Western and Indigenous Perspectives," Intemational 
Joumal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27, May (1995): pp 159-161. For a European women's accounts of 
Muslim women see Judy Mabro, Veiled HalfTruths(London: I.B. Tarius, 1991). 
44 Arnira El-Azhary Sonbol, "Rethinking Women and Islam," in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. 
Esposito, eds., Daughtrs of Abraham: Feminist Thought in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Gainesville: 
University Press ofFlorida, 2001): p. 114. 
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undertaken by Yossef Rapoport, these faIse presumptions are turned on their heads. In 
the scholar's study of marri age and divorce during the twilight of the Mamlük Sultanate 
ofEgypt (648-922/1250-1517), Rapoport demonstrates that instances of divorce were 
quite frequent and in many cases initiated by women. 
Using the biographie al dictionary compiled by the Egyptian scholar Mu4ammad b. 
'Abd al-Raq.man al-Sakhawl (d. 902/1497) as his primary source, Rapoport analyzed' the 
lives of sorne 168 women from the °15th century who came from notable Cairene 
families. Astonishingly, a third of the women discussed by al-Sakhawl were married 
more than once - sorne were married more than three times during their lives.45 
Interestingly, al-Sakhawl points out that women were just as likely to initiate a divorce 
as their husbands.46 These findings contradict commonly held percepHons of pre-
modem Islamic societies in which women are often depicted as powerless to pursue 
divorce. Although family law was mostly slanted in favor of men who had the right to 
unilateraIly sue for divorce, the affluent women discussed by al-Sakhawl had at their 
disposaI various means of successfully initiating divorces.47 
One way women pursued divorces in Medieval Egypt was via an appeal to a judge 
(qiifl) for a mskh or judicial divorce. However, in maintaining the patriarchy in society, 
45 YossefRapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006): pp. 82-83. 
46 Ibid., p. 88 
471t should be noted that despite the ability ofwomen to seek alternative ways of obtaining divorces, 
Islam.ic legal culture was very much a patriarchal phenomenon. For instance, the ability husbands had to 
easily repudiate their wives served as a powerful coercive tool for sorne Muslim men. This patriarchy is 
reflected in the fact that sorne men would threaten their wives with divorce oaths in order to control their 
wives' behavior. These divorce oaths would come into effect once certain conditions set by the husbands 
were broken. See Rapoport, Marriage, Mone~ and Divorce, pp. 70-72. 
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judges rarely granted such divorces without the husband's approval. Furthermore, the 
conditions in order to obtain a faskh in Egypt at that time were quite narrow and were 
limited to a husband's abandonment ofhis wife. In order to circumvent this restriction, 
other means were available to women in order to obtain divorces. Rapoport reports that 
during the Mamlük Sultanate, women often inserted clauses into their marriage 
contracts detailing their right to sue for a divorce if certain conditions were broken.48 
Thus, a woman could obtain a divorce from her husband if he embarked on a secondary 
marri age with another woman. Other conditions that would automatically cause a 
divorce included restrictions on the husband's consumption of a1cohol, and his 
participation in extramarital affairs with concubines and slave-girls. For instance, in 
one particular anti-nuptial contract a man named Shihab al-Dln al-Raqqawl promised 
his wife, 'A'isha bt. Ibn al-I:Iawranf, that he would abstain from extramarital affairs 
while on business trips. These sorts of oaths, both written into marriage contracts or 
pledged afterwards, readily found their way into manuals oflaw.49 
Another means by which women living during the later stages of the Mamlük 
Sultanate exerted power was via the mlLfiïlim courts. The mlLfiïlim courts were 
administrative offices run by functionaries of the military that along with their official 
business also offered women married to soldiers a means of disciplining their husbands. 
In one particular case, an affluent woman whose husband had not consummated the 
48 Ibid., p. 74. 
49 Ibid., p. 75. 
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marri age, approached a military court in order to have her husband reprimanded and 
threatened with a judicial divorce if he did not acquiesce to his wife's demands.50 
Presumably, the husband had a change of heart once the naqJbs (military guards) 
knocked at his door. In another instance, a pre-pubescent girl was married to a soldierat 
the request of her guardian. It was written in the marri age contract that he would not 
have conjugal relations with the girl until she reached the age of majority. Tragically, 
. . 
the soldier did not follow through on his contractual obligations and repeatedly raped 
the girl. Shortly thereafter, he beat the girl in order to obtain a khui' divorce thereby 
absolving him from paying the deferred portion of the mahr. When the girl returned 
home to her family, her aunt appealed to the dawadir(the head of the mt1?ii1imcourt) to 
punish the soldier, which he did. According to the chronicler Ibn al-~ayrafi, the soldier 
was flogged for his behavior and the m~aJjm court pressured the chief ~anafi qaçll to 
annul the divorce settlement and issue a new one, which he did. Finally, the soldier was 
forced to pay the girl four dinars in damages, a sum that represented a sizeable 
amount.51 
This incident is certainly not indicative of how most divorces were settled in 
Mamluk society. Usually couples divorced by way of a khui' - a procedure in which the 
wife asks the husband to release her from the marital bond. Although technically the 
wife forfeited the deferred portion of her mahr in asking to be released from the marital 
50 Ibid., p. 79. 
51 Ibid., p. 80. 
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union, Rapoport maintains that in many of the divorce cases detailed in the biographical 
literature, the break-ups were 'balanced affairs, in which women often had their say.'52 
One of the cases of divorce recorded by al-Sakhawl is that ofhis own brother, Abu Bakr 
b. 'Abd al-Ra4man al-Sakhawl, whose wife insisted on a divorce due to her displeasure 
with her living arrangements. It appears that the overbearing al-Sakhawl family did not 
suit his wife's liking and she insisted on moving away from the family compound. 
. , 
During the time in which they lived in a different part of Cairo, she frequently asked her 
husband to divorce her. Adding to the couple's woes was the fact that shortly thereafter 
the husband fell ill. Eventually he acquiesced to her demands for a divorce, and in 
retum Abu Bakr was granted sorne financial compensation from his ex-wife. He died 
shortly thereafter.53 Clearly, the blanket notion that women were powerless in initiating 
divorces throughout Islamic history should be revised to inc1ude these and other 
scenarios whereby women had various means at their disposaI to assert themselves. 
Apart from the fact that divorces were put into effect in a more cooperative manner, 
another piece of information to emerge from the biographie al literature is the notion 
that most marital conflicts were settled outside of the purview of official bodies of law. 
Moreover, when a couple was in need of mediation and arbitration services, they were 
likely to tum to family members or neighbors rather than seek official help from 
govemment authorities. This is in line with the traditional Islamic system of justice 
whereby individuals are free to negotiate amongst themselves. Khul' agreements were 
52 Ibid. p. 70. 
53 Ibid., p. 85. 
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drawn up between the parties themselves and were seldom imposed by govemment or 
religious authorities. Owing to the communal nature of Islamic society, individuals are 
more likely to tum to relatives, friends and associates who form networks of relations as 
a source of conflict resolution.54 AlI financial matters pertaining to the dissolution of 
the matrimonial home were concems taken up by the parties involved. Thus, in most 
cases, courts were only accessed by divorced couples in order to register their divorces 
with authorities. The principle of not accessing official bodies is based on the notion 
that a Muslim is ultimately beholden to God alone, not a govemment bureaucracy. 
Thus in contracting a marriage or a divorce, individuals are not only making an oath in 
front of witnesses, they are also making the pledges in the presence of God. This 
principle is still in play today whereby many people, including sorne Muslims in Canada, 
simply avoid official bodies of law altogether and opt for ad-hoc forms of justice. 
This being said, courts set up by the govemment, albeit functioning independently 
from govemment, did mediate complicated divorce cases that required sorne form of 
ruling on the part of a judge or qiiçll. A brief glimpse at a fàtwii (legal opinion) from 12th 
century Spain reveals not only the organizational scope inherent in medieval Islamic 
societies but the systematic nature of Sharl'a procedure. Again, the purpose of this 
discussion is to counter the Orientalist notion that Islamic law was chaotic and 
arbitrary. In a khU]' divorce that was put into effect on the 25th of Sha'ban 512 (1l th 
December, 1118) and recorded in the court records of Lisbon, a woman by the name of 
54 Lawrence Rosen, "Justice in Islamic Culture and Law," in R.S. Khare, ed., Perspectives on Islamic Law; 
Justice and Society (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefied Publications, 1999): pp. 44-45. 
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Ru'ya b. Abu al-Walid petitioned to have her husband, 'Ubaydallah b. Mupammad b. 
A4mad b. Ukamin al-Azdi divorce her.55 On the surface, this case represents a clear-cut 
example of a failed marri age that was terminated at the behest of the wife. However, 
this case is more complicated than it appears. In this particular case, the wedding 
dower, which was weIl endowed, included several houses and farmland outside the city 
of Lisbon. In a collection of fàtwiis entitled Al-Mi'yiir al-Munb wa-al-Jiimi' aJ-
Mughdb 'an fàtiiwii 'Ulamii' IfHqiya wa-al-AndaJus wa-aJ-Magrib~ compiled by A4mad 
al-Wanshaiisl, the same /Œuf' case appears with a number of interesting twists. The 
complications associated with the divorce required a ruling from a judge who, in turn, 
consulted a higher-ranking muftI (legal expert or consultant) for further clarification as 
to how the case should be resolved. 
It appears that the marriage between Ru'ya and her husband 'Ubaydallah was one 
fraught with problems and broken promises. In an attempt to rid himself of his wife, 
'Ubaydallah beat his wife so as to encourage her to ask for a /Œuf'. The reason the 
husband opted for this unfortunate tactic appears to be his unwillingness to forfeit the 
deferred portion of his wife's dower, which as mentioned above, was rather large. 
Fortunately, Ru'ya's father, Abu al-Walid Yiïnis b. 'Abd al-Razzaq, was a jurist who 
applied his knowledge of the Shaii'a in assisting his daughter gain her deferred mahr. 
His hopes lay in convincing a judge that his daughter's husband beat her in order to 
extract a /Œuf' request. Prior to thesigning of the khul', Ru'ya' s father, Abu al-WaIid, 
sought the services oftwo professional witnesses who documented the abuse in a 
55 David Powers, "Women and Divorce in the Islamic West: Three Cases," Haww~ vol. 1 (2003): p. 31. 
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written statement. This type of dossier, referred to as a memorial document or rasm 
istir'i', was put together by Abu al-Walid with the understanding that it would later be 
presented to a judge as evidence against the husband. The particular document in this 
case had dec1arations from neighbors and servants testitying to the frequent beatings 
suffered by Ru'ya. When the khul' was completed, Abu al-Walid approached a judge 
with the rasm istir'a' detailing the abuse suffered by his daughter with the hopes of 
having the judge rule in favor of allowing her to retain her mahr. 
Frequently, qaifls who carne across difficult cases would seek the advice of legal 
consultants who offered their opinions or fatwas in order to assist the courts. The legal 
establishment saw offering a decision without following established interpretive 
procedure as problematic. Moreover, unqualified individuals who gave legal advice 
were not well received because such rulings served to de-Iegitimize the work of licensed 
legal experts. In this particular case the judge in Lisbon wrote to the muftI in the 
neighboring city of Cordova seeking assistance. The muftI in question was Abu al-
Walid MlÙ}.arnrnada Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (d. 520/1126), grandfather of the famous 
Andalusian philosopher Averroes (d. 595/1198). Ibn Rushd responded with a fatwa 
maintaining that Ru'ya was indeed entitled to the deferred portion of her dower if the 
following conditions were met: 1) the trustworthiness of the witnesses who testified in 
the rasm istir'a' was ascertained; 2) her sole motive for seeking a khul' was to extricate 
herself forrn an abusive relationship; and 3) she was indeed coerced into agreeing to a 
khul' based on the abuse she suffered. Unfortunately the case's final outcome is not 
48 
discussed in al-Wanshaiisl's fàtwi compilation, though it has been speculated that the 
judge ultimately ruled in favor of the wife receiving her full dower.56 
Regardless of the out come, our purpose for briefly looking at such a case is to 
demonstrate the organizatiorral complexity of the Shan'a as it was practiced in pre-
modem times. A number of observations can be drawn. First, the legal system in place 
in Spain at the time was hierarchical. A judge in Lisbon who did not have the 
qualifications to address the particularities of a difficult case sought the council of a 
more qualified legal mind in Cordova. Second, letters between the two scholars traveled 
between the two cities courtesy of a postal service or baddwhich frequently couriered 
legal questions and answers not only within a geographic region but across the Muslim 
world. Finally, and most important, the decision forwarded by Ibn Rushd would have 
been formulated using a systematic approach to the law as opposed to an opinion based 
on personal convictions, which the first judge in Lisbon could have simply offered. The 
Cordovan muftJwas consulted because the judge in Lisbon did not have the appropriate 
license or ijiiza certifying his ability to participate in ijtihid (creative interpretation) the 
case required. This particular case, transpiring during medieval times, belies the 
criticism leveled against Islamic law as being arbitrary and rigid. 
Clearly, Muslimjudges did not sit under palm trees concocting rulings off the tops of 
their heads as was characterized by Lord Goddard. Rather, the manner in which the 
Shaii'a was applied followed a systematic approach. Judges were required to make 
rulings based on interpretations fuqahi' had previously issued which were consistent 
56 Ibid,. p. 35. 
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with their particular school's legal methodology. Subsequently, these rulings were 
recorded in manuals of jurisprudence and agreed upon by a consensus (ijma' of scholars. 
When a c1ear precedent was unavailable in a particular case, judges sought the advice of 
ml!itahids, such as Ibn Rushd, who provided answers based on their qualifications to 
issue fatwas. These fatwas would, in tum, be recorded in manuals of law - thereby 
providing future legal precedents from which to base rulings. Because certain jurists 
approached particular scenarios differently according to local customs or interpretive 
differences, the Islamic legal tradition was marked by a great deal of plurality. 
Ultiniately, the plurality inherent within Islamic law allowed the legal system to be 
flexible and open to change. 57 
Contributing to this diversity was the fact that schol ars , belonging to different 
schools of law or madiihhib, employed different techniques of legal hermeneutics. This 
inevitably produced further differences in the way law was expressed. These methods of 
interpretation revolved around issues of theology and the nature of a school's juristic 
ch aracter. 58 These characteristics were adhered to by jurists through a process known as 
taqRd, a term which has until recently been translated as a form of blind adherence to 
existing legal interpretations. Recent scholarship is altering this notion and 
demonstrating that taqRdis best seen as a form ofloyalty to one's school oflaw. Thus 
interpretations that individual scholars produced were grounded in the logic that their 
school espoused. This should not be confused with the notion that scholars merely 
57 Wael Hallaq, "Can the Shari'a be Restored?" in Yvonne YazbeckHaddad and Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser, eds., Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modemity(fiew York: Altamira Press, 2004): p. 28. 
58 Wael Hallaq, Authont}'. Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001): p. 109. 
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parroted the findings of previous scholars. Rather, in fonning a legal opinion they paid 
special attention to the way in which their particular school interpreted law. This 
interpretive logic provided the foundational authority from which the law emanated. In 
other words, to regard Islamic law as only rooted in Divine origin is to miss the point 
that the Shaii'a was in fact a dynamic system of positive law employing human reason 
and methodology. This in turn led to the various differences in the way law was 
. . 
articulated given the geographic and cultural diversity in the Muslim world. AlI of this 
may or may not have taken place under palm trees given the temperate c1imate found 
throughout Muslim world - but to label this system as arbitrary and unchanging fails to 
acknowledge the intellectual dynamism and social relevance of medieval Islamic legal 
systems. 
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Chapter 2 
Modem Islamic Law 
This chapter will demonstrate t~at the different versions of Islamic law currently 
practiced throughout the world do not follow traditional forms of Shan' a used during 
the pre-modem period. Owing to the influence of European-styled legal reform, Muslim 
nation-states have altered laws goveming personal status creating hybridized legal 
systems that fuse together Islamic norms with statutory law. These reforms replaced a 
flexible system of law, detailed in the previous chapter, with a static legal code. The 
goal of this chapter is two-fold. First, it will offer a very general discussion of Islamic 
marri age and divorce law currently in use today in order to convey to the reader an 
overview of sorne of the legislation found in the Muslim world. Second, this chapter 
will shift its focus to modem Egypt's divorce laws in order to dislodge sorne commonly 
held assumptions surrounding the purported benefits of European-styled legal reform. 
What will bec orne apparent is that existing modem personal status legislation used 
throughout the Muslim world no longer maintains the dynamism found in the pasto 
Rather than improve the lives of women, for instance, the reforms have negatively 
affected their rights by codifYing patriarchy. In practical terms, this limited the access 
women once had to divorce. These nuances in legal practice were seldom discussed 
during the debates over the use of Islamic arbitration in Ontario. Instead, both 
opponents and proponents of faith-based arbitration presented a narrow image oflslamic 
law. 
When European involvement in the political and economic affairs of the Muslim 
world began in earnest during eighteenth century, it was not long before colonial powers 
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insisted on modifying Islamic legal systems to reflect a more European bias.1 For 
instance, European interference with local laws and customs began as early as the 
eighteenth century when Warren Hastings (d. 1818), the British Govemor General of 
India, appointed employees of the East India Company to oversee criminal justice in 
parts of the Sub-Continent? Meanwhile, the Ottoman Commercial Code that was 
promulgated in 1850 was, for all intents and purposes, a literaI borrowing of the existing 
French laws goveming financial matters.3 
One of the most striking outcomes of the European foray in the Ottoman Empire 
was the move towards the codification of Islamic law. When the Ottoman govemment 
codified existing l1anafi jurisprudence into a Westem-styled legal code and promulgated 
them as the Mejelle of 1869, there were a series of repercussions which would change 
the face of Islamic jurisprudence forever. Unlike the previous centuries where the 
govemment remained alooffrom the interpretation ofShaii'a, the Ottoman govemment 
now became directly involved in the process of enacting law. Accordingly, it opened 
secular schools of law that trained Westem-styled lawyers and judges who were 
1 The phenomenon ofWestem imperiaIists interfering with 10caIlaws in the Muslim world is an ongoing 
occurrence in places such as present-day Iraq. In Iraq, the United States of America is not onlyaItering 
the nature of the politicaIlandseape, but is aIso reformulating matters as mundane as the traffic code. 
Operating from the Green Zone in Baghdad, an American Army Reserve lawyer, who practiced personaI 
in jury law in his civilian life, introduced a new set oftraffic laws that very closely mirrored those rules 
and regulations currently available to the drivers ofthis lawyer's home state, Maryland. An associate of 
the enterprising Army Reserve lawyer characterized him as having the attitude that 'aIl the traffic police 
[in Iraq] were corrupt, and that no one in Iraq was educated enough to write the law or to understand the 
problem.' When this new Iraqi Traffie Code was presented to senior Iraqi officiaIs in the post-Saddam 
Hussein govemment, it was duly rejeeted, in part because the American lawyer did not take into aecount 
the differences between Maryland's Common Law tradition and Iraq's existing Civil Code. For a 
complete discussion on this particular American adventure in the Muslim world seeWilliam Langewieshe, 
"Welcome to the Green Zone: the American Bubble in Baghdad," The Atlantic MonthlJj November 
(2004): pp. 60-88. 
2 Anderson, Law RefOnD, p. 22. 
3Ibid., p. 86. 
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delegated by the central government to apply the new codified jurisprudence. What is of 
great significance here is that the new batch of legal practitioners were not trained in 
traditional u~iïl aI-fiqh and thus were divorced from the religious formulas for 
pronouncing fàtwiis.4 Furthermore, the mujtahids whose fàtwiis were bound by u~iïl a1-
fiqh found themselves on the fringes of the legal world. In essence, the centuries-old 
methodologies of interpreting Islamic texts were demolished in favor of a more secular 
system of law.5 The end result was that a legal system that was once fluid and 
decentralized was replaced by a codified law that was more rigid owing to the fact that 
it became difficult to instilliocai and regional flavors into the law. 
At the same time as the traditional methods of interpreting the law were undergoing 
change in the Ottoman Empire, the central government introduced legal practices that 
diverged from traditional u~iïl a1-fiqh. One such innovation was the use of takhayyur or 
amalgamation. By borrowing different provisions from various schools of law and 
combining them into a single code oflaw, the Ottomans were able to alter the Shaii'a in 
an attempt to meet the needs of contemporary society. For instance the traditional 
l:Ianafi doctrines, used throughout the Ottoman territories, made it difficult for women 
to dissolve their marriages of their own volition without their husbands' consent. In 
cases where women found themselves married to mentally incompetent, impotent, 
abusive or insane men, little recourse was available for pursuing a divorce.6 Seeking to 
address such situations, the Ottomans amalgamated doctrines from the I1anbaIi and 
4 Hallaq, A History, p. 261. 
5 Hallaq, "From Regional to Personal," p. 26. 
6 In such cases, jurists often ruled in favor of dissolving the marriage in order to maintain the best 
interests (m~lalJa) of the woman. Thus, although divorce was considered repugnant according to 
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Miïlik1 schools which had developed provisions that permitted women to initiate 
divorces by way of the khur7 The 1917 Ottoman Law of Family Rights was replete 
with examples of selective incorporation of doctrines from different schools. 
Although on the surface the use of this particular legal method appeared to 
correspond with traditional u~ii1 al-fiqh~ frequently the end results were off the mark. In 
the past, the 'ulami' would have raised their eyebrows at such judicial maneuverings; 
however, because they had been pushed aside by the Ottoman government, their voices 
no longer carried the weight they previously had. Although this particular code would 
only survive two years before being repealed, the reforms themselves would help shape 
family law in emerging Muslim nations in both the Arab world and beyond. 
Following the First World War, and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 
Kamal Atatürk (d.l938) continued the trend of favoring European legal practices by 
discarding Islamic law altogether (inc1uding laws of personal status) in favor of secular 
legal codes in Turkey. In the realm offamily law, the 1926 Turkish Civil Code (inspired 
by the 1912 Swiss Personal Status Code) completely reconfigured personal status law 
along secular lines. Under this secular law, practices such as polygamy and a man's 
right to repudiate his wife using a triple divorce were no longer permitted in Turkey. 
Furthermore, wives were granted the right to terminate their marriages through the civil 
courts.8 Although sorne commentators have assumed that the new laws put an end to the 
unequal status between husbands and wives,9 in reality the borrowed European codes 
traditional Islamic law and custom, in certain instances it was advisable in order to maintain justice. See 
Hallaq, A HistoIJj pp. 112-113. 
7 Anderson, Law Refonn, p. 39. 
8 Tughrul Ansay, Introduction to Turldsh Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1987): pp. 145-48. 
9 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965): p. 267. 
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included a number of provisions that entrenched gender inequalities. lO Under the new 
secular code, the husband was deemed to be the head of the family and could decide 
whether his wife would be permitted to work outside the home. Furthermore, the 
husband was charged with the obligation of supporting his wife, who in return owed 
obedience to her husband. These legal reforms served to codifY gender inequality and 
limited women's participation in public life; a trend that appears to have reversed 
existing social practice. For instance, in his study of Ottoman court sijills (records) 
from the seventeenth century, Ze'evi demonstrates that Palestinian women were active 
participants in various commercial affairs and regularly brought complaints to the courts 
when they were aggrieved. 11 Under the newly reformed laws however, a husband could 
now deny his wife the opportunity to participate in commercial affairs outside the home. 
Although other emerging Muslim nation-states did not emulate modem Turkey's 
wholesale secularization of laws goveming persona! status, various govemments did 
follow the earlier Ottoman Empire's lead by codifYing Islamic law as well as 
introducing novel methods of interpretation in an effort to modemize their legal 
systems. Various states dismantled tradition al u~iïJ aJ-fiqh in favor of statutory family 
status law that may have appeared Islamic but in reality diverged from authentic legal 
methodology. Meanwhile, in criminal and commercial affairs, Islamic laws were totally 
overhauled in favor of European-inspired legislation. Completely shedding the Islamic 
character of family status laws was not, however, an option owing to the importance 
many Muslims place on the Shaii'a in regulating their personallives. 
JO Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Refonn ofPersonal Status Laws in North Africa: A Problem ofIslamic or 
Mediterranean Laws?" Women Living Under IsJamic Laws, Occasional Papers, July (1996): p. 6. 
11 Ze'evi, "Women in 1 ih-Century Jerusalem," p. 166. 
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Islamic Marriage: Brief Overview 
In what follows, 1 seek to describe sorne of the key principles of law associated with 
marriage and divorce in the Muslim world. Rather than focus exclusive1y on one 
particular region or school of law, 1 will select examples from various Muslim countries, 
ranging from North Africa to the Middle East and Asia, in order to reflect the diversity 
inherent in legal practices throughout the world. It should be mentioned that an 
exhaustive review of CUITent Islamic marri age and divorce law is beyond the scope of 
this work. Embarking upon such a survey would be akin to covering European, South 
American, North Arnerican and Australian marri age and divorce legislation in one fell 
swoop. This brief review will be followed by a closer look at Egyptian legal reforms in 
order to pinpoint sorne shortcomings associated with modern legal reform. For now, let 
us turn our attention to sorne general perspectives of marri age and divorce legislation. 
Similar to marriage practices found throughout the world, an Islamic marriage is 
initiated by an engagement between two individu aIs. In an Islarnic marri age, the couple 
is betrothed (khu.tba) when the groom or his guardian, acting as a proxy, requests a 
woman's hand in marri age. Although the betrothal does not legitimize any sexual 
relations between the couple, it does grant them certain rights. For instance, the couple 
can request to meet in person either in a chaperoned environment or in seclusion: 12 Both 
fiancés have the right to inquire as to the financial and social status of their prospective 
spouse.13 If the woman accepts the offer of betrothal, another man cannot approach the 
woman for her hand in marriage, except in circurnstances where the betrothal has been 
12 "KhUfba," EncycJopedia oflslam, vol. V (Leiden: Brill, 2003): p.23a. 
13 JamaI J. Nasir, The Islamic LawofPersonal Status(London: Graham and Trotman, 1990): p. 45. Also 
see Abdullahi An-Naim, Islamic Family Law in a Changing World(London: Zed Books, 2002). 
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called Off. 14 In both c1assical and modem Islamic legislation, both parties possess the 
right to cancel the betrothal in order to avoid an unwanted marriage. Despite the fact 
that the betrothal is a promise to marry and not a legally binding contract, the 
concealment of pertinent information such as impotence and infertility can, in sorne 
jurisdictions, give rise to payments for damages. For instance, Egypt's Court of 
Cassation has summarized the duties and privileges associated with betrothals in the 
following way: 
Betrothal is only a preliminary step towards a marriage contract, a mere 
promise that is not binding on either party who are lawfully free to end it 
at anytime ... .if the promise to marry and the subsequent withdrawal 
therefrom [sic] are accompanied by other acts entirely independent 
thereof, of such a nature as to cause material or moral injury to one of the 
parties, such acts shaH give rise to a lawful suit for damages against the 
party from whom they [the injury] emanate on the ground that such acts, 
apart from the mere breach of promise, shall constitute a tort that 
requires redress. 15 
There are certain restrictions conceming who can enter into a betrothal. Married 
women obviously cannot be approached for betrothal as weIl as divorced women who 
are passing through their waiting period ('idda). Widows, on the other hand, can be 
approached during their 'idda period, but can only be offered an implicit betrothal such 
as '1 intend to marry a suit able wife' rather than an explicit betrothal such as '1 would 
like to marry yoU.,16 
Following the betrothal period, the parties enter into a marriage contract or nikap. 
Unlike the Christian notion of marriage where the union is regarded as a religious 
14 Ibid. 
15 Cited from Nasir, IsJamic LawofPersonaJ Status, p. 47. 
16 Ibid., p. 46. 
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sacrament, an Islamic marriage is strictly a contractual agreement that specifically 
confers legal status on a couple and their future children. 17 In its simplest form, the 
Islamic nikiï1J is a document that announces to the community the couple's marital 
status. Yet in the modem world, the definition marriage has taken on another 
dimension. For instance, according to Article 4 of the Moroccan Moudawana marri age 
is defined in the following manner: 
Marriage is a legal contract by which a man and woman mutually consent 
to unite in a common and enduring conjugallife. Its purpose is fidelity, 
virtue and the creation of a stable family, under the supervision of both 
spouses. 18 
This definition reflects a Euro-centric outlook. 
A marriage contract in the Muslim world is initiated when either the bride or the 
groom (or their respective guardians) proposes an offer (ljiib) of matrimony.19 For a 
valid marriage (~alJllJ) to be in effect, the offer must be accepted (qabiîl) by the other 
party.z° Usually both parties are physically present at the marriage ceremony. However, 
it is possible to be married through letters or in sorne instances by way of the telephone. 
In such cases, a marriage is valid so long as the offer is accepted during the same 
meeting in which the proposaI is initially read or heard, and provided that this is done in 
the presence of the requisite guardians and witnesses.21 
17 Ibid., p. 45. 
18 Cited from Global Rights, "The Moroeean Family Code (Moudawana) ofFebruary 5, 2004: An 
unofficial English Translation of the original Arabie text" (2005): 
http://www.gIobairights.orgisitelDoeServerlMoudawana-English _ Transiation.pdf?doeID=3106. 
19 David Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim PersonaJ Law (London: Croom HeIm, 1987): p. 41. 
20 Asaf A. Fyzee, Outlines ofMuhammadan Law(London: Oxford University Press, 1960): p. 74. 
21 Nasir, IsJamic Law ofPersonaJ Status, p. 49. 
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An Islamic marriage contract requires the presence of two witnesses (shahld).22 
Contemporary legislation in Syria reads that '[i]t is a condition for the validity of a 
. marriage contract that it be witnessed by two men, or a man and two women, who are 
Muslim, sane and adult and shaH hear [the] offer and acceptance and understand the 
intention thereof. ,23 TraditionaHy, as for the validation of evidence before a judge 
(qiiç/i), witnesses to marriage had to be either a combination of two male or one male 
and two female Muslims or four females?4 This disparity is based on the principle that 
one male witness can take the place oftwo female witnesses due to the traditional view 
that men are more capable as witnesses because they play a greater role in the public 
forum. 
The marri age contract requires a clear indication on the part of the bride and the 
groom that they wish to marry. '1 have married myselfto you' or '1 have consented' are 
often the phrases found in marriage contracts in the Muslim world.25 Beyond the 
necessity of having clear consent, the actual substance of marriage contracts can vary 
greatly since couples may add certain conditions. For instance sorne contracts will 
include the amount of mahrthe wife will receive and whether or not this amount is to be 
paid promptly (mu'ajjal) or deferred (mu'ajjal)?6 In sorne marriage contracts, no 
mention is made of the mahr. This does not necessarily imply that no dower is paid to 
22 Unlike the different Sunnl schools oflaw, the Shl'ïï Ithnïï 'asharl school does not require witnesses to be 
present at the nikiip ceremony in order to validate the marriage. Rather their presence is a customary 
practice that is considered desirable. 
23 Cited from Nasir, Islamic Law of Personal Status, p. 56. 
24 Although this law is part of a modern code, it reflects a pre-modern sentiment. Namely, it fails to 
reflect the actuallives of CUITent Syrian women who are beginning to attain important positions within 
govemment, business and military circles. Thus, due to the codification of patriarchal values within 
modem Syrian legislation, gender inequality persists in that country at the structurallevel. 
25 Ibid., p. 74. 
26 Ibid., p.l14. 
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the bride; rather this omission is a matter of local custom.27 In countries where 
polygamy is permitted, the bride can have the contract state whether or not she is 
amenable to the idea that her husband will take another wife.28 This last point is a 
feature that was àvailable to women in the pre-modem period as weIl. Finally, the 
marriage is considered binding for both parties once the contract is signed.29 
Traditional interpretations of Islamic law as well as contemporary practice require 
that in order to validate a marriage, the bride and the groom must be represented by a 
guardian (wali). The guardian must be the agnate (a direct relative) of the couple 
entering into the marri age, or, in the absence of a suit able relative, a judge representing 
the local civil authority?O According to the traditional I:IanbaTI and I:Ianafi schools of 
law, the guardian can arrange a marriage for a pre-pubescent son or daughter.31 If the 
guardian arranges such a marriage of a daughter who is a virgin (bikr), she has the right 
to disapprove of the union and thus cannot be compelled into the marri age. A virgin is 
deemed to have given her consent to the marriage through various signs such as silence, 
laughter or crying.32 
27 Jamal J. Nasir, The Status ofWomen Under Islamic Law and Under Modem Islamic Legislation 
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1990): p. 46. 
28 The right that women have to set conditions in their marriage contracts has been codified in various 
legal systems throughout the Muslim world. For instance, the Jordanian PersonaJ Status Lawof 1976 
states the following: '[i]fthe wife stipulates a condition apt to secure her a lawful interest and not to 
infringe on a third party's right, e.g. not to be removed from her town, or to reserve to herselfthe right to 
divorce at will, or to live in a given locality, or for the husband not to marry another woman, the condition 
shall be valid and binding, and the failure to honor it shall give the wife the right to apply for cancellation 
without prejudice to any ofher material rights.' Cited from Nasir, Islamic Law of Personal Status. p. 58. 
29 Nasir, Islamic law ofPersonal Status, p. 59. 
30 Ibid., p. 53. 
31 Pearl and Menski, Muslim Family Law, p. 142. 
32 Susan A. Spectorsky, Chapters on Maillage and Divorce: Responses of Ibn lfanbal and Ibn Riihwayh 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993): p. 9. Although forced marriages are forbidden or iJarim they 
do occur. This fact is bom out in the following passage from Ibn ijanbal's commentary on marriage. 
When asked about the validity of a marriage in which a father gives his daughter up for marriage without 
consulting her, Ibn I:Ianbal has the following to say. '1 do not like it, but if she is sHent and is given in 
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Sorne countries have curbed the power guardians have in compelling a son or 
daughter into marriage. In Article 12/4 of the Moroccan Persona! Status Law, it is 
prohibited for a guardian to 'compel his daughter who has reached puberty, even if she is 
a virgin,'to marry without her permission and consent ... ,33 Tunisian law forbids the wall 
from contracting a woman under seventeen and a man under the age of twenty into 
marriage.34 This is a reversaI of a long-standing Islamic norm which permitted the wall 
to contract a virginal daughter (bikr) without her consent in the I:IanbaIi and I:Ianifi 
schools of law.35 Furthermore, in a number of countries, the guardian can no longer 
challenge or stop a marri age between two individuals who have attained the full 
capacity to marry. For instance, Iraqi Law 21/1979 states that 'no kin or st ranger may 
prevent the marriage of anyone who has the legal capacity for marriage ... .'36 In a 
recent case in Pakistan, a wealthy businessman, exercising his role as the waIL 
attempted to stop the marriage of his daughter to a college lecturer on the grounds that 
marriage, then rejects the marriage, she has no right to do that. Ifher father gives her in marriage without 
her consent, then it is a valid marriage. However 1 prefer that the father consult her.' Quoted from a 
compilation ofIs4aq b. Man~ür al-Kausaj, cited from Spectorsky, Chapters on Maniage and Divorce, p. 
143. 
33 Nasir, Islamic Law ofPersonaJ Status, p. 54. 
34 Ibid., p. 50. 
35 In the following question and response taken from a compilation of different legal views conceming 
marriage by Ibn I.Ianbal, we see an early opinion on the matter of child marriage. '1 asked my father about 
a man who gives his underage daughter in marriage, "Can she opt [to tum down the marri age] when she is 
of age?" He sai d, "She cannot exercise this option if her father gave her in marriage. If she could, then 
'A'isha could have with regard to the Prophet, because the Prophet married her when she was six or seven 
years old, had intercourse with her when she was nine, and died when she was eighteen.' Cited from 
Spectorsky, Chapters on Maniage and Divorce, p. 97. A women in such a marriage can file for divorce in 
the lianafi school oflaw. Known as the khiyar-aJ-bulügh (the option ofpuberty), girls can have a qiiifl 
annul their marriage so long as they declare, in front of a number ofwitnesses, their desire to divorce their 
husband. This divorce procedure is initiated when the girl declares her intentions at the moment ofher 
men arche (her first menstruation). For a full description ofthis form of divorce and how it was enacted 
see Mahmoud Yazbak, "Minor Marriages and Khiyar al-Bulügh in Ottoman Palestine: A Note on 
Women's Strategies in a Patriarchal Society," Islamic Law and Society> vol. 8 (2002): pp. 386-409. 
36 Nasir, Islamic Law ofPersonaJ Status, p. 54. 
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the groom was not her daughter's equal (kafi'a).37 Despite the father's attempts, the 
judge ruled against his wishes?8 Irrespective of the wali's ability to compel someone 
into a marri age, his participation is still required in order to validate the marriage 
contract in sorne countries?9 
One of the components of an Islamic marriage is the mahr. The mahror bridaI gift is 
not a necessary condition for a valid marri age; rather it is a consequence of the 
marriage.40 According to both Sunnl and Shl'a schools of law, it is the right of a 
Muslim bride to have a dower made available to her in full or through deferred 
payments. Although in pre-modem times the mahr was strictly seen as the financial 
component of the marriage contract, modem interpretations of this principle have 
shifted. Fyzee explains that the mahris a 'settlement in favor of the wife, a provision for 
a rainy day and socially, it became a check on the capricious exercise by the husband of 
his almost unlimited power of divorce.'41 In other word, full payment of the dower is 
seen as a deterrent against hastily conceived divorces on the part of the husband. 
Women who are repudiated by their husbands Can daim anY deferred portion of their 
dower, though this right can be denied in cases where the woman initiates the divorce 
via a khur. 
37 The principle of equality in marriage (kafii'a) stipulates that in order to establish a suit able union 
between the married couple, the groom or his family must be of the same or greater financial and social 
standing as the bride's family. However, there does not exist a stipulation requiring the bride to be of the 
same class as the groom's family. See Fyzee, OutIines ofMuhammadan Law, pp. 91-92. 
38 HafIz Abdul Waheed v. Asma Jahangir, K.L.R. 1997, Shariat Cases 121. Cited from Pearl and Mensiki, 
Muslim Family Law, pp. 154-55. 
39 Nasir, Islamic Law ofPersonal Status, p. 52. 
40 Ibid., p. 83. 
41 Fyzee, Outlines ofMuhammadan Law, p. Ill. 
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One of the most well-known features of Islamic marri age law is the matter of 
polygamy. As discussed above, the practice ofpolygamy has been subject to reform in 
various Muslim states. For instance, Tunisia interpreted provisions of the Sharl'a in a 
manner that was completely inconsistent with traditional u~iïl methods but maintained 
the veneer of an Islamic appearance. During the presidency of HabIb Bourghuiba (d. 
2000), the 1956 Tunisian Law of Personal Status banned the practice of polygamy 
altogether. The practice of polygamy is sanctioned in verse 4:3 of the Qur'an which 
provides that men could 'Marry of the women, who seem good to you, two three or four; 
and ifye fear that ye cannot do justice then only one ... ,42 Focusing on the latter portion 
of the Siïra, the Tunisian reformers maintained that only the Prophet could do justice to 
more than one wife and concluded that the practice of polygamy was not a right 
available to Muslim men generally.43 Apart from Turkey and Tunisia, few Muslim 
countries have considered imposing an outright ban on the practice. Rather, most 
countries have curbed the institution through indirect means. In countries such as 
Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, husbands must apply to the courts for permission to take on 
subsequent wives.44 Under Indonesian law, the courts may permit a man to take on 
addition al wives based on the following grounds: 
(i) his wife cannot carry out her conjugal duties, or 
(ii) his wife becomes crippled or terminally ill, or 
(iii) his wife cannot give him children, and 
Ca) his present wife or wives give him permission, 
42 Qur'an, 4:3. 
43 Anderson suspects that the "primary reason for banning the practice in Tunisia was based on 
Bourghuiba's view that institutions such as polygamy, once deemed socially relative 'were now offensive 
to civilized conscience today.' See Anderson, Law Refonn, p. 63. 
44 Iraqi law, prior to the 2003 American invasion, maintains that ajudge has the discretion to decide 
whether or not a husband can marry subsequent wives based on whether or not he is 'fmancially capable 
of supporting more than one wife' and if 'there is a legitimate interest' in pursuing a polygamous 
relationship. Cited from Nasir, Islamic Law ofPersonaJ Status, p. 67. 
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(b) his ability to support all his wives and children is certain, and 
(c) his ability to be fair to all his wives and children is certain.45 
In Morocco, a husband must inform both his current wife and subsequent wives that he 
intends to enter into a polygamous relationship.46 Meanwhile, women in countries such 
as Jordan and Syria have the option of stipulating in their marri age contract whether or 
not they are willing to permit their husbands to take on additional wives.47 If the 
husband takes on an additional wife, the first wife can sue for divorce. 
Islamic Divorce: Brief Overview 
An Islamic divorce is initiated in the following ways: 1) by the husband via the 
.ta1iiq; 2) mutual consent of the spouses by way of a mubiira'a; and 3) by judicial order or 
mskh. Women can request that their husbands divorce them via a .taliiq. this process is 
known as a khul'. However, requesting this type of divorced does not necessarily mean 
that the wife's wishes will be met in light of the role the husband plays in deciding 
whether or not to fulfill the request. Today, various forms of these divorce practices 
have been codified throughout the Muslim world. 
There are three variants of the .ta1iiq which include the most correct (alJsan), the 
correct (lJasan), and the sinful (bid'a) forms. The most correct form of .ta1iiq begins 
when a husband, who is free from rage and sober, informs his wife of his desire to 
divorce by uttering a single .taliiq statement.48 This statement can be delivered by word 
of mouth or in writing. In both cases the intention must be explicit and should contain 
45 Cited from Pearl and Menski, MusJim FamiJy Law. p. 245. 
46 Cited from Nasir, Islamic Law ofPersonai Status, p. 68. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Most schools do not deem a divorce uttered under coercion as valid, though the ijanafis do consider a 
divorce uttered under a state of coercion as valid. See Nasir, Islamic Law ofPersonai Status, p. 108. 
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the word 'faJiïq.' In order to put the apsan divorce into effect, the declaration of faliïq 
should be invoked between a woman's menstrual period (tuhr). The declaration of 
divorce is then followed by a waiting period ('idda) of three menstrual cycles (qlffÜj 
during which time the couple avoids aIl sexual relations. The 'idda has a cautionary 
purpose in that it acts as a means ofverifying the parentage of any child the woman may 
be carrying. Having uttered the alJsan formula of divorce, the husband can revoke his 
initial divorce so long as he does so during the 'idda period. The decision to resume the 
marriage is signaled either by word of mouth or through the resumption of sexual 
activity between the couple. In either case, it is the prerogative of the husband to 
initiate the marital rapprochement. If, after three consecutive menstrual cycles, the 
husband has not revoked his initial faliïq, the couple are considered to be divorced. The 
alJsan divorce is described as the 'little method' (~aghJr) due to the fact that if, after the 
divorce is finalized, the couple wish to re-marry, they are free to do so. 
A .ta1iiq can be pronounced in another manner which is also acéeptable, albeit less 
than the previous example. The iJasan divorce occurs when the husband makes three 
separate pronouncements ofhis intention to divorce as opposed to the single declaration 
discussed above. The first two pronouncements are made in between three successive 
menstrual cycles in order to allow the husband time to reconcile with his wife as weIl as 
to ascertain the parent age of any unbom child during the 'idda period. Upon the 
completion of the 'idda, the husband reaffirms his intention to divorce a third and final 
time. F ollowing this last declaration, the divorce is considered to be irrevocable. Thus 
the iJasan form of divorce is similar to the alJsan divorce in that both are revocable to a 
point and both make use of a waiting period. What differentiates the two forms is the 
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fact that the lJasan divorce is considered to have a greater (kabliJ finality given the 
husband's triple dec1aration of divorce. In practical terms, this means that the couple 
cannot remarry until the woman marries another man and is subsequently divorced or 
pursues a divorce on her own. Only after this intermediary stage takes place can the 
couple re_marry.49 
Another form of divorce, this one less acceptable, is the so-called 'triple !aliicj based 
on innovations (bid'a) that are extra-Qur'anic in origin. The main difference between 
the !aJiiqu'l-bid'a and the more acceptable forms of divorce discussed above is the 
immediate irrevocability of the triple ,taliiq. In this regard it falls outside the acceptable 
provisions of the Shaii'a and is thus regarded as sinfu1.50 Although there are ethical 
problems associated with this form of divorce, the triple !aJiiq is occasionally invoked in 
parts of the Muslim world. The divorce cornes into effect at the precise moment at 
which a husband dec1ares his intentions. The divorce is initiated by uttering a phrase 
such as; '1 divorce you, 1 divorce you, 1 divorce yoU!,51 Following this dec1aration, the 
marriage is terminated irrevocably and the wife receives her full dower. 52 Once the 
divorce has been uttered, the wife passes through a period of 'idda, in order to ascertain 
the parent age of any child she may be carrying. Unlike in the two previous instances of 
divorce, the husband is not permitted to revoke the divorce during the 'idda period. 
Finally, if the couple wishes to remarry, either during or after the 'idda period, the 
woman must first marry another man and then go through another divorce before 
49 Fayzee, Outlines ofMuhammadan Law. pp. 129-130. 
50 Pearl and Menski, Muslim Family Law. p. 282. 
51 Fayzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law. p. 130. 
52 Recently a Malaysian man divorced his wife by way of a text message (Short Message System or SMS) 
sent via a cell phone. The judge who presided over this case determined that the electronic message had 
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returning to the previous husband. In an attempt to curb this form of divorce, various 
countries have adopted the Shl'a practice of disa1lowing the triple la1aq. For instance, 
Article 3 of the Egyptian Law No. 25, promulgated in 1929, states that '[a] repudiation 
in which a number is implied whethèr verbally or by a gesture shall be counted as one. ,53 
Similar provisions have also been adopted in countries such as Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Oman. 54 
Women can initiate a lalaqby requesting a khu/'from their husbands.55 This form 
of divorce is quite common in the modem Muslim world, belying the commonly held 
notion that women have no say in divorce. The foundation of this form of divorce is 
spelled out in the Qur'an where it states, in reference to a woman seeking to break her 
marriage contract, that 'it is no sin for either of them if the woman ransom[ s] herself. ,56 
As the above passage suggests, a woman seeking a divorce may be required, if the 
husband so chooses, to forfeit her dower and any other financial benefits promised to her 
in the marriage contract.57 
Despite the fact that the wife initiates the divorce, it is up to the husband to either 
accept or reject the demand to dissolve the marriage.58 So, although women have the 
ability to request a divorce, they do not have equal access to bringing a divorce into 
fruition as the husband has the ultimate power in accepting or rejecting the wife's 
the same intent as a more traditionallet1er demanding a divorce and thus was valid. See, Balan Moses et 
al., "Divorce Declaration through SMS Valid, Rules Court,"New Straits Times, July 26 (2003): p. 8. 
53 Cited from N asir, Islamic Law of Persona! Status, p. 111. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The traditionalIJanafi school of law does not provide women with the right to initiate a divorce 
through the khuJ'. See Pearl and Menski, Muslim Family Law, p. 283. 
56 Qur'iin, 2:229. 
57 Fayzee, Outlines ofMuhammadan Law, p. 140. 
58 Pearl and Menski, Muslim Family Law, p. 284. 
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wishes. In cases where both parties agree to mutually end their marriage by way of a 
mubiïra 'a~ the wife is not obliged to forfeit any dower that is owed to her, nor is she 
required to 'ransom' herself from her husband as in the case of the khur divorce. 59 
Although most forms of Muslim divorce have traditionally been carried out outside 
the courts, a Muslim couple can in fact seek divorce by way of a judicial rescission or 
/àskh. The most noteworthy ex ample of this form of divorce is the Jj'iÎ1l or mutual 
imprecation. In cases where a husband suspects that his wife has committed an act of 
adultery or zina, he can petition the courts to grant him a divorce. The reasons he would 
choose this avenue and not simply utter a .taliiq formula are based on the harsh 
punishments associated with uttering false accusations and the even more severe 
punishments linked to adultery. Although adultery is no longer a capital crime in most 
Muslim states, the social stigma associated with this act remains and thus individuals 
may opt for this form of divorce to avoid such criticism. Another form of /àskh divorce 
is one that is initiated by a wife who faces various hardships such as desertion or abuse 
at the hands of a husband. However, owing to the diversity inherent within the Sharl'a, 
this form of divorce was traditionally c10sed to members of the I-Janafi and Shiifi 'i 
schools.60 Meanwhile, women from the Miilikl and I-JanbaIi schools could petition the 
courts for a divorce and, if successful, could receive a court-granted faskh along with 
their full dower. 
59 Ibid., pp. 284-285. 
60 These schools oflaw have dissented due to their beHefthat divorce is a reprehensible act and should be 
avoided altogether. Rather than allow for divorce, these schools advocate reconciliation between the two 
parties. Any divorce, if ultimately enacted, must be in the form of a laliïq or khu/'. 
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Apart from the faskh, most traditional forms of Islamic divorce do not require the 
intercession of the courts. However, this phenomenon has changed in recent times 
following the reforms to Islamic law which began during the nineteenth century and 
continue to this day. The increased role of the courts is due, in part, to the desire to curb 
certain excesses such as the use of the irrevocable triple .taliiqby men. Thus in countries 
such as Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan and Iran, .taliiq divorces uttered outside court chambers 
are not considered valid. However, demonstrating the diversity inherent within Islamic 
law, Saudi Arabia still recognizes this form of divorce as valid. It should be noted that 
the bureaucratization of the law and the requirement to register divorces with state 
authorities has not been uniformly applied and followed in sorne Muslim societies. In 
Pakistan, for instance, Article 7 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance maintains that all 
divorces must be registered with courts. This requirement, however, is a purely civil 
matter and is not part of the Sharl'a proper. Thus, although one will not be in violation 
of the Sharl'a for not reporting a divorce, one may find themselves spending three 
months in prison or paying a fine of up to 1,000 rupees upon failure to register a 
divorce.61 Owing to the increased Islamization of Pakistani society, the provisions that 
require the registration of marriages and divorces in that country have come under 
scrutiny as a result of their extra-Sharl'a origins. Today, Pakistani case law clearly 
demonstrates that men in that country not only continue to pronounce the unilateral and 
irrevocable .taliiq7 but also fail to register these divorces with the civil authorities.62 
61 Pearl and Menski, Muslim Family Law, pp. 338-344. 
62 Ibid. p. 360. 
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This very brief review of marriage and divorce legislation brings to light the scope of 
Islamic law in use throughout the world today. Unlike its c1assical and medieval 
predecessors, current legislation in the Muslim world is predicated on the nation-state 
model of justice whereby the central government seeks exclusive control over legal 
1 
affairs. This has resulted in a loss of judicial autonomy previously employed by judges 
during the pre-modem periods an4, as we shaH see, has resulted in a reduction of 
women's rights vis-à-vis their access to divorce. 
Modem Legal Reform in the Muslim World 
Like other emerging nation states that appeared after the faH of the Ottoman 
Empire, Egypt also enacted a hybridized legal system that borrowed provisions from 
French Civil law in matters relating to commercial and criminal codes while 
maintaining certain Shar1'a principles for family matters.63 To the casual observer, these 
reforms appeared to simplify the legal process and grant women new rights. In reality, 
this was not the case. According to Arnira El-Azhary Sonbol, a prof essor at Georgetown 
University, women actuaHy 'experienced a marked deterioration in gender relations 
under what can only be caIled state patriarchy since the government extended its 
authority over aIl matters of family, gender and personal relations,'64 For instance, 
Egypt enacted a law stipulating a woman's obedience to her husband. This law, the bayt 
al-ta'ah (house of obedience), now made it permissible to incarcerate a wife in the 
63 Arnira Mashhour, "Islamic Law and Gender Equality-Could there be a Common Ground?: a Study of 
Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law in Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt," Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 27 (2005): p. 578. 
64Sonbol, "Rethinking Women," p. 113. 
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family home if it was felt that she was misbehaving by either a husband or a judge.65 
The rationale in formulating laws of this kind did not originate from Middle Eastern 
cultural sources alone; rather these laws reflected the principles articulated in France's 
NapoJeonic Code which characterized the role of women as one associated with 'virtue, 
reproduction and family. ,66 
These Euro-centric gender roles reduced the ability of Egyptian women to access 
divorce. During the Mamliïk and Ottoman periods, court records regularly demonstrate 
that certain women who suffered from spousal abuse (ç/arar), obtained divorces from 
judges.67 These divorces were granted despite that fact that under tradition al Iianafi 
doctrine, women could not easily request /àskh divorces in such cases due to the fact 
that within the text of the Qur'an, husbands are permitted to punish their wives within 
certain limits (ta'dlb).68 However, the reported divorces taking place in pre-modern 
Egypt suggest that judges were using their own discretion in granting women ~ivorces 
based on the societal needs at the time. In fact, during the pre-modern period, Iianafi 
qiùfis would invite judges from other schools of law that had more accessible divorce 
doctrines to preside over certain cases in order to facilitate the proceedings.69 However, 
the new codified laws stripped judges of this discretionary power and focused their 
attention on applying the letter of the law. 
65 Ibid., p. 114. 
66 Bonnie C. Smith, Changing Lives: Women in European History Sinee 1700 (Toronto: D.C.Heath, 
1989): pp. 120-122. 
67 Sonbol, "Rethinking Women," pp. 114-115. 
68lmmanue1 Naveh, "The Tort ofInjury and Dissolution ofMarriage at the Wife's Initiative in Egyptian 
MalJkamat aJ-NaqrjRulings," Is1amie Law and Society; vol. 9 (2001): p. 22. 
69 Judith Tucker, "Revisiting Reform: Women and the Ottoman Law of Family Rights, 1917," Arab 
Studies, vol. 4 (1996): p. 13. 
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This does not mean that women did not have the legal option to seek judicial divorce 
in Egypt. For instance, the 1929 Decrees Conceming Provisions in PersonaJ Status 
adopted doctrine found in Maliki law whieh aIlowed women to aecess fàskh divorces. 
According to the new law, "[i]f a wife aIleges that her husband is abusing her in such a 
way as to make it impossible for people of their c1ass to continue with the matrimonial 
relationship, she may ask the qiçlI to dissolve the marri age, whereupon the qiçlI shaIl 
grant her an irrevocable divorce, provided the abuse is established and reconciliation 
appears to be impossible .. :70 
Although the new law codified a woman's ability to apply for a divorce, in reality 
not aIl women were able !o exercise this right. The centralized court system and its 
bureaucratie procedures required individuals to bire lawyers to represent them in court. 
This, in turn, made the costs associated with court attendance prohibitive for many 
women.
71 Furthermore, because of the laws of obedience, courts often justified a 
husband's physical abuse over his wife due to the perception that she lacked discipline.72 
The result was that numerous women who applied for divorces were frequently denied 
their requests based on patriarchal principles that were now codified into Egyptian law. 
However, when, and if, these cases were appealed to the MalJkamat aJ-Naqçl, the highest 
court of the land, the lower court rulings were consistently overturned.73 It goes without 
saying that appealing lower court decisions entailed financial costs few could afford. It 
should be noted that although women had the right to seek divorce under the newly 
70 Cited from Naveh, "The Tort of Injury," p. 22. 
71 Sonbol, "Rethinking Women," p. 115. 
72 Mashhour, "Islamic Law and Gender," p. 583. 
73 Ibid. 
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reformed laws, a judge acted as the final arbiter in granting the divorce. Meanwhile men 
retained their exclusive capacity to declare unilateral divorce. In this regard, the 
modernization of Egyptian law did not improve a woman's overall ability to seek 
divorce. On the contrary, devoid of the flexibility inherent in the traditional practice of 
Islamic law, women faced various obstacles in pursuing divorce - a trend that would 
continue throughout much of the twentieth century. In fact, by the 1990's sorne divorce 
cases were taking more than ten years to settle.74 
Throughout this time, the Egyptian govemment attempted to offer women greater 
access to divorce, particularly in cases dealing with polygamy. However, with the 
growing revival of an Islamist discourse in Egypt following the 1967 war, these 
attempts were sidetracked. Conservative groups, such as the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, did not endorse the govemment's tampering with principles of law, such 
as polygamy, that were entrenched within the text of the Qur'an. The debates that 
transpired in Egypt over how family law would change point to the existing tensions 
between religious and secular camps in that country. Inspired by feminist and secular 
discourse, a number of influential Egyptian women sought to amend the country's laws 
so as to completely ban polygamy and allow women access to divorce if their husbands 
took on additional wives. Among these women was Dr. 'A'isha Ratib, an Egyptian 
prof essor of law who would later become that country's Minister of Social Affairs. 
During the polygamy debates, voices opposing secular reforms emanated from high 
ranking religious scholars at Cairo's al-Azhar University - one of the Arab world's most 
74 Mashour, "Islamic Law and Gender," p. 583. 
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prestigious Islamic educational institutions. Among those who wished to curtail the 
reforms that did not conform to traditional lJ.siï1 aJ-fiqh was Dr. 'Abd ai-Ifalim Mal].mud, 
the university's highest ranking official or Shaykh al-Azhar. While sorne segments of 
Egyptian society were demanding reforms to statutory law, others, namely individuals 
representing conservative religious voices, demanded a complete return to Islamic law 
(ta!blq aJ-Shail'a).75 This was to be expected given Egypt's long history of adhering to 
I:Ianafi doctrine that had been radically altered. Dr. Maçmud thus became a spokesman 
for a return to a more traditionallegal system which would not only limit the ability for 
women to sue for divorce but would also reinstate traditional Islamic punishments 
(iJudiïd) for theft, unlawful intercourse, and apostasy.76 Needless to say, polygamy was 
not something the conservative camp wished to see eliminated from Egyptian society 
owing to its appearance in the Qur'an and acceptance within Ifanafi doctrine. 
When Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (d. 1981) implemented his wide ranging 
liberalization policies (aJ-Infitiil} aJ-Iqti$iicli) in economic and social spheres, he also 
suggested that reforms to personal status laws could be expected. Despite the calls 
against such reforms from conservative religious figures, Sadat promulgated Law no. 44 
in 1979 which stipulated that polygamous marri ages were harmful and thus were 
automatic grounds for women to sue for divorce. 77 His criticism of what had been a 
standard, albeit marginally practiced component of traditional Islamic family law, put 
him out of favor with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood who were already 
opposing Siidiit's secularizing tendencies. Siidiit's attempts to re-shape Egypt's cultural 
75 Naveh, "The Tort of Injury," p. 28. 
76 Ibid., p. 28. 
77 Ibid., p. 29. 
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and economic practices may have ultimately cost him his life as he was assassinated by 
Islamic radicals in 1981. 
Seeking to quell the growing discontent in Egypt, the High Constitutional Court of 
Egypt eventually deemed Siidiit's reforms unconstitutional in 1985. The court 
maintained that the reforms did not constitute a national emergency - and thus could not 
be enacted into law without the input of the country's National Assembly. In the 
attempt to satisfy religious opposition from groups such as the Brotherhood, European 
parliamentary procedure was invoked to end Siidiit's legal reforms. This demonstrates 
how far removed the Shaii'a had drifted away from traditional ll~iïl al-fiqh. Siidiit's 
Law no. 44 was replaced with Law no. 100 issued by a committee within the Egyptian 
People's Assembly for Matters of Religion, Society, and Waqfin 1985. This new law 
served to Hmit women's automatic access to divorce when their husbands took on 
subsequent wives. Under the new legislation, a husband was required to obtain consent 
from his first wife prior to taking on a second wife. If the first wife denied her husband 
consent to marry an additional wife, she could sue for divorce. However, as was the case 
with the 1929 Decrees Concerning Provisions in Personal Statlls, it remained up to the 
court's discretion whether or not to allow the divorce proceedings to come to fruition.78 
Law no. 100 did not meet the needs of Egyptian women who increasingly were 
seeking to divorce men who had taken on additional wives. Due to the barriers that the 
new law placed in front of women seeking judicial divorces, an enormous backlog of 
cases appeared in the Egyptian court system. Seeking to relieve the courts of this 
backlog as weIl as re-open the possibility of making divorce available to women who's 
78 Ibid., p. 31. 
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husbands took on subsequent wives, the Egyptian govemment ofI:Iusnl Mubarak issued 
a new law governing personal status in 2000. Law no. l, often referred to as the 'khui' 
law', stipulated that women could now obtain court-granted divorces without their 
husbands' consent so long as they agreed to retum the mahr or dower.79 Although 
certain Muslim authorities such as al-Azhar University were now on board with the 
govemment's reforms, religious conservatives such as the Brotherhood remain opposed 
to the new law because it is seen as a violation of traditional Islamic principles.8o 
The modernization and codification of Islamic laws in Egypt demonstrates the 
difficulty inherent in reforming Islamic law outside traditional u:5üItechniques. Clearly, 
such reforms are necessary in meeting the challenges of modemity, but equally 
important are the ways in which the reforms are carried out. Because jurisprudence is 
now controlled by the nation-state and no longer the enclave of religious scholars, 
reforms will suffer from charges of illegitimacy from those representing an Islamist 
discourse. 
Modemity has brought significant substantive and procedural changes to Islamic 
legal practice. As a result, it is fair to say that the modem Muslim world is now marked 
by a new form of legal hermeneutics or quasi-ijtihiid Hallaq maintains that the newly 
evolving practice oflegal interpretation 'suffers from a methodological flaw,81 which in 
tum creates problems of legitimacy. Moreover, the new laws have, in sorne cases, 
limited women's empowerment while entrenching patriarchy. The project to create a 
79 Mashhour, "Islamic Law and Gender," p. 583. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Hallaq, A History, p. 211. 
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viable system of Islamic arbitration in Canada is problematic on a theoretical level due 
to the fact that traditional forms of Sharl' a are not readily av ail able in the Muslim world 
today. In fact, Muslim-Canadians who seek to use Islamic legal principles in arbitration 
have, on the whole, failed to acknowledge the changes that have altered the Sharl'a 
during the course of the last cent ury. This shortcoming raises questions as to the 
authenticity of their project. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in more detail in the 
sixth chapter, these same individuals had limited or no training to effectively participate 
in such legal matters. Although the demand to have Islamic arbitration recognized in 
Canada appears to sorne devout Muslims as authentic; in reality the move strays farther 
away from the Shan' a. 
With the codification of law, beginning in the Ottomans Empire, the way in which 
the Sharl'a was articulated ceased to follow its traditional trajectory. In its place 
emerged a hybridized legal system that had the veneer of the former Sharl'a but not its 
methods. This has created numerous tensions and charges of illegitimacy by members of 
the religious community seeking to re-install Islamic virtues in countries such as Egypt. 
The dynamism that existed in the past (which granted women sorne forms of 
empowerment) is, for the most part, gone in favor of statutory laws that are statie and 
often fail to refleet the aetual needs of a given society. Any suggestion that Canadian 
forms of Islamie arbitration will follow Sharl'a prineiples thus has to be qualified with 
the fact that, although the arbitration may be influeneed by Islam, it eannot adhere to 
bygone forms of applied traditional Islamie law. 
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Chapter 3 
Liberal Universalism 
Understanding how Islamic law will be viewed in Canada requires insight in liberal 
perceptions of diversity. Liberal philosophy has greatly influenced Canadian policy 
makers and the laws they have put forward that deal with diversity and 
multiculturalism. This chapter will demonstrate that the freedoms offered to the 
individual are not unlimited. Rather, there are limits to freedom within liberal societies 
when individuals wish to govem themselves under religious law. The underlying reality 
of the freedoms offered under the liberal banner is the following: although the 
philosophy is open to pluralism, it also carries an inherent universalism that seeks to 
nullify the diversity threatening societal unity. In other words, liberalism inherently 
embodies the attitude that different peoples will be tolerated so long as they follow the 
same world-view. This chapter will trace this tendency as articulated by various liberal 
thinkers in order to demonstrate that the use ofIslamic law in Canada is untenable given 
the CUITent liberal agenda operating the country. 
Liberalism, or more specifically political liberalism, is a philosophical movement 
that emerged out of the Enlightenment. One of its principal goals at that time was the 
transformation of eighteenth century European society from one fixed on foundational 
principles such as religion and the rule of the nobility to one that sought greater freedom 
for individuals in their pursuits of happiness. Although classicalliberalism did not have 
as its goal the elimination of religion altogether, early liberal thinkers sought to limit its 
effects on society . 
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Classical Liberalism 
Canadian liberalism is derived from European thinkers such as John Locke (d. 1704) 
who advocated the notion that God created individuals as rational beings who would 
come together and form govemments that would utilize legislative assemblies that 
would in turn issue positive law. For Locke, a weH-run society consisted of a federal 
system with legislatures, a judiciary, and adequate checks and balances to preserve 
individual liberty and thereby facilitate the creation of wealth. The kind of society 
Locke advocated was heavily reliant on rational discourse, valued private property, and 
unified structures of authority within territorial boarders. 1 These characteristics were 
emerging in Europe during Locke's lifetime. However, these principles were not 
necessarily exported to societies that were being colonized by Europeans such as 
Canada. Although Locke assumed that aH humans were equal, the absence of liberal 
characteristics in foreign societies marked their developmental inferiority and opened 
the door for Europeans to impose their values on non-European locals.2 
Respect for diversity was not an issue to be seriously considered by European 
settlers during the 'discovery' of the New World. Rather, apart from the struggle to 
survive, the settler's main preoccupation would be applying the universalizing 
tendencies of both Chrlstianity and mercantilism. Locke himself endorsed this dual 
1 John Locke, The Second Treatise ofCiviJ Govemment, in C.B. Macpherson, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1980). 
2 Europeans frequently de-hurnanized the Native populations of the Americas during the colonial period. 
Writing in 1675, Captain Wait Winthrop, an English officer, penned the following lines of poetry 
describing the Aboriginal people of New England. 'A swarm of Flies, they may arise, a Nation to Annoy, 
Yea Rats and Mice, or Swarms of Lice a Nation may destroy.' See Douglas Edward Leach, "A Puritan 
View of the Indians," in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn eds., The History and SocioJogy of Genocide: 
Analysis and Case Studies(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990): p. 194. 
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thrust of English colonialism in North America. He did not regard the Aboriginal 
peoples of North America as having the industry, reason and generallevel of civility 
that the English colonizers possessed.3 Civilizations that did not meet the emerging 
European standards were deemed to be inferior and in need of assistance in the form of 
colonization. For Locke, and those who adhered to the principles of colonial expansion, 
the Native populations of North America were not deemed to have fully developed their 
rational, political and economic potential. English colonialists were, however, on hand 
to guide the Natives to the light of reason and industry.4 lronically, Locke, who was 
attempting ta rid Europe of Christian 'perfectionism,' had little difficulty exporting his 
brand of moral perfectionism to the New World. English 'civilization' was to be a boon 
for Natives who would ultimately benefit from the gift of rationality and industry 
bestowed upon them by the English. In this regard, diversity, according to Locke, was 
desirable once different peoples created similar institutions of government and 
economy. However, there remained one caveat, although European values would be 
installed in foreign lands, native inhabitants ofthose newly colonized regions would not 
have equal footing along side the conquering elite. 
Another English thinker who promoted liberal values over those of other cultures 
was J. S. Mill. According to Mill, the sum total of an individual's happiness would 
translate into general happiness for the entire community, resulting in a healthy, 
balanced and well-ordered polity. In a society that positioned individual happiness as a 
3 Locke, The Second Treatise, chapter 5 paragraph 25. 
4 Locke makes his favoritism of the English over Native ways oflife in America very clear in the 
following quotation conceming farming. '1 aske whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of 
America ... without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres will yield the needy and 
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noble goal, a great deal of importance would be placed on individual choice as a means 
of bringing about this state of being. In practical terms, a society that permitted 
individuals to develop along their own paths would foster diversity which would make 
life more aesthetically pleasing, while at the same time stimulate creativity and 
knowledge. On a politicallevel, governments in emerging liberal societies would accord 
the citizen the requisite freedom and liberties required to achieve their goals by not 
interfering in their choices and by not forcing them to abide by a particular way of life. 
Like Locke, Mill endorsed a certain universalizing version of liberalism. 
Envisioning diverse peoples living together but sharing one world-view Mill explains 
that: 
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a 
Basque of French Navarre to be brought into the CUITent of ideas and 
feelings of a highly civilized people - to be a member of the 
French nationality, admitted on equal terms to aIl the privileges of French 
citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity 
and prestige of French power - than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-
savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, 
without participation or interest in the general movement of the world.s 
Mill also applied this unitary vision to colonial matters. For instance, he saw in 
European societies such as France and England 'superior people' who were burdened 
with the task of civilizing the peoples of Africa and Asia.6 This ethnocentric equation, 
otherwise known as the so-called 'white-man's burden', was the philosophical 
cornerstone of British as weIl as French colonialism. 
wretched inhabitants as many conveniences oflife as ten acres of equally fertile land doe in Devonshire 
where they are weIl cultivated.' See Locke, Two Treatis~ Chapter 2, paragraph 37. 
5 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Govemments (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University, 2004): http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/jsmill/considerations.pdf.p. 200. 
6 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 45. 
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This universalizing tendency was also present in Mill's view on colonial matters in 
Canada. His personal endorsement of Lord Durham's report (1838) reflects his attitude 
that diverse peoples can exist together, albeit ascribing to one way of life. The Durham 
Report, which came out following the French Canadian Patriot Rebellions of Lower 
Canada in 1837, attempted to settle the growing disputes between French Canadians in 
Lower Canada and their English neighbors in Upper Canada. Lord Durham's proposed 
solution was to do away with cultural diversity by assimilating French Canadians into a 
united Canada that would reflect English values and institutions.7 Therefore, French 
Canadians were free to act in whatever manner they wished, so long as they did so 
within a society ruled under British standards. For early liberals such as Mill, sorne 
cultures should be respected, preserved and promoted while those deemed non-liberal, 
irrational, threatening or just different should be assimilated. Whereas individuals were 
equal, cultures were not. This pattern of liberalism, which on the surface promotes a 
certain measure of freedom and autonomy, seeks to assimilate difference in matters of 
culture. This type of aggressive liberalism would reproduce itself in Canada owing to 
the country's coloniallineage. 
Throughout the course of European history, major currents such as colonialism have 
had certain liberal undertones behind them. The 'white-man's burden' was partly a 
liberal project focused on spreading European civilization and institutions to non-
European peoples while reaping economic benefits from far-off colonies. Part and parcel 
of this project was implanting European-inspired legal systems into the colonies. For 
7 Graeme Wynn, "On the Margins of Empire: 1760-1840," in Craig Brown ed., The IIIustrated History of 
Canada (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996): p. 213. 
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instance, in India during the British Raj, British courts altered many of the local 
commercial and criminal laws while outlawing practices such as slavery that were 
deemed repugnant to English sensibilities.8 The question here is not whether or not 
slavery should be abolished; it must be eliminated at all costs. The point of interest for 
the present discussion is the manner in which the British colonial authorities eliminated 
local practices: British models of justice were simply imported into India as models of 
correct procedure. Holding the reigns of power, and seeking to create a justice system 
based on the British model, colonial administrators succeeded in distorting local 
customs pertaining to legal matters in accordance with British tradition, rather than 
permitting local institutions the benefit of internal and authentic change. The message 
was clear: although colonialism dealt with diverse peoples, there would nevertheless be 
an attempt to impose one overarching political system that would ultimately govern 
social diversity in places such as British-controlled India. Although liberalism was not 
at the forefront of the colonial adventure (this honor went to commerce), liberalism had 
a direct role in the prevailing philosophy at the time. Throughout this history, the 
universalizing tendencies of liberalism were always prevalent. Non-European and 
traditional societies which had different ways of organizing, governing and defining 
themselves were deemed to be inferior and ultimately in need of liberalizing tendencies. 
8 Michael R. Anderson, "Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India," in David Arnold and 
Peter Robb eds., Institutions and Ideologies: a SOAS South Asia Reader(London: Curzon Press, 1993): p. 
171. 
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Contemporary Liberalism 
Although shedding the overt ethnocentrism that frequently appeared in classical 
liberalism, contemporary liber ais such as John Rawls (d. 2002) also carry the same 
universalizing tendencies. The importance of Rawls in understanding modem liberalism 
cannot be understated. Two of his books, A TheOly of Justice (1971) and Political 
Liberalism (1993) have set the tone of modem political philosophy for the last thirty 
years and continue to set the standard for discussions on liberalism. Like his classical 
predecessors, Rawls also carries a universalizing strain in his thought proèess. However, 
Rawls distinguishes his brand of moral perfectionism from that of his classical 
counterparts by taking into account the inherent diversity of modem multicultural 
societies. Before discussing this point however, let us first unpack the main message of 
Rawls. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to focus the debate away from the simple 
acceptance of plurality to the actual means of promoting justice within heterogeneous 
societies.9 For Rawls, a neutral social contract or constitution will ensure that 
individuals have equal and fair access to the various opportunities and benefits of a 
given society. Moreover, this contract will be amenable to the diversity inherent within 
a heterogeneous society because it will not carry any substantive notions of the good life 
that could inadvertently benefit one group over another. 10 lndividuals will obviously 
have sorne intrinsic characteristic sueh as religious belief or a philosophie al world-view 
9 John Raw1s, A Theoryof Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971): pp. 3-4. 
10 Iris Young has pointed out very forceful1y that the 'co1or-blind' system of govemance endorsed by 
liberals such as Raw1s is a myth. Because of the dynamics of power, majority groups will impose their 
wor1d-views on al1 segments of society. See Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Dj/lèrence (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990): p. 18. 
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that will influence their private lives, but these substantive views will not curry favor 
within govemment programs or institutions. Thus, Rawls' brand of justice is 'color-
blind' to difference, a philosophical position central to his TheOly of Justice. In the 
pursuit of a just society, Rawls envisions that a veil of ignorance will influence the 
decision-making processes of society. Thus when legislation is put forward or is 
enforced it will not reflect any particular bias or group. 1 1 However impossible this goal 
might actually be, Rawls seeks to create a neutral society that will run on constitutional 
guarantees of equality that would ultimately bring about justice for all. Conservative 
Muslims wishing to use Shaii'a to govem their lives would find very Httle support 
within Rawls' early theory of justice because of the emphasis placed on a 'color-blind' 
approach to justice. 
In A TheOly of Justice, Rawls presumes that everyone in a liberal society will simply 
accept liberal positions at face value and put to rest demands for substantive concems in 
the public forum. Thus cultural and religious concems would remain private matters. 
The main objection voiced against Rawls' brand of justice is that he presupposes that 
the individual accepts the principles associated with Westem-liberalism; namely the 
ideal of Ulliversal freedom, equality and the respect for diversity. This last point needs 
sorne elaboration however. Although liberal societies attempt to respect diversity to 
varying degrees, very few are willing to fully recognize ways of life that fall outside the 
liberal tradition. Moreover, no allowance is made for those who may not actually adhere 
fully to liberal principles. Given the conservative nature of the Shaii'a, a practicing 
Il According to Rawls, 'institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in 
assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing 
daims to the advantages of sociallife.' Rawls, A Theozy of Justice, p. 5. 
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Muslim who seeks to abide by this law may not fully identi(y with aIl the goals of a 
liberal society. Rawls ignores this reality and simply positions everyone within the 
liberal framework. 12 
Seeking to address his critics, Rawls put forth a second version of his theory of 
justice in monograph he published in 1993, entitled Political Liberalism. Rawls begins 
his new inquiry by stating that the chief concern of political philosophy is establishing a 
theory of justice in a society that is 'profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines.' l3 In this reformulated theory of justice Rawls 
positions liberal democratic values within the moral world-view of a diverse citizenry; 
one that indudes conservative religious groups. In this manner, practicing Muslims will 
ascribe to liberal values within their religious tradition, and in so doing will endorse the 
political values of liberalism through their faith. Rawls refers to this philosophical turn 
of hand as an overlapping consensus which he daims occurs when 'a diversity of 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines endorse the same political conception ... .'14 
Whether or not there is a contiguity between the individual's substantive goals (Le. 
Islam) and liberal values does not concem Rawls. He assumes that individuals living 
within democratic societies will naturally accept the aims of liberalism, or will 
eventually come to accept them. Those who do not accept the liberal agenda are being 
unreasonable and should not be permitted to shape the political values of a democratic 
society. It is at this point that Rawls' liberalism takes on sorne of the characteristics of 
12 Ed Wingenbach, "Unjust Context: The Priority of Stability in Rawls' Contextualized Theory of 
Justice," American Journal ofPoliticai Science, vol. 43 (1999): p. 214. 
13 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993): p. 4. 
14 Quoted from Wingenbach, "Unjust Context," p. 217. 
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the 'perfectionist' liberalism found in Locke and Mill. Stating that individuals who 
remain opposed to liberal values are threats to the stability of society, Rawls maintains, 
in a footnote, that they should be contained like 'war and disease.'15 
One of the mechanisms Rawls proposes to instill liberal values in society is through 
educational institutions. Ironically, although he insists on civic neutrality, Rawls points 
out that the educational curriculum should foster liberalism. 16 In this manner, Rawls 
endorses a pedagogical system that seeks to convert group-oriented individuals into 
autonomous persons. Over time, these people will influence their religious groups as 
they incorporate the liberal ethos and thereby help preserve the basic structure of 
society. It seems that Rawls is effectively repeating a line of thinking articulated by 
c1assical liberal thinkers who preceded him: a plurality of views (or people) are 
acceptable so long as the views have intemalized liberal (or European) attitudes. In so 
doing, Rawls seems to suggest that society's political values are fixed on liberal goals 
and no longer fluid and open to change.17 Where Rawls differs from early liberal 
thinkers is in his desire to establish equality between individuals of diverse 
backgrounds. 
Rawls' endorsement ofliberal values at the expense of groups who wish to maintain 
non-liberal agendas is very subtIe. By stressing the neutrality of the state he disguises 
the tendency for liberal societies to impose their world-views on non-liberals. Sorne 
contemporary liberals have challenged this muted 'anti-perfectionist' view by 
maintaining that a society should not define itself as neutral in its approach to diverse 
15 Rawls, Poli/ical Liberalism, p. 64, D. 19. 
16 Ibid., p. 156. 
17 Ibid., p.152. 
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versions of the good life. The American philosopher, William A. Galston, believes that 
tolerance should not automatically mean that every life-plan is considered to be 'equally 
good, hence beyond rational scrutiny and criticism.,18 In defending the importance of 
civic unit y, Galston feels that liberal values should take precedence in society and 
'shape the character of every aspect of the community:19 Galston is seeking to preserve 
and protect liberal virtues in society over and above other competing forms of life such 
as religious conservatism. He states that liberalism 'embraces a view of the human good 
that favors certain ways of life and tilts against others. ,20 However, by his account, he 
does not wish to limit the personal choices of conservative religious people or 
institutions. Addressing the Catholic community in America in particular, Galston 
maintains that they should reject liberalism if they so choose, but must not impose their 
conservatism on others. He states that 'Catholics may be affronted by a legal code that 
permits acts they view as abominable. But in circumstances of deep moral diversity, the 
alternative to enduring these affronts is even worse:21 He is confident in providing 
conservative religious groups a measure of autonomy because, in his estimation, society 
has c1early defined itself as liberal in orientation. Furthermore, by permitting 
conservative groups the freedom to flourish in society, Galston endors es the liberal 
values oftoleration and individual autonomy. 
18 William A. Galston, "Liberal Virtues,"Amencan Political Science Revie~ vol. 82 (1988): p. 1282. 
19 William A. Galston, Liberal PUIposes: Goods, Values, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991): p. 292. 
20 Ibid., p. 3 .. 
21 William A. Galston, "Contending with Liberalisrn: Sorne Advice for Catholics," Commonwe~ vol. 127 
(2001): p. 15. 
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Despite this confidence, Galston puts forward the idea that liberal values will not 
simply perpetuate themselves without sorne sort of government intervention. By shying 
away from the Rawlsian ethic of civic neutrality, Galston maintains that govemmental 
bodies and institutions, inc1uding educational systems, should constantly seek to 
preserve liberal values. He states that 'very few individuals will come to embrace the 
core commitments of liberal societies through a process of rational inquiry. If children 
are to be brought up to accept these commitments as valid and binding, it can only be 
through a process that is more rhetorical than rational. ,22 For him, the goal of education 
is the 'formation of individuals who can effectively conduct their lives within ... their 
political community.,23 By promoting liberal principles through public channels such as 
education, Galston seeks to ensure that children do not grow up without sorne 
communal identity that is grounded in liberal values. In maintaining this (albeit 
minimalistic) 'perfectionist' stance, Galston seems to balance society's need to foster 
liberal values of individual freedom with groups who wish to take a more dogmatic 
approach toward achieving the good life. Although he does not deny his universalistic 
position, it is muted to the point of permitting conservative religious groups the 
freedom to profess their faith, albeit within a society that c1early advocates a liberal 
perspective. What is crucial for Galston is the maintenance of the society's liberal 
character, which he believes can only be safeguarded when the citizenry adheres to a 
certain unit Y in their political outlook fostered through such things as a liberal 
education. 
22 Galston, Liberai Purposes. p. 243-244. 
23 Ibid., p. 243. 
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The Canadian philosopher, Will Kymlicka, has recently put forth a theory 
promoting liberal values in multicultural states. In discussing the challenges that 
multicultural societies represent for liberal philosophy, Kymlicka argues for the 
imposition ofliberal values on groups who harbor conservative world-views, particularly 
recent immigrants.24 Liberal societies such as Canada will face two types of demands 
for group-differentiated rights from conservative religious groups: demands for intemal 
restrictions and demands for extemal protections?5 Kymlicka explains that sorne 
groups will seek to limit the freedom of their members by replicating specifie gender 
roi es and by instituting prohibitions against blasphemy on their own members. 
Imposing conservative women's roles and participating in the public outcry against 
Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses are examples of how sorne Muslims will make 
demands that Kymlicka labels as intemal restdctions.26 Kymlicka does not believe that 
these group-differentiated daims should benefit from societal recognition. Conversely, 
in recognition of the importance religion plays in shaping the individual, Kymlicka 
insists that group-differentiated rights designed to protect vulnerable cultures should be 
permitted; he labels these rights as extemal protections.27 In this regard, Kymlicka is in 
favor of allowing Muslim women to wear the lJijiib in public because to deny her that 
24 Interestingly, Kymlicka makes distinctions among conservative groups such as Hutterites, Hassidic 
Jews and Muslims in Canada. Whereas all three groups are said to carry a certain measure of internal 
conservatism and illiberal attitudes, the Canadian govemment has set a precedent for allowing the 
Hutterites and the Hassidic Jews their cultural particularities but has not extended to the Muslims, a more 
recent immigrant community. See Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theozy of Minority 
Rights(New York: Clarendon Press, 1995): pp. 161-163. 
25 Ibid., p. 35. 
26 Ibid., p. 43. 
27 Ibid., p. 35. 
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right would also inflict undue pressures on her ability to lead a public life as a Muslim 
woman.
28 
White recognizing the need to establish certain protective measures for vulnerable 
cultural groups, Kymlicka also promotes the notion that these same groups should adopt 
liberal values. For instance, he explains that individuals should be encouraged to 
question the traditionalism of their faiths by being made aware of different cultural 
options open to them in a liberal society. Kymlicka do es not endorse the forced 
transformation of illiberal groups; rather he would 'liberalize them' by way of 
education.29 Kymlicka states that it is not 'wrong for liberal states to insist that 
immigration entails accepting the legitimacy of state enforcement of liberal principles, 
so long as immigrants know this in advance, and nonetheless voluntarily choose to 
come.' 30 Although Kymlicka points out that his brand of liberalism do es not seek to 
impose itself abroad in the manner of his classical predecessors, he does see a need to 
protect the liberal values that are found in democratic societies such as Canada. 
Charles Taylor has aptly described liberalism as a 'fighting creed.'3! On the 
international scene, liberal victories have recently seen the demi se of Communism in 
Europe as well as in the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile the mission that ousted 
Saddam Hussein was portrayed to the British and American pubic as a liberal cause in 
the pursuit of freedom and democracy.32 Today, vocal supporters of this brand of 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 94. 
30 Ibid., p. 170. 
31 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994): p. 62. 
32 For a concise argument in support of exporting liberal values abroad see Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser 
Evil : Political Ethics in an Age ofTelTor(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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aggressive liberalism includes the current government of Prime Minster Stephen Harper, 
who is collaborating with the American administration in their attempt to democratize 
the Middle East and Afghanistan.33 Meanwhile, on the local Canadian scene, liberals are 
uncomfortable with people and groups that reject the basic tenets of individualism, 
liberty, and free agency in favor of religious conservatism and limited political 
freedom.34 Nowhere is this discomfort more evident than in multicultural societies 
where members of conservative religious groups hold on to their communal values and 
regard the march of liberalism as a threat to their way of life. Just as on the 
international scene, liberals seek to incorporate conservative religious groups living in 
the West into their fold. Commenting on Muslims living in Europe, one observer 
explains that 'the logic of liberalism does not allow for a free and reasoned critique or 
rejection of the liberal order and its underlying axioms. Only free and rational agents 
deserve the political rights associated with liberalism; irrational actors require liberation 
from their irrational tutelage. ,35 
Thus, not only do sorne Muslim groups appear to threaten liberal values, but they 
also threaten the unit Y of states within which they live because of their strong 
communal bonds which are predicated by faith. By demanding group-differentiated 
rights, sorne Muslims are ostensibly demanding special status within the liberal nation-
33 For a revealing look at how the George W. Bush administration blundered into Iraq in se arch of 
weapons of mass destruction while ignoring the reasoned advice of policy analysts and members of the 
military see James Fallows, Blind intoBaghdad(Vintage: New York, 2006). 
34 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 152. In the United States, however, Christian discourse is quite 
strong in guiding public policies, especially under the presidency of George W. Bush. Recently, the 
American federal government provided charitable organizations closely affiliated with religious groups 
$60 million. See Paul Harris, "Bush says God Chose him to Lead his Nation," The Observer, November 
2nd (2003): http://observer.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,6903, 1 075950,00.html. 
·35 Peter O'Brien, "Islam vs. Liberalism in Europe," The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Fall 
(1993): p. 377. 
93 
~ .. 
state. One American scholar has commented that policies that seek to endorse group-
differentiated rights act 'like a corrosive on met al, eating away at the ties of 
connectedness that bind us together as a nation. ,36 The concern is that deep divisions 
within a population will threaten the societal stability that liberals have fought so hard 
to establish. A society unified on similar goals is seen as a precondition for a working 
liberal society since it provides a public forum where people can come together and 
discuss their differences in a common language of citizenship. The Canadian political 
scientist Margaret Moore goes so far as to explain that '[t]here is no public interest in 
preserving diversity; diversity is not an intrinsic good in itself, which should be 
protected. Indeed, encouraging too much institutional separateness may have the effect 
of jeopardizing our shared political identity and common political institutions. ,37 
The demand for societal unit Y on the part of sorne academics is a reaction to the 
new multicultural realities found in Western societies and the fear that this diversity 
will fragment society.38 Commenting in the early 1980's, Nathan Glazer, a right-wing 
American sociologist/9 endorsed a number of strategies aimed at ensuring societal unit Y 
amidst fears that cultural communities were demanding greater recognition based on 
their communal identities. One such proposaI was that immigrants should leam English 
36 Cynthia Ward, 'The Limits of 'Liberal Republicanism': Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican 
Citizenship Don't Mix," Columbia Law Review, vol. 91 (1991): p. 598. 
37 Margaret Moore, "Liberal Nationalism and Multiculturalism," in Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, 
eds., Canadian Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): p. 190. 
38 Will Kymlicka maintains that an ethnic revival took place during the 1960's and1970's which saw a 
number of groups in the United States such as the Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians and African Americans 
demand recognition from the government in the form ofland claims, employment equity, and linguistic 
rights. In Canada tbis was paralleled by a heightened sense ofnationalism on the part of the Quebecois 
who demanded sovereignty. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 12-13 and pp. 61-69. 
39 Nathan Glazer served as the edit or of the right-Ieaningjournal Public Interest. 
94 
,~ ~ in order to 'become Americanized as quickly as possible.' Another American, Michael 
Walzer, a left-Ieaning political theorist,41 proposed that immigrants who had chosen to 
migrate to the United States were 'more susceptible to cultural change' and should 
therefore integrate into the prevailing social milieu.42 
What these authors are implicitly saying is that immigrants should integrate into 
mainstream society and abandon certain cultural aspirations that would otherwise 
threaten the American identity.43 These points of view are not limited to the United 
States. Canadian academics and politicians have also expressed similar opinions. 
Writing in the early 1990's, the late Reginald Bibby, a Canadian historian of religion, 
expressed that too much pluralism would, in effect, dilute cultural identity in Canada 
and produce what he caUs 'mosaic madness.' Referring to the Canadian vision of 
multiculturalism that is often represented as a mosaic of different groups living together 
in harmony, Bibby questions how such ghettoization would combine to promote 
national unity. Quoting him at length captures sorne of the fears expressed by those 
who bristle at providing too much recognition to minority groups. 
When a country like Canada enshrines pluralism through policies such as 
multiculturalism and bilingualism and the guaranteeing of individu al 
rights, the out come is coexistence - no more, no less. It is a good start in 
building a society out of diverse peoples. But, there's a danger. Ifthere 
is no subsequent vision, no national goals, no explicit sense of coexisting 
for sorne purpose, pluralism becomes an uninspiring end in itself. Rather 
than coexistence being the foundation that enables a diverse nation to 
pursue the best kind of existence possible, coexistence degenerates into a 
40 Nathan Glazer, Ethnie Di1emmas: 1964-1982 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983): p. 149. 
41 Michael Walzer served as the editor for the left-wingjournal Dissent. 
42 Quoted from Kymlicka, "MultieulturaJ Citizenship, "p. 63. 
43 Ibid., p. 67. 
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national preoccupation. Pluralism ceases to have a cause. The result: 
mosaic madness.44 
As we have seen, liberalism has had a universalizing component that seeks to 
transform non-liberal societies and individu aIs into liberal ones. Liberalism is not 
simply a benign force open to all forms of cultural expressions and diversity. Rather, 
liberalism seeks to promote pluralism and .choice over and above conservative group-
oriented goals. This line ofthinking can be traced back to classical thinkers such as Mill 
who advocated equality of peoples while insisting that they follow one particular world-
view. Modern liberals such as Rawls, Galston, and Kymlicka follow this transformative 
logic, albeit within the context ofmulticultural societies that are more open to diversity. 
With this in mind, it is fair to say that the use of Islamic law in Canada will face a great 
deal of opposition from individuals seeking to maintain and protect the liberal values in 
the country. 
44 Reginald Bibby, MosaicMadness: the Poverty and PotentiaJ of Li/è in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 
1990): pp. 103-104. 
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Chapter4 
Canadian Multiculturalism 
Writing in the eighteenth century, David Hume (d. 1776) explained that '[w]here 
a number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse 
must be so frequent, for defense, commerce, and govemment, that, together with the 
same speech or language, they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a 
common or national character. .. .'1 Canada's attitude towards cultural difference has 
followed Hume's observation by way of assimilating and integrating minority groups 
into the prevailing societal culture.2 The dominant Canadian culture during the last 200 
years has been an Anglophone one based primarily on a British model. Along with 
Canada's maintenance of the British Crown and use of the English language throughout 
most of the country, institutions such as the Westminster-styled legislatures common 
across the country, typify the dominance of the English mode1.3 Despite the triumph of 
English-Canadian culture, various concessions have been made towards recognizing 
French and more recently Native identity as a means of securing various political goals. 
This chapter will address a number of instances that point to a universalizing trend 
within Canadian cultural dynamics. It will demonstrate that, very much like the tenor of 
1 David Hume, Essays. MoraL PoIiticaL and Literary. Eugene F. Miller, ed. (Library of Liberty, 2004): 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/ Hume/hmMPL21.html. Mirroring this line ofthinking the 
contemporary thinker Eamest Gellner explains that such a common culture would facilitate the 
functioning of an industrial society because such unit Y provides 'the necessary shared medium, the life-
blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society 
can breathe and survive and produce.' See Eamest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983): p. 38. 
2 Societal culture is the prevailing patterns oflife that governs a given society. These include institutions 
such as govemment, language, and customs. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76. 
3 There has always existed a certain amount of insecurity within certain segments ofEnglish Canada 
because of its position within the North American continent. Sorne English Canadians have at times 
been reluctant to see themselves as anything other than British for fear oflosing their political 
independence and cultural identity to the United States. See John Boyko, Last Steps to Freedom: The 
Evolution of Canadian Racism (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer Publishing, 1995): pp. 10-11. 
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liberal philosophy discussed earlier, Anlgo-Canadian values have a universalizing 
tendency and have trumped other cultures in Canada. Although this survey is by no 
means exhaustive, it will offer an understanding of the context within which the 
Canadian majority has coped with the presence of minority groups and their cultural 
particularities. What will become evident in the following pages is the re1uctance on the 
part of English-Canadian society to accommodate alternative cultural groups and 
cultural practices. The demand for the use of Islamic law in Canada is a recent cultural 
challenge Canadian society faces. Its future recognition will ultimately emerge within 
the historical context that has shown itself to be quite skeptical of difference and 
cultural diversity. 
Establishing a simple definition of multiculturalism is difficult, for it has come to 
mean different things to many different people. At a very simple level, multiculturalism 
can point to a demographic reality whereby different cultural groups occupy a common 
region or territory. Rainer Baub6ck, an Austrian political scientist, provides an 
excellent definition of the term as used in complex modem liberal societies. He daims 
that multiculturalism: 
assigns positive value to a plurality of cultures within society, demands 
respect for cultural difference, refutes the possibility or desirability of a 
strict separation between private and public cultural practices, supports a 
policy of public recognition beyond mere tolerance and rejects cIaims of 
(moral) superiority for specific cultural traditions as well as relations of 
domination, exploitation and forced assimilation between cultural 
groupS.4 
4 Rainer BaubOck, "Cultural Minority Rights for Immigrants," IntemationaJ Migration Review, vol. 30 
(1996): p. 205. 
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It would be a mistake to assume that this view reflects the longstanding attitudes taken 
by Canadians over the years. Rather, the history of Canadian diversity can be 
characterized as an asymmetrical power relationship between the English economic, 
political, and military elite and other groups such as the Native, French, and immigrant 
populations. 
Canada's history of multiculturalism has been a lengthy one, stretching as far back 
as the period before the arrivaI of the European colonialists. The first major migration 
of people to Canada began roughly 28,000 years ago when the ancestors of Canada's 
First Nations people crossed the Bering land bridge that once connected Asia to North 
America. Despite the existence of a great deal of diversity amongst these ancient Native 
populations, our focus here will begin with the arrivai of the Europeans. Beginning in 
the seventeenth century and lasting weIl into the 20th century, Canada has portrayed 
itself as a European outpost dominated first by the French and then later by the English. 
The bicultural identities, or the so-called 'two solitudes, ,5 were at times augmented with 
Sc andin avi an, and Eastern and Southern European settlers. The European presence in 
Canada came at the expense of the local indigenous population who were pushed off 
their lands or forced to assimilate into White settler society. Today the influx of 
immigrants from Asia and Africa has supplanted Europe as the primary source for 
migrants into Canada. Since 1901 until the present, Canada has admitted roughly 13.4 
5 This phrase was popularized by one ofCanada's most distinguished authors, Hugh MacLennan, (d. 
1990). MacLennan's 1945 novel, Two Solitudes explores the interrelationships between Canada's French 
and English communities. The main thesis of the book is that members of the two 'founding' cultures 
were not bound by their culture; rather the difference they had could be overcome through the similarities 
they shared. Thisnovel is considered to be one of the defming pieces ofliterature in the Canadian 
cannon. See, Hugh MacLennan, Two Solitudes (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2003). 
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million immigrants into the country.6 Prior to 1961 however, only 3% of those who 
entered the country originated from Asia due to the very restrictive immigration policies 
that acted as barriers against Asian migrants. Recent census figures, taken between the 
years 1991 and 2001, point to a major shift that has occurred in Canadian immigration 
policy. According to this data, 58% of immigrants originated from Asia while the 
percent age ofimmigrants to Canada from Europe has decreased to 20%.7 
The first reliable statistics pointing to the number of Muslims in Canada appeared 
in 1871 when the national census recorded thirteen Muslims living in the country.8 
Later, the 1931 census recorded 645 Muslims.9 Prior to 1961, Muslims made up only 
0.2% of the total immigrants who came to Canada. However, by 2001, the number of 
Muslims in the country had risen significantly. Between the years 1991 and 2001, the 
Muslim population increased from 253,260 to 579,640 respectively.lO Statistically, by 
2001, Muslims accounted for 15% ofall immigrants entering the country.1l 
Although it is tempting to categorize the Muslim population in Canada with a single 
stroke, it should be c1ear that the origins of Muslim migrants into Canada have been 
varied. Different eras of immigration attracted individuals from diverse regions of the 
Muslim world. For instance, Muslim immigrants who entered the country prior to the 
6Statistics Canada, "Canada's Ethnocultural Portrait: The Changing Mosaic," January (2003): 
http://wwwI2.statcan.ca/english/ censusO 1 /products/ analyticl companionl etoimm/pdf/96F0030XIE200 1 008. 
pdf. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Daood Hassan Harndani, "Canadian Muslims on the Eve of the Twenty-First Cent ury," Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 19 (1999): p. 204. 
9 Baba Abu-Laban, "The Canadian Muslim Community: The Need for a New Survival Strategy," E.H. 
Waugh, B. Abu-Laban and R. B. Qureshi, eds., The Muslim Community in North America (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 1983): p. 90. 
JOStatistics Canada, "2001 Census: Analysis Series: Religions in Canada," May (2003): 
http://wwwI2.statcan.ca/english/censusO IlProducts/ Analytic/ companionlrel/pdf/96F0030XIE200 1 0 15. pdf. 
11 Ibid. 
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Second World War arrived mostly from the Mediterranean regions of Syria, Turkey and 
the Balkans. 12 These immigrants mostly originated from rural backgrounds and quite 
often lacked any formaI education. Many of these individuals would find employment 
in North America as factory workers or as door-to-door peddlers of buttons, yarn and 
other household goods. 13 The relatively small nurnber of Muslim immigrants to Canada 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a reflection of a number of 
different factors. The Ottoman governrnent, for instance, imposed travel restrictions on 
Muslim emigration during the latter half of the nineteenth century.14 Meanwhile the 
Canadian closed-door immigration policies imposed by the government limited the 
nurnber ofMuslims arriving into the country. 
When immigration policies were revised following the Second World War, greater 
numbers of non-European immigrants, including Muslims from countries such as Egypt, 
India and Pakistan, began to arrive. 15 Although Muslim Canadians share the same 
religion, the group as a whole carries a number of significant complexities. Religiously, 
Canada's Muslim population includes individuals from the Sunn{ Shl'a and Isma'1Ii 
communities, just to narne a few. Meanwhile, the different countries and regions from 
which these denominations corne from further complicate the sectarian diversity. 
Suffice it to say, although often portrayed in the media as a unified group, Canadian 
Muslims, like any group, represent a complex society. 
12 For more information regarding the early Muslim migration to North America see, Kemal H. Karpat, 
"The Ottoman Einigration to America, 1860-1914," IntemationaJ JoumaJ of Middle East Studies, vol. 17 
(1985): pp. 175-209. 
J3 Ibid., p.180. 
14 Ibid., p.182. 
15 Daood Hassan Hamdani, "Muslims and Christian Life in Canada," JoumaJ ofMuslim Minority Affairs, 
vol. 1 (1979): pp. 52-53. 
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Multiculturalism: Asymmetry and Domination 
As mentioned above, Canadian identity politics can be categorized as an 
asymmetrical relationship between different cultural groups. Michael Foucault has 
written extensively on the relationships between different social actors in modem 
society.16 For Foucault, elites categorize subjects by projecting onto them an identity 
along with p aramet ers, such as laws, within which the subjects can relate to the 
powerful. Coupled with this view is Foucault's notion that elites define subjects to 
control them in order to use their labor.17 For over 200 hundred years, Anglo-Canadian 
attitudes towards diversity have followed a c1ear pattern that c10sely resembles 
Foucault's theory. Namely, the English have categorized different groups in order to 
fulfill their vital economic interests. 18 It should come as no surprise that caUs for 
greater immigration today are often coupled with demands for maintaining a sustainable 
work force in Canada. 
English Canada's military, economic and political power enabled it to establish 
hegemonic control over the groups that lived in the country such as the Natives and the 
French. During the nineteenth century, this control was a matter of pride and national 
destiny. Speaking before the Mechanics' Institute of Ottawa in 1864, the reverend A.M. 
Dawson did not hi de the prevailing colonial tendencies when he c1aimed that 'every 
people, when they reached a certain degree of power and renown, ought to aim at 
16 MichaelFoucault, "The Subject and Power," in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, eds., The Essentia/ 
Foucault(fJew York: The New Press, 2003): pp. 126-144. Edward Said has applied the basic premise of 
Foucault's thoughts to the relationship that has evolved between the West and the Muslim world. See 
Said, Orienta/ism. . 
17 Foucault, "Subject and Power," p. 130. 
18 See Bernard S. Cohn, Colonia/ism and its fonns of KiJowledge: the British in India (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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possessing colonial dependencies.,19 In this light, power brokers throughout Canadian 
history have attempted to either exterminate,20 segregate or assimilate individuals and 
groups who did not fit into the seemingly fixed notion of what it meant to be a 
'canonical Canadian,.21 
The British colonial involvement in North America dates back to the seventeenth 
century when the Christian Pilgrims settled the coast of what is now called 'New 
England'. Groups such as the Christian Puritans arrived in the New World in search of 
both economic sustainability and spiritual fulfillment. Meanwhile, seeking to expand its 
overseas Empire, the British Crown facilitated the Puritans by subsidizing their 
journeys. Along with the British, other commercial and military empires such as Spain, 
France, Holland and Russia, were also vying for territory throughout the Americas in a 
bid to exp and their own respective economies. Although Native communities had lived 
throughout the regions now claimed by the Europeans for centuries, their presence was 
of litt le concem to the explorers who took possession ofthe land under a continentallaw 
known as vacuum domiciJium. The basis of this law is articulated in the following 
quotation from 1629 attributed to John Winthrop, an early English settler. 'As for the 
Natives in New England, they inc10se noe Land, neither· have they any settled 
habytation, nor any tame Cattle to improve the Land by, and soe have noe other but a 
Naturall Right to those Countries, soe as if we leave them sufficient fore their use, we 
19 Day, MulticulturaJism; p. 116. 
20 BrItish settlers greatly contributed towards the extinction of the Beothuck peoples ofNewfoundland 
who died mostly at the hands of disease and aggressive settlement tactics utilized by English colonialists. 
Although a number of proclamations were issued between 1769 and 1776 against the killing of Natives 
"without the least provocation," no one was ever tried or brought to justice for the abuse groups such as 
the Beothuck suffered. See J .R. Millar, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000): pp. 113-114. 
21 Day, MulticulturaIism, p. 144. 
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may lawfully take the rest, there being more than enough for them and us. ,22 This law 
stipulated that land not inhabited by 'civilized' individuals could be c1aimed as colonial 
possessions of European powers that had 'discovered' them. As Europeans came into 
contact with civilizations such as the Aztecs of South America and the Iroquois 
Confederacy of North America, they were quick to label these groups as 'uncivilized' as 
a means of taking possession of their territory. Natives suffered an enormous loss not 
only in terms of territory, but also in terms of life during these first encounters with 
Europeans. Although there were frequent military exchanges between the two 
communities, the presence of European-bred disease ultimately conspired to decimate 
the Native populations of North, Central and South America.23 
Meanwhile, the Continental wars and feuds that dominated the European scene 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also played themselves out in the New 
World as colonial powers competed against each for territory and resources. Often 
forming strategie alliances with local Native communities, different European powers 
attempted to offset each other's commercial interests through open warfare. For 
instance, the British who had seized the coastal regions New England were weary of 
French settlers inhabiting the coastline of Nova Scotia as weIl as along the St. Laurence 
River Valley. When the British defeated the French army in 1710 at Port Royal, Nova 
Scotia, the English were faced with the prospect of goveming the French speaking 
22 Quoted frOID Gary Nash, "Cultures Meet in the Seventeenth-Century New England," in Frank Chalk 
and Kurt Jonassohn, eds., The His/ory and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies(New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990): p. 186. 
23 For an excellent analysis of the effects European contact had on Native society in North and South 
America see Alfred W. Crosby Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 
1492(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972). 
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Acadian population. One of the first suggestions as to how to cope with the Acadian 
population was to deport them en masse. A British member of the delegation at the 
Council of Victors fo11owing the Battle of Port Royal proposed that '[a]l1 French must 
be deported outside the country, save those who adopt Prot est antism. ,24 This policy 
option was initia11y ignored. Under the terms of surrender established in the Treaty of 
Utrecht of 1713, Acadians were granted status as British subjects. But, despite the oaths 
of loyalty to which Acadians swore to, English colonialists were forever suspicious of 
their Catholic subjects. Unlike Native Beothuck of Newfoundland, who were classified 
as 'barbarous' by the English settlers and ki11ed in large numbers during the eighteenth 
cent ury, the Acadians could not be eliminated in the same manner. The Acadian's 
Christian heritage and the anger such an act would have provoked with the French 
govemment served to deter the British. However, forty-five years after the proposaI to 
deport the Acadians was initia11y discussed, this policy was put into effect. In what 
would be labeled by today's standards as 'ethnic cleansing,' British soldiers rounded up 
approximately 1,600 Acadians of Nova Scotia in 1755 and placed them on ships bound 
for the Thirteen Colonies where they were dispersed amongst the American 
population.25 This event and others like it directed at the Native community would 
mark a trend repeated throughout Canadian history whereby the political, military and 
cultural elite attempted to shape the country's demographic character by force. 
24 Quoted from Day, MuiticuituraJism, p. 103. 
25 Desmond Morton, A Short HistoryofCanada(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2(01): p. 64. 
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Post-War Multiculturalism 
A modern example of designing a Canadian identity by way of exclusion was the 
internment and deportation of 'undesirables'. During the First World War, 8,000 
individuals of Austro-Hungarian decent were held in internment camps throughout the 
country. Meanwhile 145 individuals, described as 'Turks,' were interned in various 
locations according to John Porter, the American Consul General in Ottawa.26 The 
practice of detaining 'undesirables' from the Canadian landscape would once again 
appear during the Second World War. Following the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor, 22,000 Japanese-Canadians, including thousands who were bom in Canada, 
were stripped of their property as well as their legal rights and placed in internment 
camps throughout the country out of fear that they represented a fifth column for the 
Japanese Army. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the government 
attempted to deport the Japanese despite the fact that many had known no other home 
other than Canada.27 Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his Liberal colleagues used 
the issue of Japanese deportation as an election promise in order to attract the vot ers of 
British Columbia during the 1945 elections. Mirroring this view, the Veterans Affairs 
Minister, Ian Mackenzie, threatened to resign from government altogether by stating 
that '[i]f the Japs[sic] are in, l'm out.'28 Although officiaIs in the federal government 
and various civil society groups were in favor of deporting the Japanese, a growing 
26 See Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Borys Sydoruk, In My Charge: the Canadian Intemment Camp 
Photographs ofSergeant William Buck (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1997). Also see, D.J. Carter, Behind 
Canadian Barbed Wire: AIien, Refugee and Prisoner of War Camps in Canada 1914-1916 (Calgary: 
Tumbleweed Press, 1980). 
27 Ken Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was: a History of Japanese Canadians(Toronto: McClelIand and 
Stewart, 1991). 
28 Desmond Morton and J.L. Granastein, Victory: 1945: Canadians fIom War to Peace (Toronto: Harper 
Collins, 1995): p. 209. 
106 
number of Canadians objected to this plan. One opponent was an Ojibwa veteran who 
explained at a Legion meeting that '[ w ]hen it cornes down to brass tacks, everybody 
here is a foreigner except me. The Legion must never associate itse1f with racial 
prejudice. ,29 In the end, despite protests from various sectors of the Canadian 
population, close to 4,000 Japanese were deported to Japan for no other reason than 
their identity. 
Numerous other examples can be cited detailing the discrimination against groups 
such as Chinese workers, Jewish émigrés and Sikh migrants. For now, it will suffice to 
say that lasting weIl into the latter half of the twentieth century, the prevailing image 
projected by Canadian cultural and political elites was that of a mono-cultural state 
based on the British-Anglo-Saxon mode1.30 A Globe and Mail editorial from 1937 
articulates this view in stating 'that immigration should be preponderantly British is 
undeniable, but those of other nations who come here to improve their lot by taking 
advantage of our resources should recognize their obligation to respect and not merely 
tolerate, those who provide them the opportunity.'31 Throughout much of Canada's 
history, non-canonical members of society were defined as 'problems' in need of sorne 
form of 'management' in order to align them with the prevailing image ofthe country.32 
In this respect, policies such as assimilation were used against Natives and recent 
immigrants, while exclusion and expulsion were used against Chinese, Japanese and 
Jews. According to two contemporary scholars of Canadian diversity, 'any cultural 
29 Ibid. 
30 Day, Multiculturalism, p. 178. 
31 Globe and Mail, "Tolerance of the Majority," June 30th (1937): p. Al. 
32 Day, Multiculturalism, p. 5. 
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attribute that wandered too far from the principles of God, King and Empire were 
dismissed as incompatible with national identity or loyalty to the Dominion. ,33 
The paradox of this ethnocentric world-view was that Canada required a steady 
influx of immigrants to maintain its economic viability. As immigration from Britain 
continued to wane following the Second World War, the Immigration Act of 1947 was 
enacted in order to allow European groups, previously denied entry into Canada, easier 
access into the country. The primary motivation for this policy shift was to bolster the 
country's economy with workers from Eastern and Southern Europe. However, in the 
same piece of legislation, Canada continued to restrict the arrivaI of large numbers of 
Asians into the country. Speaking in the House of Commons, Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King felt that although certain immigrants would be admitted, the country 
should stand on guard against Asian immigration in order to preserve the 'fundamental 
composition' of the country.34. King also maintained that, 'Canada is perfectly within 
her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not 
a "fundamental human right" for any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. ,35 Among 
the people who received this privilege were post-war refugees or 'Displaced Persons' 
from Ukrainian, Russian, Hungarian, Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Czech, 
Slovak, Rumanian, Serbian and Croatian backgrounds. 
Before the Second World War, politicians, clergymen and newspaper editorials 
might have challenged the arrivaI of these non-British immigrants, but Canadians 
33 Augie FIeras and Jean Leonard Elliot, Engaging Diversily: MuilicuiluraIism in Canada (Toronto: 
Nelson Thompson Learning, 2002): p. 61. 
34 William L. Mackenzie King, OfliciaI Report of Debales (Ottawa: Government of Canada May 1, 1947): 
p.2645. 
35 Ibid. 
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seemed to keep their intolerance and ethnocentrism in check. According to Canadian 
historian Desmond Morton, one of the most important reasons for this moderation was 
the increased level of affluence Canada enjoyed during the post-war years. Jobs were no 
longer scaree and the competition for employment no longer pitted English Canadians 
against the newly arriving immigrants. In this fashion, according to Morton, economic 
growth 'anaesthetized open protest' against the new arrivals.36 Yet, it would be a 
mistake to assume that aH Canadians had completely lost their taste for discrimination. 
In a 1973 study that analyzed immigrants who sett1ed in Alberta between 1946 and 
1970, figures show that 64% of Jews, 58% of Asians, 52% ofYugoslavs, 52% ofItalians 
and Austrians and 44% of Ukrainians faeed sorne form of discrimination.37 Finally, the 
link between tolerance and affluence is tenuous because of the fact that financial 
security cannot be guaranteed. This fact leaves Morton as weIl as others, including a 
govemment report issued by the Multiculturalism Directorate in 1974, to predict that 
tolerance towards Canada's immigrant population would wither if economic conditions 
tumed for the worse.38 
Other factors contributed towards greater levels of tolerance in Canada following 
the Second World War. At the national level, the federal govemment issued the 
Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947, an act that granted citizenship to both locally bom 
residents and immigrants alike.39 This act 'signaled Canada's intention to stop 
36 Desmond Morton, "Strains of Affluence," in Craig Brown, ed., The l11ustrated History of Canada 
(Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996): p. 483. 
37 Wsevo1od W. Isajiw, Understanding Diversity :Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context (Toronto: 
Thompson Educational Publishing, 1999): p. 113. 
38 Morton, "Strains of Affluence," p. 483. See also Isajiw, Understanding Diversity, p. 347. 
39 Citizenship Act, R.S.C., January 1947. 
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identifYing so c10sely to its mother country, the United Kingdom ... ,40 Canada would 
thereby begin a process of re-defining its identity by acknowledging the country's 
demographic diversity. Whereas in the past, Ukrainian, Russian and Italian Canadians 
were defined as 'British subjects' who could never bec orne fully 'British' because of 
their cultural lineage, the Citizenship Act, on a symbolic level at least, removed this 
barrier and offered equality based on a newly branded Canadian citizenship for aIl those 
who qualified. 
Trudeau' s M ulticulturalism 
The emergence of human rights discourse both in Canada and abroad also helped 
alleviate sorne of the open antagonisms directed towards non-Anglo-Canadians that had 
existed at the governmental level. For instance, with the signing of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the country was obliged to curtail official policies 
that discriminated against various minorities. As non-British immigrants arrived in 
Canada, the danger existed that a multi-tiered citizenry would evolve in such a way as 
to position Anglo-Canadians atop a hierarchy of different peoples. Seeking to avoid this 
problem, lawmakers at both the provincial and federal levels of govemment passed 
various fair practices acts during the 1950's and 1960's in an attempt to aboiish open 
discrimination in public spaces and curtail the development of a citizenry organized 
along hierarchicallines.41 In addition to these laws, the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights 
40 FIeras and Elliot, Engaging Diversity, p. 61. 
41 One such act was the Racial Discrimination Actthat was issued in 1944. This Iaw attempted to curb 
instances of discrimination based on race or creed by making it illegal to publish and display signs that 
promote discrimination. See, Racial Discrimination Act, Statutes of Ontario, 1944, Chapter 51. 
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provided aIl citizens with an American-styled legal system based on individual rights.42 
Combined with the Citizenship Act, these various pieces of legislation attempted to 
provide Canadians, regardless oftheir cultural backgrounds, equal status under the law. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy trend that fostered a less aggressive view of diversity 
in Canada was the public affirmation that the country was a 'multicultural state' .43 This 
realization was made public in the Fourth Volume of the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and BiculturaJism (hereafter the B&B Commission).44 The B&B 
Commission, convened in 1963 under Prime Minster Lester B. Pearson, released its final 
report in 1969 during Pierre Elliott Trudeau's leadership. The principal goal of the B&B 
Commission was to pacify Quebecois nationalism that was on the rise during the 'Quiet 
Revolution. ,45 In declaring the country bicultural and bilingual along English and 
French lines, it was hoped that the nationalist movement in Quebec would be stifled. 
42Canadian Bill ofRights, 1960, c.44. Meanwhile the Ontario Fair Employment Practiees Act claimed 
the following in an attempt to limit discrimination. 'Whereas it is contrary to public policy in Ontario to 
discriminate against men and women in respect of their employment because of race, creed, colour, 
nationaIity, ancestry or place of origin, whereas it is desirable to enact a measure designed to promote 
observance ofthis principle and whereas to do so is in accord with the Universal Declaration ofHuman 
Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations." See, Fair Employment Practices Act, 1951 (S.). 1951, ch. 
24. 
43 Colin M. Coates argues that multiculturalism has been in evidence in Canada as far back as the 
seventeenth cent ury. According to Coates, local Natives tolerated the differences between themselves 
and the French while at the same time assimilated the French into their local practices. See Colin M. 
Coates, "Multiculturalism in Colonial Society: Canadian Examples From the 1 i h and 18lh Centuries," in 
Barbara Saunders & David Haljan, eds., Whither Multiculturalism: a Politics of Dissensus (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2003). 
44 The description of Canada as a multicultural society was not a humanitarian gesture seeking to address 
the wrongs ofthe past perpetrated by the English against other cultural groups in the country. Rather, 
defining Canada as a multicultural state was more of a pragmatic gesture in response to the various 
political issues that faced the country in the 1960's. These included the large influx of immigrants coming 
to Canada, growing racial tensions, the demand for cultural recognition by Eastern European decedents in 
Western Canada, and the growing nationalist movement in Quebec. See K.V. Ujimoto, "Studies of 
Ethnic, Identity, Ethnic Relations and Citizenship," in P.S. Li, ed., Race and Ethnie Relations in Canada 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 278. 
45 Canada, Report ofthe Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bieulturalism, vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer, 1967). AIso see Day, Multieulturalism, p. 180. 
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The report issued by the B&B Commission is another example of how political elites 
have redefined the culturallandscape in Canada in order to gain sorne tangible benefits, 
in this case maintaining Canada's unity. 
In dec1aring the country bilingual and bicultural, the Commission found that it 
could not comfortably address the issue of Canadian identity without recognizing the 
existence of other cultures such as the Ukrainians and Germans in Western Canada. 
These groups, represented by their cultural associations, pressed for greater recognition 
of their respective languages and cultures during, the Commission's hearings.46 
Although the Commission did not acquiesce to their demands, it was willing to 
highlight the contributions these groups, along with others, had made in developing the 
Canadian state. In so doing, the B&B Commission dec1ared the country's demographic 
footprint to be multicultural. Moreover, the Commission made it c1ear that aIl 
Canadians could participate on the national political stage as equal partners with the 
French and English.47 
Beyond the polite tenor of the Commission's findings, ethnie and cultural groups 
were still defined as negative challenges to Canadian unit Y and identity. In order to 
manage the problem of multiculturalism, the Commission· recommended that more 
effort be directed towards language training in either official language so as to hasten 
integration into the mainstream. Furthermore, the cultural particularities non-canonical 
Canadians maintained were to be observed on a personallevel 'once [immigrants] have 
46Isajiw, Understanding Diversity, p. 246. 
47 Karl Peter, "The My th ofMulticulturalism and other Political Fables," in Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa 
Fernando, eds., Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1981): p. 64. 
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been integrated into Canadian life. ,48 These sentiments, which came out of the B&B 
Commission, would be legislated into law in the 1969 Official Languages Act. The 
thrust of this legislation was not so much the promotion of diversity but rather ' ... the 
preservation of human rights, the development of Canadian identity, the reinforcement 
of Canadian unit Y, the improvement of citizenship participation and the encouragement 
of cultural diversification within a bilingual framework. ,49 This legislation dearly 
demonstrates Foucault's logic of a cultural and political elite defining and appropriating 
meaning in order to secure tangible gains. In this instance, Canadian identity would be 
expressed within a bicultural/bilingual framework while other cultures that feH outside 
this duality would play subordinate roles in shaping the Canadian culturallandscape. 
Predictably, various cultural groups were not happy with these findings and would 
have preferred further recognition beyond the daim that Canada was a multicultural 
society. Under the leadership of Trudeau, these demands would be ignored. Trudeau, 
who has been characterized as the 'most deeply ideological of the Canadian prime 
ministers' was influenced by a brand of philosophical liberalism that promoted 
individualliberty above the rights of communities.50 Trudeau's main concem during his 
tenure as Prime Minster was holding the country together. Communal demands 
ultimately represented threats to both individualliberty and Canadian unity. However, 
Trudeau had the political savvy to recognize that the country's promotion of a 
bilinguallbicultural identity could no longer hold a multicultural society together. The 
48 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bijingualism, p. 12. 
49 Dflicial Languages Act, 1969 (17-19 Eliz II, c. 54).ltalics added for emphasis. 
50 Kevin J. Christiano, Reason Before Passion (Toronto: ECW Press, 1994): pp. 98-99. 
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solution Trudeau devised to manage this predicament was to construct a completely 
new Canadian identity from the top down. 
In re-crafting a new Canadian identity, Trudeau defined the national character as 
one based on tolerance. Addressing an audience gathered outside Parliament Hill on 
Canada Day in 1969, he spelled out his vision of Canada. According to him '[t]oleration 
and moderation are found in this country perhaps in larger measure than anywhere else; 
against them we canjudge our stature as a country and as a people.'5! Clearly, this line 
of thinking was at odds with Canadian govemment policy that had recently proposed 
the deportation of 'undesirable' Japanese-Canadians. This fact did not matter to 
Trudeau as the country was now on the road towards formulating a new identity. 
Trudeau put these sentiments into a formalized policy when his govemment issued its 
new multicultural policy in 1971. 
Speaking before Parliament that same year, Trudeau introduced a new cultural 
paradigm for Canadians by explaining that 'there cannot be one cultural policy for 
Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third 
for aIl others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, 
nor does any ethnie group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of 
citizens is other than Canadian, and aIl should be treated fairly.'52 Although the 
motives appear noble, the historical foundations upon which these daims rested were 
meager. However, historical accuracy was not the priority in this instance; rather 
51 Pierre Trudeau, Canada Day Speech, 1969. Quoted from Christiano, Reason Before Passion, p. 117. 
52 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "Canadian Culture," speech delivered in the House of Commons Friday October 
8th 1971, in House of Commons Debales: Official Report, 3rd session 28th Parliament, 20 Elizabeth II, vol. 
8, (1971): p. 8545. Italics added for emphasis. 
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maintaining Canadian unit Y in light of vast cultural differences was the focus of the 
Prime Minister's concems. In this light, English and French Canadians were encouraged 
to dismantle the prejudices they had traditionally harbored towards each other and revel 
in their mutual admiration based on tolerance. Meanwhile, members of different 
cultural communities were encouraged to shed their cultural practices which 'inhibited 
adaptation and involvement' with the mainstream and integrate into the Canadian 
mainstream which was now redefined as tolerant.53 Thus, the main goal of Trudeau's 
multicultural policy was to 'neutralize' ethnicity and re-define a Canadian identity 
based on the tolerance of diversity.54 However, in maintaining the position of French 
and English as 'official' languages, these two groups would continue to define Canadian 
identity while other cultures would be managed within the prevailing framework. 
Cultural Homogeneity 
Himani Bannerji, a professor at York Univeristy, has concluded that this vision of 
Canada is far from inclusive. Rather, according to her, Canada manintains a colonial 
mindset by catagorizing visible minorities as cultural dependants who in tum view the 
country as a 'post-conquest capitalist state, economically dependent on an imperialist 
United States and politically implicated in English and US imperialist enterprises, with 
sorne designs of its own. ,55 Bannerji further explains that a unified Canadian identity 
'loses its transcendent inclusivity and emerges instead as a device and a legitimation for 
, 
a highly particularised ideological form of domination. Canada then becomes mainly an 
53 FIeras and Elliot, Engaging Diversity, p. 63. 
54 Ibid., p. 68. 
55 Himani Bannerji, "The Dark Si de of the Nation: Politics ofMulticulturaIism and the State of 
"Canada"," Joumal ofCanadian Studies, FaII (1996): p. 105. 
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English Canada, historicized into particularities of its actual conquerors and their social 
and state fonnations. Colonialism remains as a vital fonnational and definitional 
issue. ,56 
The 1988 Multiculturalism Act,57 issued under the Mulroney govemment, reiterated 
much of what Trudeau's policy initiatives had attempted to do 17 years earlier. 
However, between 1971 and 1988, Canada's population changed as more non-European 
immigrants entered the country. The MulticulturaJism Act reflected this demographic 
shift by emphasizing the need to dismantle structural barriers that often impeded the full 
participation of non-European immigrants in Canadian govemment and society. For 
instance, within aIl federal govemment agencies, departments were now required to hire 
and advance members of different ethnic and racial groups. 58 Meanwhile, Heritage 
Canada, the ministry responsible for administering the multiculturalism policy, re-
focused a bulk of its funding away from celebrating identity towards that of fostering 
incJusiveness. In the 1993-1994 Federal Budget for instance, of the $25.5 million 
allocated to Heritage Canada's multiculturalism portfolio, $13.3 million was spent on 
language training designed to integrate new Canadians while only $5.5 million were 
eannarked for the promotion of different cultures and languages. 59 
The policy incentives and legislation that followed the B&B Commission's findings 
as weIl as the 1988 Multiculturalism Act have, to sorne extent, fostered feelings of 
tolerance among Canadians. Writing on the subject of defining the country's national 
56 Ibid. 
57Multicuituralis11J Act, 1988,35-36-37 Elizabeth II. 
58 Isajiw, Understanding Divesity, p. 248. 
59 FIeras and Elliot, Engaging Diversity, p.66. 
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identity, G.B. Madison, professor emeritus at McMaster University, has surmised that 
Canada' s philosophy is one based on 'toJerance~ restrajnt~ and mutuaJ respect'. 60 Yet 
this new-found philosophy does not necessarily mean that Canadians are open to the 
recognition of group-differentiated rightS.61 Although the country is now regarded 
around the world as a strong advocate of multiculturalism, recent developments in 
Canadian cultural dynamics clearly demonstrate that there are certain limits to 
tolerance. 
Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Davia Stasiulus point out that since the mid-1980's 
academics, journalists and a Canadian Govemment Commission of Inquiry have aIl 
questioned the merits of multiculturalism when it seeks to celebrate diversity at the 
expense ofpromoting Canadian unity.62 The 1991 Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future 
(hereafter the Spicer Commission), found that Canadians in general accepted the 
demographicface of multiculturalism. However, the Spicer Commission also 
discovered that Canadians were reluctant to endorse a form of pluralism that allowed 
individuals to live out their cultural particularities both in private and in public. 
According to the Spicer Report, '[t]he key goal of multiculturalism should be to 
we1come all Canadians to an evolving mainstream - and thus encourage real respect for 
diversity. ,63 In carrying out this ideology, the Commission recommended that aIl 
60 G.B. Madison, Is There a Canadian Philosophy?(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2000): p. 16. 
Italics original. 
61 One of the strongest critic of official forms ofmulticu1turalism emanates from novelist and University 
of Laval English prof essor, Neil Bissoondath. Bissoondath rejects group specifie rights and privileges and 
advocates full integration into the Canadian mainstream. See Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: The 
Cult ofMulticulturaIism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994). 
62 Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Davia Stasiulus, "Ethnie Pluralism under Siege: Popular and Partisan 
Opposition to Multicu1turalism," Canadian Public Policy, voU 8 (1992): p. 365. 
63 Canada, Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future: Report to the People and Govemment of Canada. 
(Ottawa: Minister ofSupply and Service Canada, 1991): p. 129. 
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r' .. 
'federal government funding for multiculturalism activities other than those serving 
immigrant orientation, reduction of racial discrimination and promotion of equality 
should be eliminated and the public funds saved be applied to these areas. ,64 In other 
words, although immigrants would be encouraged to participate in their particular 
cultural activities, the Spicer Commission recommended that they receive no 
government funding for such activities. Abu-Laban and Stasiulus maintain that in this 
light, multiculturalism is sirilply a 'homogenizing' tool used by the Canadian 
establishment to integrate non-canonical individuals into the mainstream.65 Although 
the report does not clearly state what the mainstream represents, the frequent references 
to VIA Rail, the CBC and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police suggest that the 
mainstream is a reflection of Anglo-Canadian society. The findings of the Spicer 
Commission ultimately served to de-legitimize real diversity as it argued that 'only 
when individuals have commonalities' will respect for diversity become a reality.66 This 
view, which seeks to promote unit y by stifling cultural differences, has become the 
prevailing vision of multiculturalism in Canada today. These unifying tendencies also 
/ 
appear to be a throwback to classical liberal goals of fostering equality by negating 
differences. 
Amongst the most articulate observers of Canadian multiculturalism is Richard J.F. 
Day who draws a direct line between old patterns of assimilation and CUITent policies 
that seek to integrate different Canadians into the mainstream. Day is under no illusion 
that Canada is attempting to create an image of itself beyond that of the British model 
64 Ibid. 
r', 65 Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, "Ethnie Pluralism," p. 370. 
66 Ibid., p. 371. 
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under which it evolved. According to his perspective, Canada "is presently articulated, 
through a history of violent relations of power, more strongly with a set of British 
institutions, customs, and language, than it is with any other [culture]."67 
Following the 9/11 attacks, Muslim communities in Canada faced a series of 
challenges that have exceeded the homogenizing poHcies of the past. Pnina Werbner, a 
British Anthropologist who studies the Pakistani community in that country, has 
forwarded the notion that Muslims living in the West have become the lat est 
incarnation of the societal 'folk-devil', a position previously occupied by the European 
Jew. What makes this characterization aIl the more frightening is Werbner's assertion 
that this view is not limited to isolated bigots and racists. Rather, she states that the 
hatred of Muslims has spread across different classes within society and includes the 
'intellectuai eHtes, and the consumerist masses' who have genera11y adopted an 
Islamophobic perspective.68 Various Western governments have also implicitly 
participated in this characterization by issuing anti-terror legislation that has placed an 
enormous burden on Muslim populations through various profiling policies.69 Canada's 
Bill C-36 (hereafter the Anti-TelTorism Act) 70 provides police and government agencies 
greater power to restrict the movement and overall rights of individuals and groups 
67 Day, Multiculturalism, p. 223. 
68 Pnina Werbner, "Islamophobia: Incitement to Religious Hatred - Legislating for a New Fear?" 
AnthropoJogy Today, vol. 21, February (2005): pp. 8-9. 
69 According to Kent Roach, a prof essor oflaw at the University of Toronto, '[p]rofiling is a strategy that is 
both over and under inclusive and alienates communities that may assist authorities in identifying 
terrorists.' See, Thomas Gabor, "The Views ofCanadian Scholars on the Impact of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act," Department of Justice Canada, March 31 st (2004): http://www.justice.gc.ca/enlps/rs/rep/2005/rr05-
lIrr05-1 a 05.html. 
70 Bill C-=-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the 
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the 
registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, Ist Session, 3ih Parl.,2001. 
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suspected of terror activities.71 Abu-Laban reminds us that the Anti-TelTorism Act is 
not unique, other pieces of legislation, such as the laws permitting the intemment of 
'enemy aliens' during the First and Second World Wars also targeted the 'alien from 
within.'72 IfWerbner's daim, that Muslims have now become 'folk-devils', is true, the 
prospect of integrating certain members of the Muslim-Canadian community into the 
mainstream will ~e even more difficult in light of the CUITent atmosphere of fear and 
mistrust. 
Modem political elites have attempted to articulate a shared identity in order to 
bring together disparate segments of the population and foster economic and political 
goals.73 The political scientist Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out that new forms of 'civic 
religion' based on nationalism have replaced the traditional identity found in societies 
ruled under the authority of dynastie and religious rule.74 At times, the actual societal 
ties have been few and far between. The manner in which Canada became a nation 
following Confederation is an excellent case in point. The 'Laurentian Thesis' put 
71 In October of2006, one of the central provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Aetwas struck down by Ontario 
Justice Douglas Rutherford. Article 83.01:Section i(A) defined terrorism as an act that is committed 'in 
whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause ... ' According to 
Justice Rutherford, this article represents 'an essential element that is not only novel in Canadian law, but 
the impact ofwhich constitutes an infringement of certain fundamental freedoms ... including those of 
religion, thought, beHef, opinion, expression and association.' See, Canadian Press, "Judge Strikes Down 
Parto of Anti-Terror Law," Globe and Mai~ October 24th (2006): 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061 024. wterrorlaw 1 024/BNStory/National/hom 
e. Also see, R. v. Mohammed Momin Khawaja (14 September 2006), Toronto East Region 04-G30282 
(Ont. Sup. Ct. 1.). 
72 Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "Liberalism, Multiculturalism and the Problems ofEssentialism," Citizenship 
Studies, vol. 6 (2002): p. 476. 
73 Margaret Archer maintains that the need to promote a unified culture as defined by elites 'precluded 
any theory of cultural development springing from internal dynamics.' The net result ofthis omission is 
an 'official' cultural identity that often fails to reflect social reality. See Margaret Archer, Culture and 
Ageney: the Place of Culture in Social TheOlJ'(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): p. 6. 
74 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Sinee 1870: Programme, Myth. and Reality(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990): pp. 84-85. 
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forward by the late University of Toronto professor Donald Creighton, points out that 
the country's foundation was not predicated on a common culture based on language, 
ethnicity, religion or identity. Rather, the rationale for piecing together separate 
Canadian provinces was based on a tangible need to offset American economic, political 
and military strength.75 In her study on early Canadian nation building, Suzanne Zeller 
furthers this assertion by explaining that Confederation was an economic and political 
union motivated by the availability of new technologies such as rail travel, which 
allowed for the domination of the harsh Canadian environment by a merchant c1ass 
seeking wealth.76 In realizing these goals, Native populations were either assimilated or 
were forced off their land, while specific groups of immigrants were invited into the 
country and used for their labor \vhile others were exc1uded altogether. Meanwhile, 
groups such as the Japanese, who were considered to be threatening following the 
Second World War, were deported. Today, new legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism 
Act is repeating the same principles that have become hallmarks of Canadian 
multicultural poli ci es. 
Throughout much of Canada's history, cultural diversity has appeared as a negative 
challenge to the economic, political and military goals established by the English elite. 
In order to mold a common cultural front, various strategies such as deportation, 
intemment and assimilation were employed in Canada. Until recently, Canadian 
attitudes towards diversity have been fueled by ethnocentrism and chauvinism. With 
75 D.G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire ofthe St. Lawrence, 1760-1850(Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 
1937). . 
76 Suzanne Zeller, Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and the Idea of a Transcontinental Nation 
/-" (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 
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,( the introduction of Official Multiculturalism, overt acts of discrimination and 
intolerance have been replaced by more subtle modes of coping with diversity. Rather 
than openly celebrate Anglo-Canadian culture to the exclusion of all others, 
multiculturalism has promoted aH cultures within a bicultural framework that has 
propelled French culture to a new heightened status in order to avoid the break-up of the 
country. Meanwhile other cultures have been asked to fit into the prevailing society by 
way ofintegration. Today, the primary goal ofmulticulturalism is not the celebration of 
diverse cultures; rather it is ensuring that aIl Canadians can access opportunities within 
a society that is primarily defined by an Anglo-oriented culture. In this regard, Islamic 
law will have great difficulty being accepted in Canada. 
122 
Chapter 5 
The New Multiculturalism 
The previous two chapt ers have demonstrated that both liberalism and the nation-
state have maintained certain homogenizing tendencies conceming diverse cultures and 
identities. A recent Statistics Canada study projects that the country's visible minority 
population will number 20% of the overall population by the year 2017. The same study 
points out that Canada's white population will experience minimal growth as its birth 
rate declines. l In light of these projections, it is becoming evident that modeling 
society along Eurocentric bicultural and bilingual models will increasingly be difficult in 
a population whose ethnie backgrounds are non-European. Recent discussions in 
multicultural theory are beginning to address these demographic shifts in Canada by 
questioning the traditional demands for homogeneity and full cultural convergence. 
This chapter will highlight sorne of the new multicultural theories that seek to expand 
the scope of cultural recognition. The ide as are not attempts to do away with the 
existing social system; rather what these new multicultural theories are trying to 
accomplish is include, in the public forum, cultural voices that have previously been 
ignored or suppressed. 
The goal ofthis chapter is fourfold. First, it will assess the Islamic views conceming 
the residency of Muslims in countries where Islamic law does not govem society. 
Second, this chapter will introduce the notion that Canadian judges are currently 
recognizingprinciples of Islamic law in their chambers. This is inevitable given the 
(' ) Statistics Canada, "Study: Canada's Visible Minority Population in 2017," The Daily, March 22nd 
(2005):http://www.statcan.caIDailylEnglish/050322/d050322b.htm. 
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large Muslim community in Canada. Third, this chapter will put forward a number of 
philosophical justifications that support the broadening of multiculturalism in liberal 
countries such as Canada. Towards this end, the work of Taylor and Kymlicka will be 
analyzed. These two Canadian thinkers have pursued the politics of cultural recognition 
and have greatly contributed to the field of multiculturalism by encouraging liberals to 
exp and their acceptance of diversity in ways that go beyond the mere tolerance of 
difference. However, despite their calls for greater recognition, both Taylor and 
Kymlicka have certain limitations in their approach: namely their essentialist line of 
thinking and their privileging of Western society over non-Western cultures. Finally, 
this chapter will propose a new way of addressing diversity based on Habermas' theories 
of communicative democracy. His views will address sorne of the shortcomings found 
in Taylor and Kymlicka's work: specifically how to adopt a perspective on diversity that 
is not overtly paternalistic. One such approach is the formation of a legal system based 
on a joint governance model of justice as a way to mediate interpersonal conflicts within 
cultural groups. The attempt by the IIC] to establish ADR panels in Ontario represents 
an example of the joint governance approach mode!. This chapter will point out that, 
although such a system will serve the interests of certain segments of the Muslim 
community, there are a number of safeguards that need to be built into such a system in 
order to protect the rights of vulnerable members of society. 
According to Weber's classic view, a nation-state endeavors to consolidate its 
territorial integrity, cultural identity, and political legitimacy in its quest for security 
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and economic productivity.2 However, various globalizing phenomenon such as 
immigration, telecommunication and rapid transportation are increasingly challenging 
this model of state formation. As assimilative models of immigrant acculturation give 
way to multicultural policies that promote diversity, the demands for a unitary citizenry 
will inevitably undergo sorne alteration. For instance, Rawls' suggestion that 
'background culture' remain in the private sphere is increasingly losing its hold as a 
viable option within liberal multicultural states as more individuals link their 
substantive lifestyles to their public personas. If culture is to play a greater role in the 
daily lives of the state's citizenry, institutions such as the law will have to meet the 
challenges of personal identity. Amy Gutmann sums up this concem by explaining that 
'[r]ecognizing and treating members of sorne groups as equals now seems to require 
public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities, at least for 
those people whose self-understanding depends on the vitality oftheir culture.'3 
Muslim Residency in Non-Muslim Territory 
In light of the fact that sorne Muslims wish to maintain their devotion to religious 
law, it is useful to ascertain sorne of the Islamic positions conceming the legality of 
living in societies where the Shan'a is not the primary normative order. In answering 
this question, a number of different legal experts (mujtahids), imiims, and 
2 For a recent analysis of Max Weber's political thought see Steven Pfaff, "Nationalism, Charisma, and 
Plebiscitary Leadership: the Problem ofDemocratization in Max Weber's Political Sociology," 
SocioJogicaJ Inquiry. vol. 72 (2002): pp. 81-107. 
3 Amy Gutmann, ed., MulticulturaJism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1994): p. 5. 
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commentators, spanning both time and place will be discussed. Given the scope of 
geography and time, their views on this matter have not produced a uniform consensus. 
A number of Islamic sources maintain a strong preference for living within the 
bounds ofIslamic law. For instance-the Qur'an maintains that 'Those who do not judge 
by God's revelations are infidels indeed.'4 Furthermore, prophetie traditions or (J;adlth) 
encourage Muslims to avoid living in lands where Islam is not present as a societal 
force. For instance, one J;adlth maintains that '[w]hoever associates with an infidel and 
lives with them, he is like him.,5 These strict invocations against living outside Muslim 
territories reflect an Islamic worldview that has split the world into two spheres, the 
land of peace where Islam govems and regions where Islam is not present as a goveming 
force. Those territories govemed by Muslims who apply Sharl'a have traditionally been 
referred to as diïr al-Isliim, literally meaning the 'land of peace,' while those territories 
that fall outside the Muslim sphere of influence are referred to as diïr al-J;8Tb or the 'land 
ofwar.' 
Although in theory the dichotomy appears strict, in reality a more fluid approach has 
defined the actual manner in which Muslims themselves have approached the 
prohibition against residency in non-Islamic territory. For instance, during the lifetime 
of the Prophet, Muslims fleeing religious persecution by sorne of the residents ofMecca 
in 615 C.E., at the behest of the Prophet, traveled in search for sanctuary to Abyssinia, a 
region controlled by a Christian king. In commercial affairs, Muslim merchants 
4 Qur'an, 5:44. 
5 Abü Zakariyya Al-Nawawl, al-Majmü': SharJ; al-Muhadhdhab quoted from Khaled Abou EI-Fad!, 
"Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the 
Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," Journal of Islamic Law and Society, vol. 22 
(1994): p. 144. 
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frequently traveled to non-Muslim territories and associated with non-Muslims on a 
regular basis in order to ply their trade. Thus, the prohibition against traveling and 
residing within non-Islamic societies is ambiguous, a fact reflected in the differing 
opinions produced by various Muslim commentators. 
For instance, the c1assical legal scholar, al-Shafi'I, deemed it appropriate for 
Muslims to travel and reside in dir al-1;arb. This view reflects the practical necessities 
that saw merchants travel to neighboring regions beyond dir al-Islam. He explains that ' 
'He [the Prophet] has not exempted any ofhis people from any ofhis decrees, and he did 
not permit them anything that was forbidden in dir al-1;arb.'6 This statement is notable 
for a number of reasons. First, according to al-Shafi'I, Muslims are permitted to live, 
work, and travel to territories outside the Muslim world. Second, although the laws 
governing different parts of dir al-ftarb may not correspond to Islamic law, Muslims 
should not expect any extraterritorial privileges, rather should obey the laws in the non-
Islamic territories so long as they remain within the realm of the Shan'a. These views 
have led many jurists to conc1ude that so long as individuals were permitted to pray and 
govern themselves according to the Sharl'a they could maintain their residence in non-
Muslim territories.7 
Opposite views concerning the appropriateness of residing beyond the bord ers of 
dir al-Islam emerged as well. The Mruiki jurist, Abü Sa'1d S<$nün (d.240/854), 
recommends that because Muslims would be subject to non-Muslim laws they should 
r-" 6 Abü 'Abd Allah al-Shafi'i quoted from EI-Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," p. 174. 
7 Ibid., p. 175. 
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avoid traveling to non-Islamic territories altogether.8 Along these Hnes, Ibn Iiazm (d. 
456/1064), an Andalusian scholar remembered for his strict literalist (?,iihir) reading of 
sacred texts, deemed it impermissible for Muslims to travel to non-Islamic territory on 
trading missions because they may bec orne subject to non-Islamic laws.9 The personal 
biases of these scholars were likely shaped by regional influences that also played a role 
in the formation of Islamic jurisprudence. For instance, Ibn Iiazm and S~nUn lived on 
. . 
the western peripheries of Islarnic territory. Their distance from the centers of Islamic 
civilization such as Mecca, Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus may have contributed to their 
uncompromising views. Ibn I:Iazm, for instance, lived in Islarnic Spain which, during his 
lifetime, was constantly under threat from Christian powers. IO As territory fell to non-
Islamic forces, continued residence in diir al-fJarb was viewed by scholars like him as a 
political choice in favor of the Christian Reconquistadors. ll Sorne jurists living in Al-
Andalus went so far as to argue that Muslims living in diir al-lJarb carried the status of 
rebels (mufliribÜD).12 The calls for Muslims to follow the Shaii'a in countries such as 
Canada can be, in sorne respect, attributed to the legal opinions that emanated from 
these particular thinkers who took a more dogmatic position. 
However, although fascinating for comparative effect, the legal opinions produced by 
c1assical and medieval legal experts are untenable in contemporary times. Today, the 
migration of millions of Muslims into secular Western nations has blurred the 
8 Abü Sa'id S~ün, al-Mudawwana al-Kubra, quoted from EI-Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim 
Minorities," p. 146. 
9 Ibid., p. 149. 
10 For a history ofIslamic Spain see Anwar Chejne, Muslim Spain: Its History and Culture (Minneapolis: 
the University of Minnesota Press, 1974). 
Il El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," p. 163. 
12 Ibid., p. 169. 
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distinctions between diir al-lJarb and diir al-Isliim, a dichotomy that no longer holds in 
modern international relations. Recognizing this fact, numerous contemporary scholars 
have put forth positions concerning the legality of Muslims living in non-Islamic 
conntries. The contemporary Moroccan scholar, 'Abd al-' Azlz Ibn al-Siddiq, maintains 
that it is indeed permissible to live beyond traditional Islamic territories. He bases his 
view on the religious freedoms offered to Muslims in Western societies. According to 
al-Siddiq, these nations have 'become Islamic countries fulfilling aIl the Islamic 
characteristics by which a resident living there becomes the resident of an Islamic 
country in accordance with the terminology of the legal scholars of Islam.'13 Other 
scholars also have come to similar conclusions. The Egyptian scholar, Yusuf al-
Qardawl, points out that becoming a naturalized citizen of a Western country is 
advisable because of one's ability to actively participate in the political debates within 
those countries as equals.14 Meanwhile, Dr. Syed Mutawalli Darsh, an Islamic scholar 
trained at Al-Azhar University, explains that it is justifiable for a Muslim to take an 
oath of allegiance to the Queen of England. According to him such an oath: 
is simply putting in legal terms the real situation of the Muslims, that is, 
to be law abiding, peaceful, and to live in a decent respectable manner, 
since the Queen represents these basic moral qualities which are supposed 
to be the fabric of the society in which we live. So when people take the 
Oath of Allegiance to the Queen, they are promising to act according to 
the laws of the country, as happens when people are granted British 
nationality. There is no way for a person seeking British citizenship to 
avoid being loyal to the Crown and the land. 15 
13 'Abd al-' Azlz ibn al-Siddiq, quoted from Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld "Loyalty to a non-
Muslim Govermnent: an Analysis ofIslamic Normative Discussions and of the Views ofsome 
Contemporary Islamicists," in Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld, eds., Political Participation and 
Identities of Muslims in non-Muslim States (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996): p. 91. 
14 Ibid., p. 94. 
15 Dr. Syed Mutawalli Darsh quoted in Shadid and Koningsveld, "Loyalty to a non-Muslim Govermnent," 
p.94. 
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Finally, this line of thinking is also echoed in a fàtwa issued by one of the highest-
ranking Islamic officiaIs in Egypt, the late Shaykh al-Azhar, 'Ali Jïidd al-Haqq (d. 
1996). This religious figure has maintained that Muslims should actively participate in 
Western countries based on a Qur'ïinic verse that reads as follows: 'Allah forbiddeth you 
not that he should deal benevolently and equitably with those who fought not against 
you on account of religion nor drove you out from your homes; verily Allah loveth the 
equitable.'16 Furthermore, al-Haqq goes on to remind Muslims that the early Islamic 
community in Medina entered into a political community with tribes in that city that 
included Jewish and Christian groupS.17 In this manner, al-Haqq opens the door for 
various social and professional exchanges between Muslims and non-Muslims living in 
close proximity to one another outside the Muslim world. 18 
Despite this trend to deemphasize the strict dichotomy between diïr al-Isliim and 
diïr al-/1arb~ sorne contemporary Islamic figures have put forward opinions questioning 
the status of Muslims living in non-Islamic societies. The Moroccan born imiim, 'Abd 
Allah al-Tïi'i' al-KhamIishf, who currently lives in Amsterdam, maintains that Muslims 
living in the West are not able to practice their faith freely because they are subject to 
secular laws that govern their personal status. Al-KhamTIshl further maintains that 
those Muslims who choose to become naturalized citizens of Western countries are 
16 Qur'ân, 60:5-8. 
17 Shadid and Koningsveld, "Religious Authorities ofMuslims in the West: their Views on Political 
Participation," in Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld, eds., Intercultural Relations and Religious 
Authorities: Muslims in the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002): p. 156. 
18 Shadid and Koningsveld, "Loyalty to a non-Muslim Government," p. 95. 
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eommitting aets oftreason to both their religion and to their eountry of origin. 19 Others 
have taken sirnilar uneornprornising positions, sueh as the Syrian born imiim, 'Umar 
Bam Mu4ammad, who until reeently lived in Britain but has now been banished to 
Lebanon.20 Aeeording to Bakrl, Musli ms living in' the West should begin working 
towards the creation of Islamic rule in the eountries in which they eurrently reside. In 
an interview given to the London-based Arabie-language newspaper al-lfayat, Bam 
made the following staternent: 
God willing, we will transform the West into Dar Al-Islam [sic] 
by rneans of invasion frorn without. If an Islarnic state arises and 
invades [the West] we will be its army and its soldiers frorn 
within. If not, [we will change the West] through ideological 
invasion frorn here, without war and killing. 21 
Bam's rationale is partly based on his view that there should exist a strict dichotorny 
between diïr al-parb and diïr al-Islam. For Bam, integration into Western society is not 
a viable option for Muslirns; rather, converting the Western states into Islamic nations 
appears to be his goal. 
The lack of a centralized and univers al ecclesiastic authority in the Islamic world, 
both in the past and today, permits this wide divergence of opinions concerning the 
legality of living in non-Muslirn territory. It is crucial to point out that sorne of the 
individuals cited above, namely Al-KhamIishl and Bam, have little training in 
traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Rather, they are prayer leaders or imiims who have 
19 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
20 Audrey Gillan and Dilllcan Campbell, "Many faces ofBakri: Enemy of West, Press Bogeyman and 
Scholar," Guardian Unlimitect August 13 (2005): 
http://politics.guardian.co. uk/homeaffairs/story /0, 11026,1548409 ,00.html. 
21 Middle East Media Research Institute, "Islamist Leaders in London Interviewed," Special Dispatch 
Series, no. 410 (2002): http://memri.org/biniarticles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP41 002. 
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traditionally not participated in legal discourse. However, with the demise of traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence as a result of modernization throughout the Muslim world, there is 
little stopping these individuals and others like them from putting forward their ideals 
and labeling them as 'Islamic.' These opinions ultimately reflect a politicized voice of 
Islam that is addressing the West's continued imperialistic designs in the Muslim world, 
an involvement that has brought about a great deal of social displacement, violence, 
destruction and upheaval to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Their views appeal to 
those individuals who seek to further the divide between the Muslim world and the 
West. However, as mentioned above, the existing realities of global migration and 
trade have blurred the distinctions between the Muslim world and the West. Although 
their opinions may gamer a great deal of media attention, the programs they have in 
mind are unlikely to succeed. Meanwhile, those opinions that emanate from individuals 
such as al-Qardawl, al-lfaqq, and al-Siddiq, individuals who have a greater 
understanding of lJadlth scholarship or are associated with systematic jurisprudence, 
represent a more pragmatic approach to the question of Muslims living in the West. 
Although the circumstances surrounding their views are different from the concerns 
classical and medieval jurists faced, the conclusions they have reached are similar: 
namely so long as individuals are permitted to maintain their faith - residency in non-
Islamic territory is permissible. This conclusion is certainly at play in Canada where 
many Muslims reside and flourish while maintaining their faith under the Canadian 
Charter. 
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De-facto Legal Pluralism: Islamic law in Canadian Courts 
The presence of a large Muslim population in Canada is reflected in the fact that 
Canadian judges are currently addressing cases that deal specifically with Islamic 
concems. Denise Réaume, a professor of law at the University of Toronto, points out 
that a de-facto system of legal pluralism currently exists in Canada whereby different 
nonnative orders interact with iocallaws on a regular basis.22 Many ofthese cases arise 
in the context of family law and often deal with issues such as inheritance, child 
custody, marriage and divorce.23 Rather than discounting the cultural concems of such 
cases, Réaume encourages the interaction of different nonnative orders within the 
Canadian context as a means of promoting a greater sense of cultural recognition and 
justice. Underscoring Réaume's view is her concem for providing greater autonomy to 
members of cultural and religious communities. She c1aims that '[r]ecognizing sorne 
autonomy for minority groups would mean that disputes between members are resolved 
according to the group's own nonns, rather than by reference to sorne extemal body of 
wisdom such as the law. ,24 In supporting this position, Réaume proposes two 
methodological approaches for handling different nonnative orders within the Canadian 
legal context. They involve the use of 1) content-neutral legal tools in determining the 
outcome of a case and 2) the interpretation of abstract legal concepts from different 
22 Denise Réaume, "The Legal Enforcement of Social Nonns: Techniques and Principles," in Alan C. 
Cairns et. al., Cifizenship Diversity and PluraIism (Montreal and Kingston: McGiII-Queen's University-
Press, 1999): p. 179. 
23 John Tibor Syrtash, Religion and Culture in Canadian Family Law(Toronto: Butterworths, 1992). 
24 Réaume, "Legal Enforcement," p. 178. Emphasis added. Although Réaume's idea resembles Alternative 
~. Dispute Resolution (ADR), it is different in that the existingcivil courts will serve as the forum within 
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legal systems in order to permit sorne culturally specific adjudication. In each case, 
Canadian courts will recognize certain principles of law that fall outside the existing 
Iegal system. 
Turning first to content-neutral legal tools, Réaume demonstrates how the internaI 
rules governing cultural and religious communities and the disputes that may arise from 
these regulations can, in sorne cases, easily fit into Canada's existing laws governing 
contracts and trust'S?5 This precedent is evident in Ayache Estate v. Muslim 
Association of Calgary.26 This case deals with Muslim burlal ceremonies and the 
Islamic prohibition against reproducing animate objects. In a 1997 automobile accident, 
Fatima Ayache of Alberta was killed. The individu al in question was a Muslim but was 
not an active participant in the religion according to the judgment of Justice Hess?7 
Shortly following her death, the deceased's adult children, Michael Anthony Brennan 
and Ahmand Abdoul Rahman (both serving as executors of the estate) asked their uncle, 
Hussien Ayache, to arrange for their mother's burlal at a Muslim cemetery. The burlal 
took place on March 1 i h at the Muslim cemetery in Cochrane, Alberta, a site 
administered by the Muslim Association of Calgary. Prior to the burlaI, the plaintiffs' 
Unc1e ~igned a contract which stated that "[t]he family of the deceased will not be 
aIlowed to have any pictures or statues on the headstone or the grave. ,28 This rule is in 
accordance with the tradition al Islamic practice of utilizing unmarked graves as a means 
which the disputes are settled. In the religious based ADR format, such as the one proposed by the Islamic 
Institute of Civil Justice of Ontario, conflicts would be mediated outside the civil court structure. 
25 Réaume, "Legal Enforcement," pp. 180-183. 
26 Ayache Estale v. Muslim Assn. ofCalgmy(2000), ABPC 101. (Prov. Ct.). 
27 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
28 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
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of deterring the worship of ancestors.29 Despite the wording of the contract, the 
plaintiffs ordered and subsequently placed a headstone at the gravesite that inc1uded an 
image of the deceased. This provoked the defendants, the Muslim Association of 
Calgary, -to contact the Ayache family and ask that the image of Fatima Ayache be 
removed. Failing to do so, the cemetery would proceed with the removal of the image 
and forward all costs to the Ayache family. 
When the plaintiffs did not respond or take the necessary action, the Muslim 
Association of Calgary proceeded to alter the headstone in order to make it conform to 
the contract signed by Hussien Ayache. Shortly thereafter, the Ayache family proceeded 
to disinter the grave and re-inter the deceased at another cemetery. The co st of this 
procedure was $3,017.40 the amount for which the plaintiffs were suing the Muslim 
Association of Calgary. Along with this sum, the suit inc1uded an additional $4,482.60 
for emotional and nervous shock suffered by various members ofthe Ayache family. 
In his decision, Justice Hess ruled against the Ayache family citing that the contract 
c1early stated the prohibition against placing any animate images in the Muslim 
cemetery. According to the judge, '[t]he decision taken by the plaintiffs to disinter and 
re-inter the deceased and restore the likeness of the deceased on the headstone was not 
29 The Islamic prohibition against representational art (ta$wJr) is based on the principle that God alone 
engages in the act of creation (kha1if). In this regard God is sometimes described as a MU$awwir 
(artist/creator), the same term that is used to describe a painter or draughtsperson. There exists a close 
correlation between the word $awwara (to draw) and the words khaJl{(to create) and bar'a (to create). A 
number of i}adith link the act ofGod's creation with the act ofproducing art. Therefore, individuals who 
create art based on living beings possessing souls (riïlJ.) are seen as people imitating God. The prohibition 
against the reproduction of living creatures in Islamic civilization is often overstated. Numismatics 
dating to the Umayyad Dynasty were often adomed with images of the Caliph, a practice borrowed from 
Byzantine coins which carried depictions ofthe Emperor. Also amongst the Umayyads, private 
residences were often decorated with images ofhunting scenes painted by non-Muslim artisans who were 
probably Greek in origin. See" Tll§wJr." in EncycJopedia of/siam, Vol. X (Leiden: Brill, 2003): p. 361 b-
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as a result of anything done by the defendant [Muslim Association of Calgary] in breach 
of the terms of its contract with the plaintiffs and consequently the defendant is not 
responsible for the costs incurred by the plaintiffs .... ,.30 The judge further suggests that 
- any grievance on the part of the Ayche family be directed against thelUlcle who made 
the initial funeral arrangements. This case demonstrates a clear example of a breach of 
contract whereby a Canadian judge merely has to follow existing content-neutral legal 
tools in determining the outcome of the case. 
Not aIl cases related to the Shaii'a appearing before Canadian courts are as clear-cut. 
In JaJaJ v. Canada a number of complications required sorne understanding of Islamic 
family law as weIl as an awareness of the judicial practices of a foreign country.31 In 
this case, Younas Jalal, a Canadian of Pakistani origin, was seeking to sponsor his 
adoptive Pakistani child into Canada. His request was disallowed when Canadian 
officiaIs questioned the validity of the child's Pakistani adoption procedure. They came 
to this decision based on their understanding of Pakistani law. Under Pakistani family 
law, which is based on Islamic princip les of personal status~ there are no provisions 
governing adoption (tabannl).32 Meanwhile Canadian law stipulates that individuals 
who are in the process of adopting foreign-born children must first adopt them in their 
366a. See also Richard Ettinghusen and Oleg Grabar The AIt and Architecture of Islam: 650-1250 
(London: Penguin Books, 1987). 
30AyacheEstate v. MuslimAssn. ofCaIgary, paragraph 17. 
31 JaIaI v. Canada (MinisterofCitizenship & Immigration) (1995) 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 146, (Immigration & 
Refugee Board (Appeal Division», 
32 The Qur'iin abrogates the pre-Islamic practice of adoption. The basis for this prohibition is found in 
verse 33:4 which reads, 'God did not give any man two hearts in his chest. Nor did He turn your wives 
whom you estrange (according to your custom) into your mothers. Nor did He turn your adopted children 
into genetic offspring. AlI these are mere utterances that you have invented. God speaks the truth, and He 
guides in the (right) path.' For further detail on adoption in reference to Pakistani law, see Pearl and 
Menski, Muslim Family Law, pp. 408-409. 
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country of origin. Only after a child is legally adopted in their country of origin can the 
Canadian family apply for the child's Canadian status.33 Because of the lack of 
legislation goveming the adoption of children in Pakistan, the parents in question had 
obtained a declaratory statement from a Civil court judge in Pakistan endorsing the 
transfer of parental rights. However, owing to the ad-hoc nature of this procedure, the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board maintained its refusaI to admit the child into 
the country as a landed immigrant. Complicating matters further was the fact that both 
the child in question and his adoptive parents were members of Pakistan's small 
Christian community. Although Islamic law forbids adoption, this prohibition does not 
apply to non-Muslims living under Islamic rule. 
Seeking to establish whether the adoption of a Christian child was valid under 
Pakistani law, the Canadian judgetumed to an expert legal witness. The witness in 
question was a McGill University prof essor, Wael HaIlaq. During the course of his 
t est imony, Hallaq explained that under Islamic law, adoption is indeed forbidden; 
however, because the individu aIs involved in the case were Christians, they did not fall 
under the Shaii'a in matters relating to the provisions against adoption. As Justice 
Blumer states, '[a]ccording to Prof essor Hallaq, it is [a] ... basic tenet of the "Shariat" 
that non-Muslims are not bound by this prohibition and Christians and Jews in Muslim 
countries may adopt subject to their respective ecclesiastical authorities. ,34 
33 Immigration Act, R.e.s. 1985, c. 1-2. 
34 Jalal v. Canada, para. Il. 
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Unlike the previous case involving a contractual matter whereby the judge relied 
exc1usively on existing neutraI legal mechanisms to formulate a decision, the latter case 
required sorne interpretative skills on behalf of the presiding judge. Instead of following 
the letter of the law, where the child should have been denied immigration status, the 
judge deferred to the nuances of Islamic legal practice with the help of an expert witness 
and allowed the child entry into Canada. This scenario exemplifies the ideas brought 
forward by Réaume earlier. In recognizing the validity of Islamic law in the case, the 
judge did not simply defer to the conventional principles of Canadian law. Rather, in 
rendering a decision, the judge recognized certain cultural norms as a means ofbringing 
about justice. 
The recognition of Islamic principles in Canadian law provides a c1ear indication 
that legaI pluralism involving Islamic law is an operational phenomenon in the country. 
What is not clear, however, is the ethicaI dimension of this emerging legal reality. For 
instance, why should Canadian society tolerate principles of Islamic law within the 
secular legal process? How will Islamic law, which privileges community identification, 
operate within a society that is oriented around individu al rights? Islamic society and 
law have different conceptions of the status of women than those found in Western 
constitutionaIlaw. Given these differences, what will be the status of Muslim women 
within a formaI system oflaw that recognizes principles ofShaii'a? FinaIly, how should 
Muslim individuals who break with Islamic tradition or 'dissenters' be treated by the 
Muslim community ifthey are given a voice in representing Muslims in Canada? These 
are a few of the concems that need to be addressed when incorporating matters of 
Islamic law within Western constitutional law. The remainder of this chapter will 
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analyze a number of positions that will attempt to answer these matters. My goal is to 
endorse a philosophie al position that is not paternalistic towards Muslims who wish to 
address sorne of their concerns within the framework of the Shan' a, while at the same 
time upholding the standards of equaHty and individual rights that underscore Canadian 
law and society. 
Taylor and Kymlicka: Recognizing Difference in Canada 
In traditionally liberal societies such as Canada, there is a need to revise theories of 
multiculturalism in order to reflect the diverse realities of the population. The Canadian 
philosopher, Charles Taylor, provides sorne interesting recommendations towards the 
politics of recognition. Focusing on liberal democracies in general and the Canadian 
landscape in particular, Taylor argues that when "we recognize the equal value of 
different cultures .... we not only let them survive, but we acknowledge their worth.,,35 
His view of providing worth to different elements of Canadian society stems from his 
reading ofliberal democracy and its trajectory throughout post-Enlightenment history. 
In hierarchical societies such as those of pre-Enlightenment Europe, dignity and 
recognition were primarily based on honor. Taylor explains that 'one's personal glory 
must be another's shame, or at least obscurity.'36 In this light, public honor was reserved 
for a very small minority of the population (usually the nobility), while the vast majority 
of the public toiled in obscurity. With the Enlightenment, philosophers such as 
Rousseau sought to introduce sorne principles of equality by emphasizing a 'general 
/'~' 35 Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," p. 64. 
36 Ibid., p. 48. 
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will' as a way of implementing univers al justice. Rousseau's Social Contract would 
usher in a new paradigm whereby principles of equality and respect were made available 
to a broader spectrum of the population. However liberating this model may have 
appeared, it presupposed a-certain level ofhomogeneity within the population.37 As we 
saw in the third chapter, early liberal thinkers assumed that societal uniformity was one 
of the components required for securing equality and unity. Hegel would sum up this 
orientation by claiming that such a society was predicated on a '''we'' that is an "l", 
and an "1" that is a "we.",38 This social reality is impossible to imagine in contemporary 
societies such as Canada's where the population is not only diverse but the country 
actively maintains a multicultural policy that promotes plurality as a positive goal. 
Taylor points out that '[d]emocracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, 
which has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of 
demands for the equal status of cultures and genders. ,39 This idea offers a partial answer 
as to why Canadian society should recognize sorne cultural particularities found 
amongst certain segments of the population. Taylor views democracy as an 
evolutionary phenomenon that has undergone a number of paradigmatic shifts over the 
years. As such, he feels that the CUITent expression of democracy should be open to 
37 The promotion of a general will amongst a unified and homogeneous citizenry carries with it sorne 
inherent dangers. Namely, it does not address the needs ofthose members of society who choose to 
remain alooffromthe 'general will'. These individuals have at various times faced an 'overwhelming 
moral authority' that forced them to conform to the popular will. The most notorious ex ample of this 
moral authority was in Robespierre's 'republic ofvirtue' that soon became a 'republic ofterror' 
demanding conformity during the course of the French Revolution. See, Raymond Geuss, History and 
Illusion in Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001): p. 73. 
38 Friedrich Hegel, PhenomenologyofSpirit, A.V. Miller, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 
p.ll0. 
39 Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," p. 27. 
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cultural recognition. With greater cultural recognition, he believes that liberal societies 
will provide individuals the ability to construct an authentic identity. In this manner, 
individuals will create personalities that encompass their substantive needs. In Taylor's 
words, '[b]eing true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is' 
something only 1 can articulate and discover. In articulating it, 1 am also defining 
myself. 1 am realizing a pot enti alit y that is the property of my own. ,40 
Acquiring identity, however, is not accomplished in the absence of the majority 
culture. Rather the process according to Taylor is dialogical, meaning that a number of 
institutional variables must combine in order to shape an individual's identity.41 By 
extension, if identity is shaped by the interplay of institutions that inc1ude schools, 
govemmental agencies, and businesses then, Taylor insists, there is a need to have one's 
culture recognized by these very institutions.42 Herein lies the crux of Taylor's 
argument and the basis as to why Canadian society should recognize minority groups 
and their cultural particularities; the recognition granted to minority cultures by public 
institutions in modem societies is often lacking due to the failure of these institutions to 
acknowledge people's substantive needs. This can subsequently cause adverse effects 
for members ofminority groups such as alienation. Taylor explains '[e]qual recognition 
is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusaI can inflict 
40 Ibid., p. 31. 
41 Ibid., p. 32. 
42 The idea that an individual develops through the interplay of different social factors is one of Charles 
Taylor's greatest contributions to contemporary philosophy. In his text Sources of the Self; Taylor 
asserts that '1 am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors; in one way in relation to those 
conversation partners which are essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those 
who are now crucial to my continuing grasp oflanguages of self-understanding-and, of course, these 
classes may overlap. A self exists only within what 1 calI 'web of interlocution.' See Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989): p. 36. 
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damage on those who are denied it ... ,43 The result of not recognizing cultural traditions 
that help shape an individual's identity is a form of oppression. In order to avoid this 
situation, Taylor proposes that the majority should begin recognizing minority cultures 
in order to help the latter enjoy a feeling of self-worth. In such an atmosphere, 
minorities will not find themselves stitled under the yoke of the dominant culture; 
rather, by recognizing an individual's substantive needs the majority will 'recognize the 
equ~l value of different cultures ... ,44 
However appealing his ideas may seem on the surface, Taylor's recommendations 
for greater cultural recognition leave sorne important questions unanswered. Although 
Taylor's views are based on the liberal school ofthought, he approaches the question of 
/~ multiculturalism from a communitarian perspective. The recognition granted to 
r 
minority culture will focus primarily on group identity rather than on an individual's 
specifie concems. Furthermore, because communitarians seek to promote the 'common 
good' as a way of maintaining the survival of a minority culture, the range of options 
individuals can pursue in shaping their personalities is sometimes restricted.45 Language 
laws in Quebec, which promote French, are good examples of the 'communal good' 
outweighing individual choice in the pursuit of group interests. These laws stipulate that 
parents of French and immigrant children cannot enroll their children in English 
elementary and secondary school. Although English public schools exist, only children 
whose parents attended English schools can qualify to register in these institutions. 
43 Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," p. 36. 
44 Ibid., p. 64. 
45 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 92. 
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These restrictions are in place in order to preserve the French culture in Canada by 
ensuring that French remain the predominant language of instruction in the province. 
However, in promoting the 'common good,' certain individuals will have their choices 
limited if they wish to educate their children in English. 
Taylor's communitarian perspective, which privileges the group over the individual, 
raises sorne questions regarding personal liberty and individu al autonomy. The 
controversy surrounding the Canadian-Muslim-feminist, Irshad Manji, who is openly 
gay, is an interesting case that demonstrates how group rights may impinge upon an. 
individual's freedom and autonomy. Manji is free to express her sexual orientation in a 
liberal environment; however she has faced a great deal of criticism from sorne Muslim 
community groups in Canada and the United States for her lifestyle choices. When 
society privileges the group over the individual, people like Manji face the danger of 
being marginalized by the very groups they wish to identify themselves with and build 
their personalities around. 
According to Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi of the Islamic Society of North America 
(ISNA), '[h]omosexuality is sinful and shameful. In Islamic terminology it is called «Al-
Fahsha" [sic] or an atrocious and obscene act. ... [t]hose who insist on this lifestyle, 
consider it legitimate and feel "gay pride", we should not associate with them and 
should not take them as friends. We should certainly avoid those people. ,46 Speaking on 
behalf of a prominent Islamic organization in North America, Siddiqi is quite clear in his 
46 Muzammil Siddiqi, "Islamic Manners in Dealing with Homosexuals," Islamonline.net, June (2003): 
http://www.islamonline.netlfatwa/englishIF atwaDisplay .asp?hF atwaID=27 53. 
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admonition of homosexuality. In expressing his views, he is as king that Muslims 
disassociate themselves from fellow Muslims who are gay. This begs the question as to 
the status of gay Muslims and their place within the Muslim community. Moreover, if 
communal rights take precedence over individual rights, how should gay Muslims 
identify themselves with the greater Muslim community and visa versa? More to the 
point, is individual choice, guaranteed within a liberal society, being served when 
society places a premium on recognizing group-centered rights as Taylor would suggest? 
In her book, The Trouble with Islam: A Wake- Up Call for Honesty and Change, 
Manji urges Muslims around the world to engage in ijtihiid in order to modemize their 
faith in such a way as to accept homosexuality.47 Upon the publication of her book, 
voices representing well-known Muslim organizations in Canada and abroad expressed 
their displeasure with Manji's thesis. Muhammad Elmasry, although not voicing his 
displeasure directly at Manji, had the following to say about individuals who take up 
causes such as the one Manji has assumed. 
Most self-hating Muslims claim to practice their faith. They call 
themselves liberal, moderate, and contemporary. In themselves, these 
traits are neutral, but in reality they contribute to distancing the self-
haters from their religion, masking deeper issues. Self-hating Muslims 
secretly (or not so secretly) despise their religion and curse the day their 
parents gave them Muslim names. Yet most lack the courage to change 
either name or faith, or leave the communities in which they grew up. 
Instead, they try to accommodate their ambivalence by being very 
selective, or even minimal, in their Islamic practices; and if asked for an 
opinion, will indicate that Islam should be reformed to suit their own 
./~ 47 Irshad Manji, The Trouble with Islam: a Wake-Up Call for Honesty and Change (Toronto: Random 
Rouse, 2003). 
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increasingly tenuous beliefs. Often, they are not satisfied to leave other 
Muslims to live their Islam in more traditional ways.48 
Like Manji, Elmasry is certainly free to express his views on the matter of so-called 
'self-hating' Muslims. What differentiates his opinion from Manji's is that he made 
these comments not as a private citizen but as the president of the Canadian Islamic 
Congress (CIC), a recognized Muslim organization in Canada. His strongly worded 
condemnation against 'self-hating' Muslims highlights the problems associated with 
Taylor's approach towards recognition. Reliance on groups to define the identity of 
individuals can, in sorne instances, silence voices of dissent or at least question their 
efficacy. Thus, if society were to privilege the group over the individual, Manji's 
homosexuality and her voice of dissent could be regarded as problematic. 
Seyla Benhabib cogently points out that when Taylor caUs for society to recognize 
different cultures he fails to distinguish 'which webs of interlocution should be 
normatively privileged, and under which circumstances and by whom.'49 If society 
were to place greater emphasis on recognizing the CIC as a representative body of the 
Muslim community along with its president's views concerning 'self-hating' Muslims, 
one could take on the mistaken assumption that Islam is not open to internaI dissent and 
that there exists a 'party line' which is toed by all Muslims. Furthermore, if one were to 
privilege ISNA's views on homosexuality, Manji's choices take on the appearance of 
heresy. Although homosexuality is regarded as outside the purview of the Sharl'a in the 
48 Mohamed Elmasry, "Born Agains and Self-Raters: Muslims Rave them too," September (2003): 
http://world.mediamonitors.net/content/view/fulV794/. 
49 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002): p. 56. 
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Muslim world, it is part of the mainstream in countries such as Canada. 50 For instance, 
same sex marriages are permitted in Canada as a number of provinces and territories are 
currently solemnizing same-sex unions. Despite the growing acceptance of 
homosexuality in Canada, a danger exists for individuals who choose lifestyles that are 
contrary to the aims of their particular religious group within which they seek to 
identify themselves. Dissenters, like Manji, may find themselves in a state of limbo 
concerning their own personal identity in relation to the group. This may drive people 
away from the very groups they seek to identify with. 
Beyond Benhabib's criticisms, Taylor's group-based approach towards cultural 
recognition also suffers from an essentialist perspective in that he fails to address the 
inherent divisions within any group or society. For instance, referring specifically to 
Islam, Taylor draws a very broad conclusion in stating that within 'mainstream Islam, 
there is no question of separating politics and religion the way we have come to expect 
in Western liberal society.'51 In Taylor's estimation, the entire scope of mainstream 
Islamic society (whatever that may be) is represented by sorne kind of monolithic 
construct devoid of internaI fissures and complexities. Furthermore, because 
'mainstream Islam' falls outside the expectations of Western liberal society in matters 
50 For information concerning homosexuality in the Middle East see Joseph Massad, "Re-Orienting 
Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World," Public Culture, vol. 14 (2002): pp. 361-385. This 
article argues that various North American and European advocacy groups are ascribing a particular 
identity, in this case Western-styled homosexuality, on Middle Eastern men who engage in same-sex 
encounters. Massad argues that in their attempt to 'liberate' gay men in the Middle East, the advocacy 
groups are repeating a long-standing colonialist practice ofre-defining non-European social practices. In 
doing so, the these groups not only fail to understand the nature of same-sex relationships in the Middle 
East but also contribute to the universalizing project Western liberals have been pursuing in the Muslim 
world. 
51 Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," p. 62. 
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relating to the separation of church and state, it is perceived as problematic.52 The 
European Orientalist tradition has a long history ofviewing the Muslim world as exotic 
and 'other'; Taylor's depiction of the Muslim world appearS to be a throwback to this 
line ofthinking. In his formulation, the Islamic practice of combining state and religion 
is not part of the 'we' Taylor defines as Western and liberal. Rence, any recognition the 
Muslim community gains from the majority may be predicated on the belief that Islamic 
culture is fundamentally at odds with the basic values associated with liberalism and 
Western society. Furthermore, any individu al who defines him/herself as a Muslim wili 
be associated with a group that falls outside the liberal mainstream. If we assume that 
these individuals are dissenting from 'mainstream' Islam or happen to be homosexual, 
not only will they be seen as 'outsiders' within the Western world-view, but they could 
also be viewed as non-conforming heretics by members of the majority - further calling 
into question an individual's self-worth. 
Taylor's concern for recognizing culture began with the premise of promoting the 
value of cultures so that individuals who identified with these groups could shape 
authentic personalities based on culture. As such, an emphasis on group culture is 
promoted so as to protect minority groups from being overrun by the majority's culture. 
Taylor's formulation, however, does not take into account those individuals who are at 
odds with their own cultures. The problems associated with positioning group rights 
over and above individual concerns ultimately detract from Taylor's important 
contribution towards the recognition of minority cultures within liberal societies. 
52 Ibid. 
147 
The questions associated with privileging group rights over individual rights are 
addressed in Will Kymlicka's work on multiculturalism. Liberalism, according to 
Kymlicka, should be focused primarily on maintaining personal autonomy regardless of 
group pressures to conform.53 For Kymlicka, an individual living in a liberal society 
should pursue a good life that is primarily developed from within.54 Furthermore, 
lifestyle choices made by individuals must be reversible without any group or societal 
sanction. 55' In his words, the 'defining feature of liberalism is that it. .. allows peopl~ to 
choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, 
and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life. ,56 What distinguishes Kymlicka's 
views from Taylor's perspective is the notion that the individual cornes before the group 
and that sacrificing individual autonomy to a group's authority is unwarranted. This 
does not imply that group identity is of no concem; Kymlicka advocates group-
differentiated rights in certain situations. In his estimation, cultural groups play a 
functionalist role because they provide people 'access to a range of meaningful options' 
which in tum shapes their personalities.57 So, like Taylor, Kymlicka sees the promotion 
of diverse cultures as important in liberal society. Unlike Taylor, however, Kymlicka 
views culture as playing a subordinate role to the individu al. Moreover, Kymlicka 
maintains that some cultures deserve group-differentiated rights in order to make 
available to the public the raw material individuals will use to piece together their 
53 Kymlicka, MuiticuituraJ Citizenship, p. 34. 
54 Ibid., p. 81. 
55 Will Kymlicka, LiberaJism, Community. and Culture (New York: Clarendon Press, 1991): p. 37. 
56 Kymlicka, MuiticuituraJ Citizenship, p. 80. 
57 Ibid., p. 83. 
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individual personalities. In this light, Kymlicka poses the following question: 'can 
liberals accept the demands for group-differentiated rights by ethnie and national 
minorities?,58 In answering this question within the Canadian context, Kymlicka 
-establishes a three-Iayered hierarchy of cultures. Within his formula, sorne cultures are 
granted group-differentiated rights (Anglophone, Francophone and Native cultures) 
while others, namely immigrant cultures, cannot be fully privileged in this regard. 
The first category of culture Kymlicka lists in his typology is societal culture. He 
defines societal cultures as having the following attribut es: a standard language used in 
economic, political and educational institutions; a high level of collective identity 
amongst the citizenry; and the existence of equal opportunities for acquiring societal 
benefits ranging from educational development to economic growth.59 As demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, Anglophone culture is the societal culture in Canada as it carries 
aIl of the se attribut es. The other cultures that exist in Canada are required to integrate 
themselves into this prevailing framework.60 Kymlicka places a great deal of ernphasis 
on societal culture and seeks to ensure its survivability. He backs up this assertion by 
quoting Ronald Dworkin, who explains that, '[w]e inherited a cultural structure, and we 
have sorne dut y, out of simple justice to leave that structure at least as rich as we found 
it.,61 In quoting Dworkin, Kymlicka is suggesting that in order for Canadian culture to 
survive (presumably in its Anglophone form) it needs to emphasize those characteristics 
58 Ibid., p. 34. 
59 Ibid., pp. 76-78. 
60 Kymlicka, Fimong our Way, pp. 40-59. 
61 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985): pp. 232-233. 
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that are English in orientation while at the same time limit those characteristics found 
in other cultures. In the sixth chapter, we shaH see that Ontario's ban on religious 
arbitration falls in line with this type of thinking. 
. 
The other cultural groups that Kymlicka distinguishes from societal cultures are 
national minorities and immigrant cultures. In Canada, French-Canadian and Native 
cultures constitute national minorities which previously operated on a more independent 
basis but now live within the framework of Anglophone culture. Despite the attempts 
by English Canada at assimilating the Native and French-Canadian communities, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, both groups have survived and are considered viable 
components of the Canadian identity. Their survival is partly due to the existence of 
various institutions such as language and religion that, according to Kymlicka, have 
'defined the range of sociaHy meaningful options for their members. ,62 In this regard, 
Kymlicka feels that Native and Francophone societies should be accorded certain group-
differentiated rights due to the 'determination they have shown in maintaining their 
existence as distinct cultures, despite ... enormous economic and political pressures. ,63 
The third group Kymlicka discusses in his list of cultures are the various immigrant 
communities found throughout Canada. When answering the question as to whether or 
not groups such as the Muslim community should receive recognition for their 
substantive needs, Kymlicka states that they cannot recreate the societal culture found 
in their former homes. His view is based on the fact that 'they have left behind the set 
62 Kymlicka, MulticuituraJ Citizenship, p. 79. 
63 Ibid. 
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of institutionalized practices, conducted in their mother tongue, which actually provided 
culturally significant ways of life to people in their original homeland. ,64 The reasons he 
cites for not recognizing institutions such as a parallel system of Islamic law is that 
those who wish to promote such structures are ultimately seeking to protect communal 
practices from post-industrial hybridization and relativism. Furthermore, these groups 
also seek to limit any 'internaI dissent' that would alter traditional practices.65 Irshad 
Manji's sexual orientation and calls for a new ijtihiid are examples of such challenges 
traditional group-oriented religions may wish to avoid or suppress.66 
Rather than establish a parallel 'societal culture' within their adopted homes, 
Kymlicka maintains that immigrants should contribute 'new options' to mainstream 
society.67 These new options would inc1ude such things as food, dress, and various 
esoteric principles from which members of the general society would pick in order to 
shape their own personal identities which in Canada are ultimately predicated on 
Anglophone and Francophone cultures. In other words, minority culture would play a 
purely functionalist and support ive IOle in providing individuals with life choices from 
which to shape their personality. This line of thinking follows the logic of the B&B 
64 Ibid., p. 77. 
65 Ibid., p. 42. 
66 Kymlicka's approach to 'illiberal' states and cultures is cogent and should be discussed. He rightly 
daims that it is misleading to assume that there are 'liberal' and 'illiberal' societies. Rather many 
societies-take for instance Islamic Civilization and Christian Civilization- have elements that can be 
interpreted as 'liberal'; Islam's focus on social justice and Christianity's focus on love are two such 
principles. These two societies also have practices that be interpreted as 'illiberal'; the lack gender parity 
in sorne fonns ofIslamic divorce and the history of colonialism in Christendom are two examples. 
Kymlicka is of the opinion that 'existing liberal nations had illiberal pasts, and their liberalization 
required a prolonged process ofinstitutional refonn. To assume that any culture is inherently illiberal, 
and incapable ofrefonn, is ethnocentric and ahistorical.' See Kymlicka, MulticulturaJ Citizenship, p. 94. 
67 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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Commission whereby immigrant culture would play 'second fiddle' to English and 
French institutional culture. 
Having stated the case for not granting group-differentiated rights to immigrant 
communities, Kymlicka nevertheless creates an opening that would accommodate 
certain needs minority-communities may have. One such accommodation is the 
extension of business hours on Sundays; this would allow Jewish and Muslim 
businesspeople access to the same earning potential as those who do not observe the 
Sabbath.68 So long as these measures are granted in order to rectify existing inequalities 
minority groups face due to the pervasive power of the societal culture, Kymlicka feels 
that some group-differentiated rights are warranted.69 
Despite these concessions, certain questions emerge in Kymlicka's approach towards 
group-differentiated rights, namely his privileging of societal cultures and national 
minorities over immigrant groups. His view that only societal culture 'provides its 
members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities ... ' is 
overstated as it denies minority cultures the same privileges associated with a societal 
culture.70 For instance, Kymlicka presumes that it is only within the parameters of 
societal cultures that individuals have at their disposaI internaI mechanisms for change. 
Immigrant cultures (because they lack the institutional depth) are ultimately dependent 
on societal culture for these reformative tools. Another look at lrshad Manji 
68 Ibid., p. 97. 
69 Ibid., p. 120. 
70 Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds., Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University 
Press, 1997): p. 75. 
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demonstrates how this conclusion is problematic and far too limiting. One of Manji's 
main theses throughout her text is the use of ijtihid as an instigator for Islamic reform 
throughout the worldwide Muslim community. Though there may not be deep-rooted 
Islamic institutions available in countries such as Canada to implement the sort of 
change Manji is demanding, Kymlicka's assertion ultimate1y robs her and other Muslims 
who wish to challenge their faith of the right to 'subvert the terms of their own 
culture.'71 By implication, Kymlicka fee1s that any reforms to their religion conducted 
by Muslim-Canadians could only gain inspiration from Western societal culture. In 
other words, reforms that would be enacted in traditions such as Islam would follow a 
logic derived not from the religion's actual sources but from secular-liberalism. This 
kind of reform may work for liberal-minded individuals but would gain very little 
acceptance by certain members of the Muslim community who bristle at altering their 
faith via a Western-inspired logic. Moreover, Western styled reforms do not necessarily 
create better living arrangements for non-Western societies. As demonstrated in the 
second chapter, Western-style reforms in the Muslim world have diminished women's 
overall access to divorce in countries such as Egypt. Benhabib is correct to point out 
that 'Kymlicka's understanding of culture is remarkably static and preservationist.,72 
His assumption that non-liberal groups living in Canada should accommodate liberal 
principles underlines his hegemonic world-view. Thus, Kymlicka's impression of 
multiculturalism seems to be one that re-articulates the traditional modes of dealing 
71 Benhabib, Claims of Culture, p. 66. 
72 Ibid., p. 67. 
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with diversity in Canada, privileging 'in' groups (Anglo and now Francophone 
Canadians) and c1assifying and managing 'out' groups such as the Muslim-Canadian 
community into subordinate roles.73 This line of thinking negates the possibility that 
Muslims, or other non-majority communities, can contribute to the overaH formation of . 
Canadian culture. 
Despite the gaps in their respective theories, both Taylor and Kymlicka have had 
an immense impact on the debates surrounding minority rights in liberal societies. 
Although they faH into an essentialist line of thinking in relation to culture, both regard 
access to culture as a crucial component in the development of an individual's 
personality and self worth. However, the manner in which the two thinkers provide 
access to culture carries a certain paternalism that is c1early seen in Taylor's privileging 
of 'mainstream' society and Kymlicka's hierarchical list of cultures. Both thinkers 
inevitably echo many of the demands for social conformity found amongst previous 
liberal thinkers and nation-state institutions. Given the growing plurality found in 
Western liberal societies, a new approach needs to be pursued in which different voices 
engage in the public forum as active members. 
Abu-Laban cogently points out that in developing a new multiculturalism, liberal 
societies need to acknowledge their essentialist line of thinking which has exc1uded non-
majoritarian people in the West while colonizing non-European societies abroad intheir 
pursuit of wealth and prestige.74 Once this is acknowledged, a new form of 
73 According to Day, who echoes Benhabib's criticism, Kymlicka's brand ofmulticulturalism 'does not 
take us beyond"actually existing" multiculturalism as state policy.' See Day, MulticulturaIism, p. 216. 
74 Abu-Laban, "Liberalism,"pp. 466-467. 
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multiculturalism can emerge - one that affords recognition to minorities by drawing 
them into the public sphere as active and equal partners rather than as dependents. This 
will, in turn, help alleviate the problems associated with alienation. Henry Louis Gates, 
a professor of African-American studies, offers a vivid depiction of the new 
multiculturalism that acknowledges the hybrid dynamics of North American culture. 
According to him, 'multiculturalism depends on bringing these subterranean cultures -
. . 
that which has been buried, that which has been denied, that which has been repressed -
to the surface and redefining our common culture ... ,75 
The movement of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees into the West has 
challenged the traditional model of the unified nation-state vision. In most cases, non-
Western individuals who have migrated to countries such as Canada do not wish to 
recreate their personal identity along Western models. Rather they leave their homes in 
order to fulfill certain economic and political goalS.76 In this light, host societies can no 
longer expect immigrants to assimilate fully into the predominant cult ure. 77 Poulter, 
mirroring Guttman's earlier st at ement , explains that 'the task of the modem 
multicultural state is to achieve the correct balance between the loyalties of a common 
appreciation of citizenship based around a set of shared core values, on the one hand, 
and the claims derived from the separate cultural identities of ethnic minorities, on the 
other hand.'78 An assimilationist model for immigrant integration cannot function in 
Canada. However, a revolutionary change in the way liberal societies organize 
75 Henry Louis Gates quoted in Abu-Laban, "Liberalism," p. 466. 
76 Baubôck, "Cultural Minority Rights for Immigrants," p. 220. 
77 Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 181. 
78 Poulter, Ethnicity Law and Human Rights, p. 34. 
155 
! 
themselves will also fail to meet the needs of Canadian society. Rather, a compromise 
needs to be struck between traditional Canadian powerbrokers and communities who 
wish to position themselves within the mainstream as active participants as opposed to 
ethnie, cultural and religious novelties. 
Habermas: Communicative Ethics 
The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in mind a theo~ of communicative 
ethics that seeks to create a more balanced system of governance that would better 
accommodate multicultural concerns that now appear in plural societies such as 
Canada's. Throughout most ofhis career, Habermas has attempted to propose a theory 
of deliberative democracy whereby different groups come together in a neutral 
~, environment in order to hammer out their differences in a public forum 'free from 
domination.'79 Much of Habermas' philosophy is focused on the interactions between 
civil society and administrative bodies of governments. Unlike the Rawlsian method of 
separating 'background culture' from the 'public sphere', Habermas seeks to fuse the 
two worlds together in a more cooperative relationship whereby minority cultures 
receive a form of recognition that goes beyond mere tolerance. In Habermas' proposed 
theory of deliberative democracy, groups who were previously denied access to the 
public forum would become active partners in shaping society. The ration ale behind 
Habermas' endorsement of deliberative democracy is his assertion that a single 
metaphysical, moral and normative framework Can no longer guide complex societies 
79 Jürgen Habennas, Knowledge and Human Inferesfs, Jeremy Shapiro, trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971): p. 284. 
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such as those that exist in the West.80 In light of the demands made by groups who wish 
to have their substantive norms made available to them in the public sphere, Habermas 
endorses a communicative ethic based on the principles of reciprocity, mutual 
recognition and respect.81 In striving for this goal, Habermas describes the 
communicative ethic as 'a guide for reconstructing the network of discourses 
that ... provides thematrix from which democratic authority emerges.,82 The dialogue 
that would emerge from this 'matrix' would have the effect of creating a more 
participatory society because of the different voices involved in the public forum. 
Ultimate1y, Habermas seeks to promote a normative order that is 'open and flexible to 
change and more encompassing in its prescription of justice. ,83 
One forum Habermas points to as a potential bridge between different groups is the 
realm of law. Within this domain, the various components of civil society (which 
include cultural groups like the Muslim community) and govemment can mediate their 
concems together and create a normative order that, on sorne level, recognizes the 
diversity.84 Such a system of cooperation would be predicated on a deontologicaJ 
approach thereby increasing the legitimacy of legal system by including voie es that have 
80 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Nonns: Contributions to a Discourse TheO/y of Law and 
Democracy, William Rehg, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996): p. 7. 
81 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry 
Weber Nicholson, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990): p. 130. 
82 Habermas, Between Fact and Nonn, p. 5. 
83 Ibid. 
84 According to Habermas, 'the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure, but a delicate 
and sensitive-above all; fallible and revisable-enterprise whose purpose is to realize the system of rights 
anewin changing circumstances, that is to interpret the system ofrights better, to institutionalize it more 
appropriately, and draw out its contents more radically. This is the perspective of citizens who are 
actively engaged in realizing the system ofrights.' See, Habermas, Between Fact and Nonn, p. 384. 
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traditionally not been part of the law.85 In other words, Habennas endorses a move 
away from archaic govemment institutions that offer only binary yes/no solutions to 
various complex legal concems. Moreover, he would argue against a nonnative order 
that is fixed on a particular metaphysical truth. Rather, Habennas calls for a more 
complete system of justice that utilizes a multi-track approach whereby different groups 
are represented in the process of procedurallaw. The advantage of the communicative 
discourse approach towards consensus building is that there is an attempt to fonnulate 
somereciprocity between various members of society. 
Whereas in the past, Anglo-Canadian culture and Judeo-Christian identity defined 
Canadian morality and law, a communicative logic would not limit society's adherence 
to this narrow cultural model. Although no normative order is free from cultural bias, 
Habermas' approach seeks to distance the law, as much as possible, from any one 
particular cultural world-view by grounding the normative order within a procedural 
logic that is culturally neutral. 86 Thus, any negative ruling on controversial issues such 
as polygamy would not be a reflection of pre-existing cultural nonns trumping a 
minority group's desires and needs. Rather, the negative sanction would result from the 
application of procedural law, which, following Habermas' logic, would have been 
articulated in a culturally neutral environment. Whereas in the past, Judeo-Christian 
85 Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
86 Raymond Geuss cogently explains that neutrality is an unattainable goal-even amongst those who claim 
to be acting in an unbiased manner. Commenting specifically on Habermas' attempt to create a neutral 
system oflaw, Geuss explains that 'Habermas' position saddles one with an archaic and inherently 
implausible Kantian transcendentalism. There is nothing to be gained in trying to pursue liberalism 
through the concept of neutrality.' See Geuss, His/ory and DJusion in PoJitics, p. 80. Though Geuss is 
quite right in pointing out the weakness of attempting to pursue a neutral form of liberalism, my interest 
in Habermas is not based on his neutrality. Rather it is based on his goal of attempting to formulate a 
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values motivated the Canadian prohibitions against polygamy, today's sanctions are 
primarily a result of specifie Charter violations such as Section 15 which covers the 
principles of equality and individual dignity.87 A weakness in this approach is that the 
Charter is in fact an articulation of Western political values; divorcing these principles 
from a particular culture is impossible. 
This . weakness demonstrates that Habermas is not a radical thinker. 88 His 
endorsement of the communicative approach towards 'will-formation' does not 
represent a wholesale rewriting of existing systems of law so that they meet aIl the 
needs of diverse liberal democratic states.89 Rather he is advocating a series of reforms 
based on existing procedures that will draw in marginalized voices and minority groups 
as active participants in the legal process.90 
The lynchpin of Habermas' vision is the consistent application ofprocedurallaw and 
the maintenance of impartiality in carrying out the law. He explains that a system of 
system oflaw that is as free as possible from domination thereby engendering greater legitimacy for the 
overalilegal system. . 
87 Nicholas Bala, "Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marri age and other Adult 
Interdependent Relationships," Queen 's Law Joumal, vol. 29 (2003): p. 96. 
88 William E. Scheuerman points out that although Habermas daims to be a radical theorist, his work, 
Between Pact and Norm, maintains a defeatist tone with respect to the actuaIpower and influence civil 
society can yield in light of strong administrative powers in govemment. In his critique of Habermas, 
Scheuerman explains that 'Habermas tends to emphasize the virtues of a deliberative civil society; at the 
same time, he is willing to admit that civil society inevitably has little real impact on state action during 
the course of "normal" democratic politics.' See William E. Scheuerman, "Between Radicalism and 
Resignation," in René Von Schomberg and Kenneth Baynes, eds., Discourse and Democracy: Essays on 
Habermas's Between Pact and Norms(New York: State University of New York Press, 2002): p. 76. 
89 Habermas, Between Pact and Norm, p. 178. 
90 In Habermas' books The TheOly of Communicative Action Volume 1 and II, he explains that modem 
society is greatly shaped by a capitalist agenda wielded by the corporate world along with the 
administrative power of central govemments. Together these two bodies have 'colonized the lifeworlds' 
of private citizens who have become increasingly powerless in affecting the direction of their lives. 
Habermas sees the various identity groups pushing for recognition oftheir differences as communities 
who are resisting the further colonization oftheir worlds by administrative and corporate bodies. See 
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume. 1, Thomas McCarthy, trans. (Boston: 
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law applied in a multicultural society will faH apart 'if notions of substantial ethicallife 
slowly creep into the interpretation and practice of formaI requirements. ,91 
Furthermore, Habermas feels that legitimate laws are 'rationally accepted' by aIl 
members of society.92 In this manner, procedurallaw gains its legitimacy because every 
segment of the population maintains a set of 'identical reasons' for adhering to the 
law.93 In concrete terms this means that Muslim women and girls' right to wear the 
lJijiib in Canada is not based on metaphysical notions ofwhat society 'ought' or 'ought 
not' do. Rather, permitting the veil in Canada is based on a number of procedural 
concems found in the Charter that inc1ude the freedom of religious expression, dignity 
and equality.94 Permitting double standards or inconsistencies in the application of the 
law would violate the procedural integrity of the law and would bring into question the 
legitimacy of the legal system.95 
Beacon Press, 1985): pp. 239-240. See also, Jürgen Habennas, The TheOly of Communicative Action: 
Volume II, Thomas McCarthy, trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989): pp. 576-579. 
91 Jürgen Habennas, "Religious Tolerance-The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights," Philosophy, vol. 79 
(2004): p. 14. 
92 Habennas, Between Fact and Nonn, p. 135. 
93 Ibid., p. 344. 
94 Habennas explains that laws 'count as valid relative to the historical, culturally molded identity of a 
legal community, and hence relative to the value-orientations, goals and interest positions ofits 
members.' See Habennas, Between Fact and Nonn, p. 156. 
95 Although communicative democracy seeks to limit the monopoly of power held by govemmental 
agencies, the procedures used by civil society are not as neutral as Habennas suggests. Nancy Fraser 
cogently points out that 'where societal inequalities persist, deliberative processes in public spheres will 
tend to operate to the advantage of dominant groups and to the disadvantage of subordinates.' See Nancy 
Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," 
in Habennas and the Public Sphere, Craig Calhoun, ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992): p. 122-123. 
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Opening the Door for Islamic ADR 
A practical example of Habermas' caU for an intersection between civil society and 
governmental authority is the formation of multicultural arbitration boards that address 
. . 
specific cultural needs while maintaining the procedural soundness of existing laws. 
The HCJ's proposaI to offer ADR services in matters of Islamic family law in the 
province of Ontario was an example of a joint govemance model of arbitration; albeit 
one fraught with inherent weaknesses as will be demonstrated in sixth chapter. If faith-
based arbitration would have been permitted, it could have resembled the type of 
multicultural jurisdictional body advocated by scholars such as Ayelet Shachar.96 
Shachar, a law prof essor at the University of Toronto, explains that many individuals, 
especiaUy recent immigrants and those who have strong ties to their socio-cultural 
roots, maintain 'simultaneous beJongings'to their particular identities as weIl as to the 
general culture within which they reside.97 In this regard, the demands made by Muslim 
groups to have Islamic law recognized in Canada were not necessarily calls for the 
formation ofseparate religious ghettos, rather they were demands to have Islamic values 
taken seriously by the mainstream legal community. 
In proposing a joint govemance approach in matters of personal status, Shachar is 
fulfilling Habermas' dual-track approach in matters of will-formation. Yet she proceeds 
with caution on certain matters. Although a joint govemance model would have 
96 Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Diflèrences and Women's Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
97 Ayelet Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law: The Perils ofMulticultural 
Accommodation," The Joumal ofPolitical Philosophy, vol. 6 (1998): p. 296. 
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pennitted the Muslim community to officiate marri ages and arbitrate divorces, certain 
restrictions would have to be in place according to Shachar. For instance, owing to the 
need to protect vulnerable members of society, namely women and children, Shachar's 
system 'Would leave matters relating to the redistribution of wealth and custodial rights 
of children in the hands of existing government legislation.98 Shachar cogently points 
out that it is often conservative voices, emanating predominantly from men, who define 
. . 
and/or interpret the laws of personal status in various religious groups. These laws not 
only act as a means of demarcating the boundaries between a religious community and 
the general population, but also act as tools to control the sexuality of women within 
the group. As she states, "[i]ntra-group policing of women, if encoded in the group's 
essential traditions, is achieved partially via the implementation of personal status laws 
which c1early define how, when and with whom women can give birth to children so as 
to ensure that those children become legitimate members of the community.'99 
Pennitting a religious community in Canada to implement a heightened level of 
control over its membership could produce Charter violations in the form of a loss in 
one's personal autonomy. Shachar's solution to this pot enti al problem is eliding 
tradition al rules of personal status with arbitration boards that are gUided by procedural 
norms and constitutional guarantees available to the public. By following procedural 
law, religious groups would not have 'carte blanche' in subordinating the rights of 
98 Shachar, MulticulturaJ Jurisdictions, p. 120-121. 
99 Shachar, "Group Identity," p. 293. 
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vulnerable members. lOO Thus, if cultural norms necessitate certain roi es for women such 
as the wearing of the /Jjjiïb, these practices could only persist as a matter of a woman's 
own choice. Although sorne individuals may cringe at the idea, the Charter effectively 
permits the individual the option to live a conservative religious life through provisions 
that offer people the freedom to maintain convictions they personally deem appropriate. 
What differentiates a liberal society from a more conservative one is that choices 
such as the decision to wear the veil can be reversed over time if the individu al so 
wishes. Although there may be sanctions from within the individual's peer group, the 
larger society will simply assume the individual is exercising her freedom of choice. 
Finally, Shachar sees another advantage in utilizing the joint governance model for 
dispute resolution. Rather than permit traditional practices to go unchallenged in 
matters relating to personal status, Shachar daims that joint arbitration boards in a 
liberal environment can create 'a catalyst for internaI change' within the traditional 
cultural groups themselves. 101 What would not be acceptable under Shachar's joint 
governance approach is a procedurally sanctioned legal system whereby Muslim women, 
for instance, are forced into certain scenarios that limit their rights based on a religious 
heritage they happen to be born or converted into. 
While agreeing in principle with the formation of joint governance courts, Benhabib 
offers a number of suggestions that, in her mind, strengthen Shachar' s model. Primarily, 
Benhabib maintains that, despite Shachar's protections for vulnerable members of 
100 Ibid., p. 297. 
101 Shachar, MulticulturaJ Jurisdictions, p. 118. 
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society, accommodating cultural communities through the formation of multicultural 
courts would still run the risk of limiting people's access to the law as equals.102 The 
Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW) has pointed to this very concem. This 
group ofwomen maintains that there is no: 
compelling reason to live under any other form of law in Canada and we 
want the same laws to apply to us as to other Canadian women. We 
prefer to live under Canadian laws, govemed by the Charter ofRights and 
Freedoms, which safeguard and protect our equality rights .... We are also 
concemed that, in deference to their religious beliefs, sorne Canadian 
Muslim women may be persuaded to use the Shariah [sic] option, rather 
than seeking protection under the law ofthe land. 103 
These concems are extremely important and cannot be discounted. Nevertheless, the 
CCMW's views follow a binary yes/no line of thinking that multicultural societies can 
no longer realistically maintain. Furthermore, in opposing the formation of Islamic 
arbitration, the CCMW is effectively denying members of the Muslim community 
access to legal formulations certain individuals may deem important and legitimate to 
their personal understanding of self-worth. In other words, in speaking out strongly 
against Islamic arbitration they would effectivelydeny individuals life choices and 
cultural recognition they" regard as important. 
In an effort to protect vulnerable members of society, Benhabib advances three 
propositions she hopes will best respond. to traditional cultural daims within liberal 
102 Benhabib, Claims of Culture, p. 128. 
103 Ali a Hogben, "Position Statement on the Proposed Implementation of Sections ofMuslim Law 
[Shariah] in Canada," (Kingston: Canadian Council ofMuslim Women, 2004): 
http://www.ccmw.comIPosition%20PaperslPosition_Sharia_Law.htm. See also Clarke, Linda and Pam 
Cross, Muslim and Canadian Family Laws: A comparative Primer (Toronto: Canadian Council ofMuslim 
Women,2006). 
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societies.104 They are as follows: egaHtarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription to a 
particular group, and freedom to exit a group that an individual has previously joined. 
Egalitarian reciprocity ensures that members of minority groups receive the same 
schedule of rights and privileges to which members of the majority have access. 
Benhabib is ad amant that an individual's identity should not prec1ude himlher from 
equality before the law. 105 This provision would address sorne of the concerns groups 
such as the CCMW have brought forward. One of the fears this group maintains is that 
Muslim women will be forced into forfeiting certain Charterrights when they submit to 
Islamic arbitration. Thus for Benhabib, 'minorities must not, in virtue of their 
membership status, be entitled to lesser degrees of civil, political, economic and cultural 
rights than members of the majority.,106 Second, Benhabib maintains that individuals 
should not be automatically labeled as members of a particular group based on their 
birth within that culture or religious group. Rather they should have the right to 
voluntary self-ascription, meaning the individual alone should determine whether he or 
she is a member of a particular groUp.107 Rather than fall into the essentialist trap and 
assume that aIl Muslims are alike, we should remind ourselves that many individuals 
have 'simultaneous belongings' and thus may maintain certain Islamic cultural traits 
while abandoning others in favor of non-Islamic world-views. Limiting individuals who 
104 David Peritz, "Toward a Deliberative and Democratie Response to Multicultural Policies: Post 
Rawlsian Reflections on Benhabib's The Claims of Culture, " Constellations, vol. Il (2004): pp. 281-282. 
105 Benhabib points out that in Canada, Native women who marry outside oftheir community face the 
possibility of forfeiting their residency privileges on land that owned by Band Councils. The same 
restriction is not present amongst men who choose to marry individuals outside of their communities. 
This asymmetrical scenario is contrary to the Canadian Charter. See Benhabib, Claims of Culture, p. 54. 
106 Ibid., p. 131. 
107 Ibid. 
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are born into the Muslim community to Islamic law alone negates the complexity of 
their personal identity and the changing nature of one's personal development afforded 
to them in a liberal society. FinaIly, individuals should have the right to exit any group 
that they previously identified with and be able to join another group if they so 
choose.108 If leaving a group entails the loss of informaI or formaI rights, the state 
should then be entrusted with regulating the costs of parting ways from that group under 
provisions that respect equalÎty and fairness. 109 These three points are sorne of the 
principles that ensure individu ais choosing to embark on culturally specifie or religious 
lifestyles will have access to the same rights and privileges aIl members of society are 
granted. 110 The basis of Benhabib's philosophy is her view that individuals are 'self-
interpreting and self-defining beings whose activities and deeds are constituted through 
culturally informed narratives.' III Her aim, like that of Habermas, is to create a 
normative order that recognizes the individual's substantive needs while balancing them 
with the values found in a liberal society. Rather than offer individuals the freedom to 
pursue their life-choices and then rebuff certain lifestyles that emanate from non-
Western societies, a joint governance model offers individuals some access to 
substantive roles while respecting minimal standards found in liberal societies. 
One of the advantages of pursuing a joint governance approach in multicultural 
dispute resolution is that it breaks down the isolation between different cultural groups. 
This interconnection of communities ensures that society will be attuned to the cultural 
108 Ibid., pp. 131-132. 
109 Ibid., p. 132. 
110 Ibid., p. 129. 
III Ibid., p. 132. 
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particularities that exist within the population while at the same time informing cultural 
groups of the importance of maintaining constitutional rights that uphold the general 
society. Discounting Islamic law from the lives of individuals who wish to live in 
accordance with their religion is too paternalistic an alternative given the importance 
individu al autonomy is afforded in Western democracies. Furthermore, it could push 
sorne Muslims into underground tribunals in matters related to personal status. Such an 
informaI and unregulated system could be susceptible to the various abuses that the 
CCMW fears. Finally, discounting any role of Islamic law in Canada may diminish the 
state's legitimacy in the eyes of certain Muslim citizens who may alienate themselves 
from the mainstream and increasingly tum to unofficial justice as a means of regulating 
their affairs. 
It is important to note that in operating a joint governance model of dispute 
resolution, not everyone's concerns will be resolved. In fact, there will be those who 
leave the table unsatisfied at the decisions rendered. For instance, there are certain 
provisions within Islamic law that would never meet the minimal standards of Canadian 
justice and would be disallowed; polygamous marriage cornes to mind here. However, 
the fact that sorne disputes will never be settled should not be viewed as a shortcoming. 
Rather, this disagreement should be seen as a reflection of the complexities inherent in 
any given multicultural society. Expecting complete cultural convergence on issues of 
identity is just as impossible as creating a false sense of unitary consciousness amongst 
a diverse population.112 At best, one can expect a 'multicultural cold war' in which 
112 Ibid., p. 137. 
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. ~ .. 
'there may be peace but no reconciliation.'l13 In this regard, rather than focus on the 
exotic nature of a group such as the Muslims of Canada, a procedural approach to law 
that recognizes the Muslim community's normative order will help foster a real sense of 
tolerance amongst the population. Il 4 
Coordinating diverse societies is a delicate matter. Whereas in the past chauvinism 
was the primary means of dealing with non-majoritarian groups, today's multicultural 
. . 
policies require a great deal of thought and insight. Inevitably, there will persist a 
certain level of asymmetry between powerful cultural elites and minority groups. Yet it 
is crucial for our purposes to return to the original position scholars such as Habermas 
are trying to achieve; namely, creating a dialogue as free as possible from domination 
through a communicative ethic. In this light, procedurallaw, once divorced from the 
cultural foundations of society and free from double standards that weigh against 
minority groups, can provide a forum within which to mediate culturally specific needs 
amongst a diverse population. Despite the benefits associated with a joint govemance 
model of justice, the opportunity to establish such a system of law did not come to 
fruition in Ontario. Rather, various groups and individuals rebuffed Islamic arbitration 
as a dangerous and ghettoizing phenomenon. However, as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter, the failure to draw in certain Muslims into the mainstream legal 
world may well create the very cultural ghettos groups such as the CCMW warned 
against. 
113 Ibid., p. 129 . 
114 Ibid., p. 142. 
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Chapter 6 
Islamic Arbitration in Ontario 
The previous chapter offered a number of philosophical justifications supporting 
the formation of joint govemance models of law. This chapter will bring to light the 
recent debate that took place in Ontario between 1991 and 2005 over the use of Islamic 
arbitration. The legitimization oflslamic arbitration would have helped integrate certain 
segments of the Muslim community into the mainstream legal system. However, rather 
than deciding to pursue this direction, the Govemment of Ontario instituted a complete 
ban on all faith-based family arbitration following the public outcry that emerged over 
the possible use oflslamic ADR in that province. 
The decision to ban faith-based arbitration was marked by a narrative of 
~ .. 
misinformation and Islamophobia. This discourse, taking place under the shadow of the 
9/11 attacks, cast the Shaii'a, along with those supporting its use in arbitration, as 
dangerous and illiberal. The manner in which the debate transpired certainly influenced 
the govemment's decision to ban faith-based arbitration. However, other factors were 
yet to seal its fate. This chapter will demonstrate that those who sought to implement 
Islamic arbitration were partly responsible for the ban. One group in particular, the 
I1CJ, lacked the formaI training and institutional authority required to preside over the 
kind of ADR panels they proposed. Moreover, the group failed to clearly articulate its 
goals, creating the illusion that the I1CJ sought to apply Shaii'a in Canada. Despite the 
fait accompli of the judicial ban, this chapter will ultimate1y suggest that the practice of 
Islamic private arbitration will most likely continue on an ad hoc basis - resulting in 
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possible abuses to individuals who will not stand to benefit from government oversight 
in their search for justice. 
Understanding ADR 
Before analyzing the debates, a discussion weighing the benefits and pitfalls of 
arbitration is in order. ADR panels have become fixtures in various Western legal 
systems during the course of the past 30 years. These panels are non-judicial bodies that 
seek to solve issues ranging from commercial to family disputes. Unlike mediation, 
which is not enforceable, arbitration carries the force of the law. In Ontario, the law that 
govems ADR is the Arbitration Act. 1 This law stipulates that individuals, of their own 
choosing, can submit themselves for arbitration.2 The arbiter, selected by mutual 
agreement, remains neutral throughout the proceedings,3 and decisions reached by the 
arbiter are binding.4 If one party fails to live up to the arbitral agreement or award, the 
aggrieved party can apply to the courts to have the decision enforced. Rulings can be 
overtumed if it can be proven that the arbiter acted in a way that w3:~ partial to one of 
the disputants, or ifit is demonstrated that the arbiter 'did not possess the qualifications 
that the parties have agreed are necessary. ,5 The arbitration panels themselves can 
apply whatever set of rules the participants have agreed to use; thus laws from other 
eountries, religious laws, or rules specifie to private organizations, can aIl be applied 
1 ArbitrationAcI,S.O.1991,p.17. 
2 Ibid., sec 48. 
3 Ibid., sec. Il. 
4 Ibid., sec. 37. 
5 Ibid., sec. 13. 
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during the arbitration process.6 Finally, any decision made in arbitration must conform 
to Canadian law.7 And so although Shaii'a principles can be used to settle conflicts, the 
decisions cannot violate existing provincial or federallegislation. 
ADR panels do not seek to supplant the existing normative order - rather, they 
attempt to broaden the scope of justice by inc1uding the 'cultural, economic and 
psychological features' inherent in complex, multi-Iayered, and plural societies.8 For 
instance, immigrant populations living in Western societies often show sorne reluctance 
to appear before the courts due to their perception that government agencies do not fully 
understand the culturally motivated disputes they may be having.9 This creates the 
possibility of individuals seeking non-official modes of justice in the form of 
underground tribunals offered by members of their own religious or cultural 
communities. ADR panels can help alleviate the problem of unregulated justice by 
attuning the procedural norms of the justice system to the particular cultural or religious 
needs of a given minority community. Furthermore, the panels serve as alternatives to 
traditional court based adjudication, which often takes much longer to settle, is likely to 
be confrontational, and is generally considerably more expensive. 
According to Professor Garry Watson of the Osgoode Law School at York 
University, various jurisdictions throughout Canada are now encouraging parties to 
negotiate their concerns outside the courts. According to· Watson, Canadian law has 
6 Ibid., sec. 32. 
7 Ibid., sec. 31. 
8 Mauro Cappelletti, "Alternative Dispute Resolution Process within the Framework of the World-Wide 
Access-to-Justice Movement," The Modem Law Review, vol. 56 (1993): p. 283. 
9 Mohamed M. Keshavjee, "Multiculturalism and the Challenges it Poses to Legal Education and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: the Situation of British Muslims," speech delivered at the Department of 
Peace Studies, University of Bradford, May (2004): 
http://www.iis.ac. ukISiteAssets/pdflmulticulturalism. pdf, p. 8. 
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introduced the principle of ADR into the official legal system by employing 'judicial 
mediation' during pre-trial conferencing in cases involving disputants in commercial 
matters. Meanwhile, in issues relating to family law, Watson points out that the courts 
prefer that disputants should seek arbitration and mediation rather than bring their 
concerns into the adversarial arena of the courts. lO According to Marion Boyd, author of 
the 2004 Ontario government report 100 king into the use of Islamic arbitration, 
decisions made through ADR prove to be more 'durable,' in part because the process 
used to settle the disputes are familiar to the participants involved. ll Since the passing 
of the 1991 Ontario Arbitration Act, adopted while Boyd was acting as that province's 
Attorney General, the popularity of extra-judicial conflict resolution has increased. 12 
From an Islamic perspective, mediation and arbitration in marital strife are both 
longstanding practices. 13 The Qur'an, for instance, advises that '[i]f a couple fears 
separation, you shaH appoint an arbitrator from his family and an arbitrator from her 
family; if they decide to reconcile, God will help them get together.'14 Scholars have 
pointed out that because Islamic societies are communal in orientation and have a 
'culture of relatedness' it is natural for family members to help settle disputes rather 
than to seek govemment intervention.15 Tuming to family and friends to settle disputes 
will in aH likelihood remain an essential means of recourse within the Muslim 
JO Cappelletti, "Alternative Dispute Resolution," p. 29l. 
11 Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Proteeting Choiee, Promoting Inclusion (Attorney 
General, Ontario: 2004): http://www.attorneygeneraLjus.gov.on.calenglish/about/pubs/boydifuIIreport.pdf, 
p. Il. 
12 Cappelletti, "Alternative Dispute Resolution," p. 291. 
13 Amr Abdalla, "Princip1es of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: a Search within Islam and 
Western Literature," JoumaJ of Law and Religion, vol. 15 (2000-2001): p. 174. 
14 Qur'an, 4:35. 
15 Abdalla, "Principles," p. 175. 
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community in Canada because it represents a form of justice very much in line with the 
kind of conflict resolution in use today throughout the Muslim world. 
Although there are compelling reasons for supporting the use of ADR, sorne have 
questioned the efficacy of the panels in certain situations. Since the power imbalances 
inherent in Muslim societies appear to be patriarchal (especially in the juridical 
lit erat ure ), feminist groups have cautioned against the use of ADR panels, claiming 
there exists no 'equality of arms between the litigants.'16 For instance, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow maintains that 'people of disparate power will abuse each other in informaI 
processes.'17 Sorne of the most vocal opponents of the use of Islamic arbitration panels 
in Ontario echoed these concerns by underscoring the unequal status men and women 
enjoy under the Shaii'a. For instance, on a radio show broadcast in Australia, Alia 
Hogben, the Executive Director of the CCMW, maintained that the Shaii'a 'does not 
have as one of its fundamental principles the equality of women ... ,18 This reductive 
commentary fails to acknowledge the complexities inherent in gender relations found 
throughout the Muslim world. As discussed in the first chapter of this work, Muslim 
women were not devoid of legal and economic power, nor were they powerless in 
matters of divorce. Rather, as recent scholarship demonstrates, women have access to 
avenues of power and influence that are regularly overlooked by Westerners. Hogben 
has chosen to ignore this growing body of evidence by offering a static image ofMuslim 
society. In broadcasting this view, she appears to be following a rhetorical pattern 
16 Cappelletti, "Alternative Dispute Resolution," p. 290. 
17 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Dispute Resolution: the Periphery Becomes the Core (Review Essay)," 
Judicature, vol. 69 (1986): p. 302. 
18 David Rutledge, "The Religion Report," Australian Radio National, February 2nd (2005): 
http://www.abc.net.aulrnltalks/8.30/relrpt/stories/s1293962.htm. 
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employed by European colonialists who sought in the past to 'identifY bodies of Asian 
and African women, both in the North and in the South, as bodies to be saved by 
benevolent and more civilized Europeans.,19 
Others critics of ADR have argued that sorne turn to arbitration in order to avoid 
official legal channels altogether for fear that the courts will not be likely to address 
their particular substantive concerns. According to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the 'poor and oppressed in 
society are in fact principally motivated by the desire to limit the work of the courts in 
areas affecting minority interests, civil rights and civilliberties. ,20 This kind of scenario 
has come to fruition for sorne members of Canada's Muslim community, as individuals 
have turned to unofficial bodies of authority in search of marriage and divorce services. 
The reasons why individuals access these underground services may vary; sorne seek 
them in order to meet certain religious and cultural norms, while others have more self-
serving reasons, such as gaining favorable financial settlements. This matter will be 
discussed in greater detaillater on in this chapter as weIl as in the eighth chapter. For 
now, it is fair to say that accessing underground arbitration offers individuals a form of 
'second class' justice due to the poor quality of services provided at these unofficial 
tribunals.21 
19 Sherene Razack, Looldng White People in the Eye: Gendez; Race and Culture in Courtrooms and 
Classrooms(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998): p. 6-7. 
20 Harry T. Edwards, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema," Harvard Law Review, vol. 
99 (1986): p. 669. 
21 Cappelletti, "Alternative Dispute Resolution," p. 291. 
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Islarnic Arbitration in Canada 
The attempt to implement a fonnalized system of Islamic ADR in Canada began in 
1991 when Syed Mumtaz Ali, president of the Canadian Society of Muslims (hearafter 
CSM), floated the ide a in a publication entitled 'Oh! Canada - Whose Land? Whose 
Drearn?' 22 As stated in this document, a formalized system of ADR would include such 
features as the right of Muslim officiaIs to solemnize divorces. Currently this task is 
delegated to the federal government, which applies the Divorce Act throughout Canada. 
Under Ali's proposed system, amendments would have to be made to federal and 
provinciallaws in order to grant greater powers to certain Islamic institutions within the 
Canadian Muslim community. In another proposaI, Ali suggested that the provinces 
should adopt laws similar to those found in the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and 
Tobago. There, the Muslim Marnage and Divorce Act provides a paraUe1 system of 
justice, which deals exclusively with that country's Muslim population.23 According to 
Ali, such measures are crucial for Muslim-Canadians striving to live in accordance with 
their faith. In his words, 'Muslims are informed in the Qur'an [sic] that one cannot 
consider oneself a Muslim ... unless one adheres to the guidelines, counsels, principles, 
beliefs and practices that are related to human beings through the Qur'an [sic] and the 
Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.).'24 Ali believes that existing Canadian Iaws are thwarting 
these particular religious goals.· In one of his numerous online publications, he 
22 Syed Mumtaz Ali, "Oh! Canada - Whose land? Whose Dream?" The Canadian Society of Muslims 
(1991): www.http://muslim-canada.org/ocanada.pdf. 
23 Syed Mumtaz Ali, "The Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System: the Reconstruction of the 
Canadian Constitution and the Case for Muslim PersonallFamily Law: a Submission to the Ontario Civil 
Justice Review Task Force," The Canadian Society ofMuslims (1994): http://mus1im-
canada.org/submission.pdf, p. 43. 
24 Ibid. 
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maintains that Muslims are being denied the right to follow their faith by governments 
intent on using 'a variety of strategies, diversionary tactics and Machiavellian 
manipulations to camouflage their religious prejudices ... .'25 Apart from a few 
newspaper articles discussing Ali' s 1991 proposaIs, his demands did not gather much 
attention. 
Interestingly, Ontario's laws governing arbitration have actually been in place since 
the nineteenth century and have permitted individuals to settle their disputes outside the 
courts so long as both parties voluntarily agree to the procedure, and that the decisions 
rendered in arbitration do not conflict with Canadian laws. For instance, the Jewish 
Court of Ontario (beit din) is a tribunal run by rabbis who have been ordained as judges 
or dayiins, capable of rendering rulings in accordance with Jewish law. This court is in 
place to provide Orthodox and Conservative Jews a venue to settle their commercial and 
family disputes?6 
Various Muslim groups in Ontario have also been using Islamic arbitration for sorne 
time now. The Isma'1li community operates five regional Conciliation and Arbitration 
Boards throughout Canada and has heard 769 cases nationwide between the years 1998 
and 2003. Twenty-nine percent ofthese cases dealt with commercial matters while the 
majority of the cases, sixty-three percent, were related to marriage and divorce.27 The 
arbitration services offered by this community are governed by a twelve-page document 
that lists the rights and responsibilities of each of the participants involved.28 These 
25 Ibid. 
26 Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 55. 
27 Ibid., p. 59. 
28 Ibid., pp. 163-175. 
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inc1ude statements affirming that the arbiters are trained, and reminders to the 
disputants that the process they are about to embark upon is voluntary?9 Isma'1Ii 
arbitrators in Canada have at their disposaI a British training program that teaches them 
how to operate the pane1s?O The training is conducted by the Institute of Isma'1Ii 
Studies, the School of Oriental and African Studies, and the National Family Mediation 
Centre of Dispute Resolution.31 Members of the panels in Canada are aH volunteers who 
serve three-year terms and come from various professional backgrounds.32 Expertise in 
Shl'a jurisprudence is not a requirement; rather, high standing within the community is 
the qualification that is most sought. 
It should be noted that although the Isma'1Ii community is a Muslim group the 
arbitration panels they operate in Canada do not apply Islamic law. Rather, the 
decisions made by the arbitration panels seek to provide resolutions to various disputes 
'in a fair and equitable manner within the confines of the law of the land.'33 The aim of 
this form of arbitration in cases of divorce, for instance, is to maintain the communal 
standing of individual members within the greater Isma'1Ii community, and not to 
ostracize them from the group during bitter family conflicts. Thus, the primary goal of 
arbitration, in this community, appears to be restorative, not punitive?4 Moreover, 
29 Ibid., p. 59. 
30 Mohamed M. Keshavjee, "Reflective Leaming From The Training Programmes Of The Ismaili Muslim 
Conciliation And Arbitration Boards, Globally," paper presented at the 5th International Conference of 
the World Mediation Forum in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, September 8th (2005): 
http://www.iis.ac. uk/view _ article.asp?ContentlD= 1 06246. 
31 Mohamed M. Keshavjee, "Arbitration and Mediation in the Shi'a Imami Ismaili Muslim Community," 
paper presented at the 4th International Conference of the World Mediation Forum, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, May lOth (2003): http://www.iis.ac. uk/view _ article.asp?ContentID= 1 0 1192. 
32 Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 58. 
33Ibid., p. 60. 
34 Earle Waugh, "Storm over Shari'a Courts in Canada: Responses to Shari'a Arbitration in Ontario," 
speech given at the 9th International Metropolis Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, September 27-
177 
referring to the panels as Shaii'a bodies is inaccurate. At best, the tribunals can be seen 
as conflict resolution bodies that happen to be staffed by Muslims. This line ofthinking 
corresponds to the policy adopted by one of Canada's largest Muslim advocacy groups, 
the Canadian Council on American Islamic Relations-Canada (hereafter, CAIR-CAN), 
which has expressed its unease with the use of the term 'shaii'a' in relation to an 
arbitration panel because 'such a tribunal is not a full-fledged Islamic court ... ' The 
group goes on to explain that '[t]he tribunal will, more appropriately, be a form of 
Muslim dispute resolution, consistent with Canadian law and the Charter within the 
flexibility of Islamic normative principles.'35 As will be demonstrated below, the IlCJ 
failed to make dear to the public the distinction between Islamic arbitration and the 
application of Shan' a in Canada. 
In 2003, the CSM, a neo-conservative Islamic group, found itself at the center of a 
heated debate following its announcement that it had established the IlCJ. According to 
Ali, the individual who first proposed separate Islamic laws for Canadian-Muslims and 
who is now the IlCJ's principal spokesperson, the group would begin the process of 
establishing arbitration panels in Ontario, which would be designed to apply Islamic 
law. Following through on this daim, the group incorporated itself in January of 2004 
under the name of 'Darul Qada - the Islamic Court of Arbitration,' and began seeking 
clients whose concems they would arbitrate using the principles of Shaii'a. In stating 
these goals the group failed to take into account the intricate nuances associated with 
the doctrinal, sectarian, and methodological complexities inherent in the expression of 
October 1 st (2004): 
http://pcerii.metropolis.netl events/ events _ contentiStormoverShari%60aCourtsinCanada. pdf, p. 4. 
35 Ibid., p. 45. 
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Islamic law.36 These shortcomings were amongst the various signs indicating that the 
IIcrs promise to offer Islamic law to its clients was overstated. 
The Institute ofIslamic Civil Justice 
Before delving into the structural problems associated with the IICJ's proposaI an 
understanding of the group' s motivations are in order. The IICJ, and its parent 
organization, the CSM, are communal-religious groups that do not fully identify with 
Canadian society. Specifically, these groups appear to be at odds with the uniform 
culture and homogeneous constitution of the nation-state model. S.N. Eisenstadt, a 
prof essor at the Hebrew University, has pointed out that certain Muslim diaspora 
movements in North America and Europe are seeking to resurrect and reconstruct an 
identity that has been 'subdued' by modernity, while re-defining their links to the states 
in which they reside.37 In other words, they do not wish to assimilate fully into the 
majority; rather, they seek recognition (from the mainstream) oftheir particular cultural 
and religious affiliations. Although they appear to be harkening back to a bygone era, 
Eisenstadt maintains that these groups are very modem in orientation - specifically, in 
their desire to 'reappropriate modernity and redefine the discourse of modernity in their 
own terms.'38 For these groups, Western culture is not the sole conveyer of modernity, 
36 In an interview conducted by Rabia Mills, which appears on the Canadian Society ofMuslim web page, 
Ali conveys the notion that diversity in Islamic law is not a complex matter. He explains that 'arbitrators 
would arrive at their decisions based upon applying whatever school of Law the individual happens to 
follow. There are four schools ofSunni thought, for example. If the parties involved belong to one of 
those schools, then the law ofthat particular school would be applied. Similarly, if the parties involved 
belong to the Shia sect, then the Shia Law would be applied. It is just as simple as that! See, Rabia Mills, 
"Interview: A Review of the Muslim Personal/Family Law Campaign," August (1995): http://muslim-
canada.org/pfl.htm. Italics added for emphasis. 
37 S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Resurgence of Religious Movements in Processes of Globalization: Beyond End 
ofHistory or Clash ofCivilization," International Journal on Multicultural Societies, vol. 2 (2002): p. 6. 
38 Ibid., p. 9. 
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and thus groups such as the IIeJ entertain views that challenge sorne of the central 
tenets of liberalism. Eisenstadt states that these groups 'ground their denial of, and 
opposition to, the premises of the Enlightenment in the universalistic premises of their 
respective religions or civilizations, as newly interpreted by them.'39 This last point is 
vital in understanding the motivations of groups such as the IIeJ. In its efforts to 
redefine modemity, the IIeJ has overlooked the complexities inherent within Islamic 
law. Rather, it has put forward two systems of jurisprudence that are diametrically 
opposed to one another. 
First, the IIeJ has forwarded a traditionalist, yet narrow, approach to Sharl'a by 
stating that Islamic personal status is 'rooted in and derived from the two most basic 
sources of Islamic law - namely, the holy Qur'an [sic] and the Sunnah [sic] of the 
Prophet (Pbuh).'40 Although this is not a mistaken position, this view simply ignores 
hundreds of years of legal development wherein jurists shaped and articulated the law in 
an attempt to reflect the social circumstances that surrounded them. By limiting the 
scope and depth of Islamic legal methodology to these foundational sources, the IIeJ 
fails to acknowledge the flexibility inherent in the Sharl'a. Like other revivalist 
movements active in the Muslim world today, the IIeJ appears to be addressing 
modemity in an idealized manner. 
For instance, Kecia Ali cogently demonstrates how neo-conservative Muslims living 
in North America frequently rely on texts produced by the Saudi Arabian govemm~t, 
or those endorsed by the Pakistani group Jamaat-i-Islami, which fUll counter to the letter 
39 Ibid., p. 10. Italies added for emphasis. 
40 Mills, "Interview." 
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and spirit of traditional Islamic jurisprudence. These texts include Muhammad Abdul-
Raufs monograph, Marriage in Islam: a ManuaJ, a text that is frequently quoted by the 
CSM and the IICJ on their respective web pages.41 One example will suffice to 
demonstrate just how sharp the divergence is between the neo-conservative doctrine and 
traditional Islamic jurisprudence. As noted in the first chapter, classical and medieval 
jurists viewed the marriage contract as a means of legitimizing sexual relations between 
men and women. Contemporary jurists have arrived at a different understanding of 
marriage, which focuses more on gender role stratification. Abdul-Raufs text maintains 
that women are in charge of household management and associated tasks such as 'meal 
preparation, house-cleaning and laundry. ,42 In pre-modem times, these duties were not 
the main focus of the marriage contract, nor were they legally expected. According to 
Kecia Ali, the neo-conservative approach to marriage has not only diverged from 
traditional jurisprudence, but has also unduly affected women by relegating their role in 
society to that of a homemaker.43 Moreover, owing to the legal codification of 
patriarchy in societies such as Egypt, these expectations are now entrenched in statutory 
law. Thus, when the IICJ forwarded its arbitration program, predicated on a very 
restrictive understanding of gender, the group appeared to be endorsing a vision of Islam 
41 Muhammad Abudl-Rauf, MaITiage in Islam: a Manual (Alexandria, Al-Saadawi, 2(00). See also, Syed 
Mumtaz Ali and Rabia Mills, "Sex in Islam: its Role and Purpose," Muslim Society of Canada (accessed 
October 1 st, 2(06): http://muslim-canada.orglsex.htm. 
42 Abdul-Rauf, MaITiage in Islam, p. 55. 
43 Kecia Ali, "Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence: the Necessity for Critical Engagement with 
Marnage and Divorce Law," in Omid Safi, ed., Progressive Muslims: on Justice, Gender and Pluralism 
(Oxford: One World, 2(03): p. 175. 
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that was unduly conservative, and which arbitrarily limited the role of women in 
society. 
The second legal system the IICJ put forward was based on the Anglo-Mohammedan 
legislation used in India during the British colonial period. The choice of this system of 
law represents a c1ear shift from the approach discussed above. Whereas the former 
represents a neo-conservative ideology, the latter seems to suggest an acceptance of a 
specifically Western hegemony. Ali explains, 'it is expected that the Muslim law and 
associated Case law created through the old Anglo-Mohammedan Law precedents 
would be the model for Personal Law cases initially, but any other could also be relied 
upon if the parties so desire. ,44 Clearly, there are serious shortcomings in such a 
statement, the least of which is the fact that many have questioned the Islamic 
authenticity of Anglo-Mohammedan law. This is because of its break with traditional 
u.sû1 aJ-fiqh, owing to the fact that British colonial functionaries helped draft the law. 
Moreover, the use of this code in Canada presupposes that a majority of Muslims wish 
to be governed under this single code of law. This notion is hard to accept given the 
vast demographic diversity within Canada's Muslim community. Although the use of 
traditional sources of law such as the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, along· 
with the Anglo-Mohammedan code, appears paradoxical this logic c10sely follows 
Eisenstadt's characterization of conservative communal-religious groups. The IICJ is 
flot attempting to revive pre-modern forms of Islamic justice; rather, it seeks to promote 
its own particular understanding of Islamic law as a means of challenging the 
44 Canadian Society of Muslims, "Darul-Qada: Beginnings ofMuslim Civil Justice System in Canada," in 
News Bulletin, April (2003): http://muslim-canada.org/news03 .html. 
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mainstream. However, in light of the fact that the I1CJ proposed two diametrically 
opposed systems of law, it is fair to say that their efforts suffer from certain 
methodological and structural shortcomings. 
For instance, in a web-based document, the I1CJ has maintained that in settling 
family disputes, their arbiters would use 'any school, e.g. Shiah or Sunni (Hanafi, 
Shafi'i, Hambali, or Maliki) [Sic] .... ,45 Traditionally, an individual jurisconsult (mufti) 
operating in the Islamic world worked exclusively within the bounds of the particular 
school of law from which he received his training. If jurists were to diverge from their 
own school of law and borrow ideas from another school, the opinions they produced 
would be considered suspicious and they might even be deemed void altogether.46 The 
claim, made by the IICJ, that Muslim arbitration boards operating in Canada can 
provide rulings based on the different Sunnl and Shl'a schools of law is difficult to 
imagine given the expertise required to work in such a legal setting.47 UnderstandabIy, 
this fear was reinforced by another web-based document that lists Azim Hosein as one 
of the group's arbiters. Mr. Hosein has no formaI training whatsoever in Islamic law. 
Rather, his qualifications include a B.Sc. in Microbiology and a BioMed. Sc. (Food), 
while he has experience as a business executive and is certified as a Hazard Analyst 
45 Syed Mmntaz Ali, "Establishing an Institute of Islamic Justice: Darul Qada," News Bulletin, October 
(2002): http://muslim-canada.org/news02.html. 
46 Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 209. 
47 The following quote explains the selection criteria the group has in mind when staffing their arbitration 
panel. Note the vagueness of the qualifications required; specifically, no mention is made of actual 
positions such as a mufiJ(jurisconsult), an Islamic professional qualified to carry out the tasks set out by 
the group. Furthermore the quote also seems to suggest that members ofthe Ontario Bar Association can 
function as Islamic arbiters. 'Ideally, a panel of specialists would be necessary. Such a roster would 
represent the cream of the crop of competence and expertise. They would consist of persons selected from 
(a) the bar (Le., lawyers or retired judges) with required qualifications and experience at the bar or the 
bench; (b) religious scholars from the Muslim community with proper qualifications and accreditation; 
and (c) private arbitrators accredited by the goveming licensing organization--or even one sole arbitrator 
ifhe or she has the qualifications of all three categories.' See, Mills, "Interview." 
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Critical Control Point (H.A.C.C.P.) Specialist.48 Mr. Hosein's professional 
accreditation suggests that he is, perhaps, a food inspector and not a legal specialist.49 
Thus the IICl, in seeking to provide Islamic arbitration, may inadvertently contravene 
Islamic legal principles on a number of grounds. In this particular instance, the group 
appears to be providing their clientele with unqualified and unaccredited legal counse1.50 
On a practical level, the lack of accredited experts presents a major barrier to the 
creation of an Islamic arbitration system in Canada. Frequently, the Muslim community 
will put forward imiims as legal spokespersons. The nomination of these individu aIs as 
legal functionaries poses a number of problems, not least of which is the lack of a 
recognized system of accreditation to certify such religious figures in Canada. 
According to Faisal and Ahmed Kutty, two prominent members of Toronto's Muslim 
community, the lack of trained individuals is a major stumbling block in the formation 
of an effective Islamic arbitration system in Canada.51 They explain, in an article they 
co-wrote, that 'today, anyone can get away with making rulings so long as they have the 
48 Canadian Society ofMuslims, "An Essential Islamic Service in Canada: Muslim Marriage, Mediation 
and Arbitration," (accessed September 12,2006): http://muslim-canada.orglbrochure.htm. 
49 According to Agriculture Canada, 'Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) was conceived in 
the 1960s when the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) asked Pillsbury to design 
and manufacture the first foods for space flights. Since then, HACCP has been recognized intemationally 
as a logical tool for adapting traditional inspection methods to a modem, science-based, food safety 
system.' See, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, "Food Safety Enhancement Program Manual," July 
(2006): http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/polstratlhaccp/manue/chl e.shtml# 1.1. 
50 The followingpassage from the Canadian Muslim Society's web page seemingly invalidates Mr. 
Hosein's participation on the group's arbitration board. 'For some reason, it is assumed that any Tom, 
Dick or Harry with no expertise or qualifications in Canadian and Muslim law can become an arbitrator 
and start dispensing justice (or injustice!) The fact is that the Institute has managed to have a good 
number of its executives take and successfully complete the ADR Institute of Canada's approved courses 
in arbitration law and its process.' It is important to note that the exams offered by the ADR Institute of 
Canada have no Islamic component - a fact omitted from the previous statement. See, Syed Mumtaz Ali, 
"An update on the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice," News Bulletin August (2004): http://muslim-
canada.org/news04.html. 
51 Faisal Kutty and Ahmad Kutty, "Shariah Courts in Canada: Myth and Reality," The Ambition, April 
(2004): p.8. Ahmad Kutty has Masters from McGill University specializing in Islamic law while his son, 
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appearance of piety and a group of followers. There are numerous institutions across the 
country [Canada] churning out graduates as alims (scholars), faqihs Qurists) or muftis 
(Juris-consults) [sic] without fully imparting the subtleties of Islamic jurisprudence. ,52 
Apart from the Ilcrs apparent lack of expertise in Islamic law, what has also raised 
the ire of various groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike, are the brazen and at 
times contradictory c1aims made by the IlCJ on behalf of the entire Muslim-Canadian 
community. Quoting at length from one of Ali's comments will demonstrate why many 
have opposed his organization' s proposaIs. 
Sharia [sic] is a part of our life. If we proc1aim to be a Muslim, we must 
live our life according to the injunctions of Allah [God] and His Prophet. 
Let's take the ex ample ofmarriage. You cannot have an Islamic marriage 
without applying Sharia [sic]. Similarly, if there is a fear that a 
matrimonial dispute is about to OCCur' the Qur'an [sic] c1early states that 
you must try to solve it by having two arbitrators, one from each side. 
This is the command that in order to be a Muslim, you must surrender to 
the command of Allah. Ifyou don't, then you are not a good Muslim.53 
In this statement, Ali is suggesting that allMuslims should submit to Islamic arbitration 
in order for them to be considered as 'good Muslims.' However, with the Islamic 
authenticity of their proposed ADR panels in question, it is somewhat dubious to 
profess such statements when in fact no formaI system of Shar1'a is actually being 
offered by the IlCJ. Furthermore, given that most Muslim countries do not actually 
operate under the traditional forms of Shar1'a, it seems that the demand for Muslim-
Canadians to follow Islamic law is also somewhat overstated. 
Faisal Kutty, is a Toronto area Lawyer and freelance writer whose work appears in the Toronto Star. 
Faisal Kutty also acts as CAIR-CAN's legal counsel. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Canadian Society ofMuslims, "Ali's Interview with' The Ambition;" May (2004): http://muslirn-
canada.org/ambitioninterview.html. Italics added for emphasis. 
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Ali's use of the term 'sharl'a' in conjunction with arbitration also served to further 
confuse the issue when one considers that arbitration represents a procedural system 
that falls under the jurisdiction of Canadian law. Thus any decision made in arbitration 
cannot contraveneCanadian law. For instance, the divorce proceedings taking place 
during Islamic arbitration must conform to Canada's Divorce Act. In faimess, Ali has 
stated that 'only those provisions of the Shariah [sic] that do not conflict with Canadian 
law/values will be applied for arbitration of disputes in Canada.'54 However, his overall 
message is mixed given Ali's previous statement that insists that Muslims 'must 
surrender to the command of Allah.' According to one observer, these contradictory 
pronouncements led many people to believe that the Govemment of Ontario had 
'surreptitiously colluded with the IICJ and, without consultation, allowed one particular 
Islamic group to set up a parallellegai system. ,55 
The Boyd Report 
Seeking to ease the controversy aroused by the IICJ that has emerged both in 
Canada and abroad, the Govemment of Ontario, under Premier Dalton McGuinty, 
commissioned Marion Boyd to ascertain whether the use of religious arbitration and 
specifically, Islamic arbitration, were viable options. In formulating a position, Boyd 
welcomed submissions from interested parties to assist in completing a report that was 
released in December of 2004, entitled Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting 
54 Ali, "An Update." 
55 Marion Boyd, "Arbitration in Family Law: Difficult Choices," Inroads, Winter/Spring (2006): p. 59. 
The following piece of information appeared on a BBC web page suggesting that Shaii' a law would be 
used in Ontario. According to the report, 'Islamic law could be used to settle civil and marital disputes 
under a propos al made by former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd.' BBC News, "Sharia Move in 
Canada Draws Anger," September 8th (2005): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4226758.stm. 
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Choice~ Promoting Inclusion. The submissions spoke to the various advantages and 
disadvantages of using faith-based arbitration. 
Support for the use of faith-based arbitration focused on a wide range of concems. 
One issue that resonated with a number of family law lawyers was the specifie expertise 
to be found in private arbitration as opposed to the public court system. Philip Epstein, a 
Toronto area lawyer who specializes in family arbitration and mediation, asserted that 
individu ais who access his services will get an expert in the field who can provide 
solutions difficult to come by in a court of law. Whereas a judge may be rotated in and 
out of the family law courts, arbiters like Epstein are specialists who use the 'most up-
to-date approach to the resolution of problems.'56 Furthermore, he maintains that his 
clients appreciate the speed and the lower costs associated with his form of dispute 
resolution.57 
Religious groups such as the Christian Legal Fellowship have highlighted the 
importance religion plays in people's public lives. In their submission to the Boyd 
Report, the group maintained that in 'choosing to utilize a system of religious 
arbitration, the parties are doing two things: adhering to their faith; and resolving the 
dispute on the basis oftheir religious law, rather than the secular civillaw. ,58 The group 
goes on to state that 'it is more important to the individual that the dispute is resolved 
Biblically than that the outcome be in his or her favour.'59 Clearly, this line ofthinking 
is outside of the normallogic used in the adversarial court system whereby victory is the 
56 Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 36. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 56. 
59 Ibid. 
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primary goal. Masjid al-Noor, a Toronto area mosque, recognized by the Ontario courts 
for its arbitration services, offered sorne further arguments in support of faith-based 
arbitration. According to the group, sorne Muslims are not comfortable resolving their 
disputes in the secùlar justice system, which they label as 'unauthorized. ,60 Thus there is . 
a risk that these individuals will either avoid the courts altogether, or will settle their 
affairs themselves using underground forms of justice. 
Along with these submissions were those which cautioned against the use of faith-
based ADR. The Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC), an advocacy group for progressive 
Muslims, maintained that the use of arbitration for settling family disputes was 
unconstitutional. According to their submission to the Boyd Report the rule of law 
would be negated if individuals were allowed to settle their disputes via private 
arbitration.61 And allowing other forms of justice to intervene in these matters would 
amount to the creation of a para1lel system of justice. The CCMW made a similar 
constitutional argument in their submission to the report. According to their submission, 
the Arbitration Act allows for different forms of law to be applied, including Islamic 
law, which would severely disadvantage women because it does not have the same 
principles of equality espoused in the Canadian Family Law Act or the Divorce A ct. 62 It 
should be pointed out that both these criticisms failed to take into account the limits of 
arbitration; namely, the notion that decisions handed out at the tribun aIs must conform 
to Canadian law. 
60 Ibid., p. 65. 
61 Ibid., p. 30. 
62 Ibid., p. 31. 
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1"""--- In issuing her final report, Boyd sought to test sorne of the criticisms leveled against 
faith-based family arbitration with the Charter. Her analysis demonstrated that although 
shortcomings were found in the arbitration process, using ADR was not contrary to the 
spirit of the Charter. Her reasoning was based on the fact that entering into arbitration is 
a private matter, embarked upon by two individuals.63 Although the govemment has set 
up specific procedures through the Arbitration Act, it does not actually compel people 
to employ arbitration, nor does it appoint the arbiter in the case. Thus, according to 
Boyd, there is significant distance between the parties involved and the govemment.64 
According to her, '[a]greeing to be bound by an arbitrator's decision falls into the 
category of an action that is private and therefore, in my view, is not subject to Charter 
scrutiny. ,65 
As to the fact that the agreements reached by the parties may not be based on 
principles of equality following the Divorce Act, Boyd is adamant that individuals are 
free to enter into unequal divorce settlements, if they so choose.66 In fact Boyd explains 
that 'nothing in the Charter requires disputants to resolve their property disputes on a 
50/50 basis or that private legal arrangements arrive at an equal result. ,67 She cites 
three recent cases heard by the Supreme Court that affirm that people could conc1ude 
63 The International Center for Hmnan Rights and Democratie Development has critÏcized this view in 
stating that the freedom to enter into arbitration does not grant women a real choice because their 
decision to enter into arbitration can be negated by social and economic disadvantages. In this regard, 
legitimizing arbitration 'may in fact facilitate coercion, threatening women's constitutionally protected 
equality rights.' See, Karin Baql, Behind Closed Doors: How Faith-Based Arbitration Shuts Out 
Women's Rights in Canada and Abroad (Montreal: International Center For Hmnan Rights and 
Democratie Development): http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/YDF/publications/womenlarbrfaith.pdf. p. 4. 
64 Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 71. . 
65 Ibid., p. 72. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p. 73. 
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such arrangements.68 According to the Boyd Report, the one area where the Charter 
actually pertains in the matter of arbitration is in the equal rights it provides both men 
and women to pursue ADR.69 
Boyd's understanding of the Charter is based on its stated goals, that of protecting 
the individu al from the abuses of the state. Meanwhile, many of the critics who 
opposed faith-based arbitration made it c1ear that they wished to impose more state 
control over people's lives by limiting the use of faith-based arbitration. In a rebuttal to 
individuals who have taken issue with religious arbitration, Boyd states that '[j]ust 
because we may disagree with the manner in which this alternative is used by sorne 
individuals does not mean we are allowed to deprive them of the right to use iL .. ,70 
Such a stance, in her view, is far too paternalistic.71 According to Boyd, granting 
the government the power to restrict people's choices is c1early the sort ofinfringement 
the Charter seeks to avoid. As Boyd herself states: '[i]t is not c1ear to me that we 
should aspire to the level of state intrusion in our lives that is implied by the application 
of the Charter to privately ordered relationships.' 72 Based on these arguments, Boyd 
found that faith-based arbitration, inc1uding Islamic forms, were consistent with the 
Charter and thus, in her view, should continue to be used in the province of Ontario.73 
However, she did recognize that certain shortcomings when using arbitration in family 
matters needed to be addressed. Therefore, in her advocacy of arbitration, Boyd 
68 N.S. (AG) v. Walsh [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325; Miglin v. Miglin [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303; Hartshome v. 
Hartshome [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550. 
69 Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 73. 
70 Ibid., p. 75. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., p. 76. 
73 Ibid., p. 133. 
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recommended that safeguards should be established before progressing further with 
private faith-based ADR. 
In SUIn, Boyd put forward 46 recommendations that sought to enhance the process of 
arbitration.74 Among the recommendations were legislative amendments that would 
ensure that those embarking on arbitration were made fully aware of the voluntary 
nature of their acts. Boyd also recommended that individuals seeking arbitration do so 
with independent legal counsel. Moreover, she suggested that arbiters be given training 
to ascertain whether people were coerced into private arbitration, as well as to detect 
whether a couple coming before them appeared to be in an abusive relationship. She 
further proposed programs bringing together government and culturallreligious 
communities in order to foster greater mutual understanding. The thrust of this 
particular effort would be to teach individuals the main principles of Canadian law as 
well as the options available to them under the Arbitration Act. Boyd also 
recommended that in order to provide effective government oversight, a standardized 
practice of keeping records of past arbitration hearings should be adhered to, thereby 
making it mandatory to submit to the province for review the outcomes of the panels. 
Finally, in order to safeguard those who use faith-based arbitration, Boyd suggested that 
the Govemment of Ontario should enact legislation that would effectively overtum 
harmful decisions that were rendered in bad faith. 
Islamophobia and the Shaii'a Debate in Ontario 
Prior to the release of the Boyd Report in December of 2004 and continuing 
immediately thereafter, various groups and individuals embarked on a media campaign 
74 Ibid., pp. 133-142. 
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criticizing the use of faith-based arbitration. The tone of the media blitz was marked by 
regular instances of Islamophobia on the part of those who stood against faith-based 
arbitration. The overall effect of the campaign led to public misinformation as to what 
Islamic law was and how it would function in the arbitration process. Before delving 
into sorne of the specifies of the debate, a definition of Islamophobia is in order. 
Although the term Islamophobia has been in use since the early 1990's, the Runneymede 
Trust, an independent British social policy agency that tracks issues related to cultural 
diversity, has offered a clear definition of the word. In a 1997 study, put together by a 
20-person panel that included academics and representatives of various British Muslim 
organizations, the Runneymede Trust defined Islamophobia as an 'unfounded hostility 
towards Islam.' 75 The group further maintained that there exist two general perspectives 
Western audiences entertain when relating to Islam, which the Runneymede Trust 
labeled as 'open' and 'closed.' An 'open' perspective holds that Islam is diverse, 
interacts with other world traditions, is open to change and is regarded as a genuine 
religion, 'practiced sincerely by it adherents.'76 An Islamophobic or 'closed' 
understanding maintains that Islam is monolithic, static, and impervious to change. A 
'closed' perspective also holds that the tradition is incapable of coping with modernity 
and regularly resorts to violence as a means of offsetting change. The latter 
characterization of Islam is one that closely resembles the Orientalist discourse that has 
characterized academic (to a certain extent) and non-academic literature in the West. 
Individuals who have an Islamophobic perspective view the religion, as well as Islamic 
75 Runneymede Trust, "Islamophobia: a Challenge for us AlI," November (1997): 
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf. 
76 Ibid. 
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societies, as inferior to Western culture and institutions. According to the Runneymede 
Trust, Islamophobia produces a hostility that serves to exc1ude Muslims from the 
mainstream, creating an atmosphere where negative views towards Islam are regarded as 
acceptable and norma1.77 During the media debates over the use of Islamic arbitration, 
both non-Muslims and Muslims alike regularly articulated Islamophobic arguments as a 
means of de-Iegitimizing Islamic ADR. 
For instance, Natasha Fatah, a producer with the CBC, asked 'whose version of 
Shariah [sic] law are we going to accept? Afghanistan's? Where women are shrouded 
their whole lives. Saudi Arabia's? Where they cut off your body parts if you get caught 
stealing. Nigeria's? Where they'll stone you to death for committing adultery. These are 
extreme ex amples but they are the reality:78 This kind of statement, typical of the 
debate, served only to trivialize the issue by invoking the specter of violence. In a 
repeat of the Orientalist discourse, Fatah invokes violence as a way of discrediting 
certain sectors of the Muslim population in Canada who seek to use faith-based 
arbitration. Others have also chosen to deploy a tactic similar to this. Perhaps the most 
notable instance was a statement made by Sheila Copps, a former Member of 
Parliament. According to Copps, mixing 'religion and the law' would produce a 
'Molotov cocktail that could blow up at any time.' 79 
77 Ibid. 
78 Natasha Fatah, "One Law for AlI," CBC News Analysis and Viewpoint, April 1 sI (2004): 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/viewpoint/vpJatah/20040401.html. 
79 Sheila Copps, "Sharia Law is a Danger to Women," National Post, December 241h (2004): p. A22. 
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The International Center For Ruman Rights and Democratic Development 
(hereafter, Rights and Democracy), a non-partisan body set up by the Canadian federal 
govemment, came out strongly against the Boyd Report. Many of the criticisms Rights 
and Democracy expressed concerning the report were Islamophobic in nature. For 
instance, in a pamphlet published by the group entitled, Behind Closed Doors: How 
Faith-Based Arbitration Shuts out Women's Rights in Canada and Abroad, the author 
states that although 'the application of religious laws does not automatically mean that 
women's rights will be trampled on, in practice, they often are.'80 No attempt was made 
to balance this statement - leaving the reader to assume that Islamic law has been 
misogynist throughout its history and will continue to be so in the future. Implicitly, 
Rights and Democracy is suggesting that gender relations emerging from the Muslim 
world are distinct in nature, and therefore incompatible with Western values. This view 
is typical of the c10sed perspective on Islam. Moreover, the rationale employed by 
Rights and Democracy is reductive; it appears to paint religion, particularly Islam, as 
the sole source of inequality for women while neglecting to mention that other sect ors 
in Western society, such as business, education and govemment organizations, have also 
employed systemic forms ofinequality. 
The pamphlet's front-coYer, depicting a frightened woman cowering behind a door, 
contributed to the kind of fear mongering that characterized the debate over the use of 
faith-based arbitration. The text of the pamphlet displayed a subtle kind of 
ethnocentrism in its tacit approval of Jewish and Isma'iIi faith-based arbitration, while 
80 Baql, "Behind Closed Doors," p. 4. 
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denying the same privileges to the Muslim community. In making this assertion, Rights 
and Democracy failed to mention that the Isma'Hi community is in fact a Muslim group. 
Also troubling, was the fact that in their rush to discredit Islamic arbitration, Rights and 
Democracy get certain facts wrong. In its support for Jewish and Isma'iIi arbitration, the 
pamphlet maintained that 'the vast majority of cases handled by both [groups] are 
commercial disputes.,81 As discussed above, the Boyd Report maintained that twenty-
nine percent of the cases dealt with by the Isma 'iIi arbitration panels focused on 
commercial matters while sixty-three percent ofthe cases heard dealt with issues related 
to marriage and divorce. This kind of misinformation is very perplexing given the fact 
that Rights and Democracy is an organization set up by the federal govemment and thus 
capable of gamering for itself a great deal of credibility in the eyes ofmany. 
Meanwhile, Rights and Democracy's understanding of Shaii'a is fundamentally 
flawed. In the pamphlet, they maintain that the Shaii'a is based on 'the Qur'an and 
thousands of sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, collected more than two centuries after 
his death. ,82 In this statement, no account is made of the dynamism and flexibility 
regularly deployed by Muslim jurists during the pre-modem period. Rather, by stating 
that the Shaii'a represents a legal code that emerged more than a thousand years ago, 
the group provides an essentialist perspective that is akin to using classical Greek 
history to make generalizations about modem Greece. This perspective also fails to 
acknowledge that Islamic law became less flexible when it was codified in order to 
81 Ibid., p. 5. 
82 Ibid. 
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resemble modern European legal systems. Moreover, in line with the general 
Islamophobic trends found in the West, Rights and Democracy simply sought to portray 
the Sharl'a as a disorganized body of law. In their words, Islamic law 'can inc1ude 
codified and uncodified state laws and informai customary practices which vary 
according to the cultural, social and political context.'83 This last statement suggests 
that the Sharl'a is in need of reform due to its seemingly chaotic nature. What Rights 
and Democracy fails to acknowledge is that this state of affairs is not unusual and that 
many legal traditions, inc1uding that of Common Law in Canada, operate under similar 
circumstances. It should be noted that Behind Closed Doors was put together with the 
he1p of individuals such as Alia Hogben of the CCMW, an individual who was quite 
vocal in her opposition to faith-based arbitration. Her voice and that of the group she 
represents certainly makes a valuable contribution to the overall debate. However, it 
appears that in establishing its position, no attempt was made by Rights and Democracy 
to consult with individuals or groups who supported the use of faith-based arbitration.84 
Rights and Democracy's narrow perspective on faith-based arbitration appears to 
be out of step with its own dec1ared goals. According to its mandate, the group seeks 'to 
support the participation of civil society and reinforce norms and mechanisms for the 
protection of human rights to influence governmental and intergovernmental bodies. ,85 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. p. 2 
85 International Centre for Human Rights and Democratie Development, "What We Do," (Accessed 
September lib 2006): http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/what_we_do/index.php?lang=en. 
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However, in its outright dismissal of the arbitration process, together with its 
skepticism concerning Islamic law, it appears to be ignoring an entire segment of 
Canadian civil-society; namely, the grouping that espouses a religious agenda. Yet, 
despite this, if selectively recognizes groups such as the CCMW that support its 
ideology on this matter, and although the group claims to be non-partisan, in reality, 
Rights and Democracy is clearly biased towards a discourse influenced by Islamophobia, 
and directed at the neo-imperialistic goals currently favored by the Canadian 
government, as evidenced in its military participation in Afghanistan.86 Voices that 
called for the use of Islamic arbitration were not only disregarded, but Rights and 
Democracy took to labeling advocates of religious arbitration as 'fundamentalist.' 
According to their pamphlet, '[f]undamentalism is not a religious movement - it is a 
political one that seeks control over public and private life. ,87 This last statement not 
only denies the religious convictions of certain Muslims, who wish to establish faith-
based arbitration, but also associates them with the specter of totalitarianism and 
discredits their contribution to a liberal society. In adopting the colonialist mindset, so 
pervasive in Canadian history, Rights and Democracy is attempting to manage the 
86 In a book published by Rights and Democracy and Women Living Under Muslim Laws, the authors put 
forward a neo-imperialist perspective. Specifically, in stating that human rights activists should 'argue 
for the provision of the CEDAW [Convention on the Elimination of AlI Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women], it should supersede nationallaws that do not meet even the minimal requirements of the 
Convention.' Societies should certainly make the transition to more equitable forms of gender relations. 
However, in order for these changes to be seen as authentic and effective, the move towards gender parity 
should originate from within the local cultures themselves, as opposed to being imposed on them by non-
local forces. See, Jan Bauer and Anissa Hélie, Documenting Womens Rights Violations by Non-State 
ActOIS. (Canada: International Center for Human Rights and Development and Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws, 2006): p. 36. 
87 Baql, "Behind Closed Doors," p. 5. 
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1 diversity they see in their own midst by portraying Islamic law as outdated, inflexible, 
and misogynist. 
Other critics of faith-based arbitration also adopted the Islamophobic doctrine in 
making the case against faith-based arbitration. According to sorne of these opponents, 
the caU for faith-based arbitration was a dangerous ploy that sought to implement 
'sharia [sic] by stealth.'88 Tarek Fatah, a spokesperson for the MCC, writing in the 
Toronto Star, suggested that allowing Muslim groups to embark on arbitration would 
permit 'the extreme ideological agenda' of certain Muslim-Canadians to implement a 
value system that is 'antithetical to the Constitution and Canadian values.'89 This 
statement, similar to those made by Rights and Democracy, suggests that Islamic values 
are incompatible with Canadian norms. This Islamophobic tone was also articulated by 
one of the most vocal voices against the use of religious arbitration, Homa Arjomand, 
the coordinat or of the International Campaign against Sharia Court in Canada 
(hereafter, The International Campaign). According to Arjomand, the attempt to 
implement Islamic arbitration in Canada is 'part of a global move and it is a serious 
threat. It is pushed forward by the leaders of political Islam. They need validation, 
recognition and power from the govemments of the West.,90 In making this c1aim, there 
is no attempt to identify the 'proponents of 'political Islam.' Regardless of this omission, 
88 Rita Trichur, "Muslims Divided over whether Shariah Belongs in Ontario Arbitration Law," 
Canada.com News, August 22nd (2004): 
http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/20040822.pdfsearch=%22shariah%20by%20stealth%22. 
89 TarekFatah, "Don't Succumb to hnams, Rabbis and Priests," Toronto Star, June 22nd (2005): p. A.I5. 
90 Homa Arjomand, "Speech at the Second Annual International Demonstration against Sharia/ Faith 
Based Courts in Canada," Toronto, September 8th (2005): 
http://www.nosharia.comlSpeech%20Sep805final.htm. 
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Arjomand believes that there is a direct link between government recognition of religion 
and instances of terror perpetrated by extremists. Throughout her time spent in the 
media spotlight, Arjomand displayed a uniform distaste for Islam and for its role in the 
public domain. Quotitig her at length captures this bias: 
Religion is penetrating our justice and education systems. There are 
attempts to replace the teaching of evolution with nonscientific and 
untested religious interpretations of the world. Two months ago, the Agha 
Khan, the leader of a religious sect, received 30 million dollars from Prime 
Minister Paul Martin to promote religion and backward culture. In election 
campaigns, candidates appeal to religious leaders for votes instead of to 
citizens. Given the above, how can anyone still wonder why terrorism is 
growing?91 
Although the dramatic TIse III violence perpetrated under the banner of religion is 
certainly a concem for societies around the world, Arjomand's linking of terrorism and 
the Agha Khan Foundation is especially problematic. The centre she refers to is an 
organization whose mission is to 'promote pluralism as a fundamental human value and a 
foundation for good govemance, peace and human development.'92 Arjomand 
consistently wamed against the danger of allowing religion to make further inroads into 
Canadian society. In her view, Muslim women who have recently immigrated to Canada 
do not know their rights under Ontario's family law system. According to Arjomand, it is 
often these women who are forced by their families into Islamic arbitration. Speaking 
from her experience as a translator for abused women in Toronto, Arjomand maintains 
that when forced into religious arbitration, the tribunals will 'give them no choice but to 
91 Arjomand, "Secularism Now: Modem and Progressive Social and Cultural Norms," June 24th (2005): 
http://www.nosharia.com/Secularism%20Now.htm. 
92 Office of the Prime Minster, "Govemment of Canada Welcomes the Establishment of the Global Centre 
for Pluralism in Ottawa," April 18 (2005): 
http://www.news.gc.calcfinx/view/enlindex.jsp?articleid=139129&keyword=pluralism+&keyword=pluralis 
m+&. 
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be obedient or attempt suicide.'93 In the CUITent political c1imate ofterror and insecurity, 
linking Muslims and suicide is an effective rhetorical device. These sorts of statements 
are not only difficult to corroborate"but feed on society's fears by linking religious 
convictions with extremism. In a repetition of sorne of the most flagrant excesses of 
Orientalist ideology, individuals such as Fatah and Arjomaild cast Islam as an exotic and 
violent tradition and, by extension, portrayed the Shaii'a as an outdated legal system.94 
Support for Islamic ADR 
Amid the voices that stood in opposition to faith-based arbitration were the 
organizations and individuals who supported the continued use and expansion of 
religious ADR. The Globe and Mail's editorial board, for instance, countered numerous 
opinion pieces published in its own paper, in maintaining that banning faith-based 
arbitration was a threat to people's freedom of religion under the Charter. Furthermore, 
it stated that denying individu aIs the ability to address their concerns via faith was both 
impractical and dangerous. The editorial board argued that sorne people place a great 
deal of importance on religious ceremonies when they get married and wish to see their 
marri ages dissolved according to their faith. The Globe also pointed out that these 
individuals would not only continue to use faith-based arbitration in these matters, but 
would do so while signaling a readiness to 'willingly give up their rights. ,95 However, 
unlike a reguJated system, which would conceive of faith-based arbitration as being 
93 Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 54. 
94 Ironically, one of the most vocal proponents offaith-based arbitration, Mubin Shaikh, an arbiter 
himself, was also a paid informant for the Canadian Security and Information Service (CSIS). Shaikh 
came into the national spotlight for helping to secure the arrest of 17 Ontario men who were allegedly 
plotting to execute a number of terror plots in the province. See Sonya Fat ah and Greg McArthur, "The 
Making of a Terror Mole," Globe and Mail. July 14th (2006): p. Al. 
95 Globe and Mail. "Muslim Arbitration: Don't Ban, Supervise," September 9th (2005): p. A. 16. 
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accountable, as suggested by the Boyd Report, non-regulated arbitration panels might in 
fact offer rulings that are contrary to Canadian values, and could severely harm the 
interests of vulnerable members of society. The edit ori al board maintained that 
'[b]ringing Muslim tribunals under the Arbitration Act is a way of demanding fairness 
and adherence to Canadian norms, in return for inclusion. ,96 Finally, the Globe pointed 
out that a 'creeping fundamentalism among the secular' was influencing the 
government's decision as to whether to allow for the continued use offaith-based family 
arbitrati on. 97 
. Another supporter of religious ADR was Anver Emon, an Assistant Professor at the 
University of Toronto.98 Mirroring the concerns of the Boyd Report, Emon feared that 
unregulated arbitration panels would offer no safeguards to women who chose or were 
forced into using services that he labeled as 'informaI back-ally mediations. ,99 His 
wording here is very significant. By invoking language used by pro-abortion activists in 
the past, namely the phrase 'back-ally,' Emon appears to be reaching out to progressive 
minded individuals by reminding them of the dangers of unofficial and unregulated 
medicine. Often, individuals who espouse a progressive worldview alienate religion 
from public discourse owing to their perception that faith interferes with individu al 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 According to Homa Arjomand, the hiring ofEmon and another prof essor, Mohammad Fadel, to teach 
courses in Islamic law at the University of Toronto was a 'green light for sharia [sic]' to operate within 
Ontario. Alia Hogben also voiced concern over the hiring ofthese two academics, believing that such a 
move could in fact 'make inroads' toward the use ofIslamic arbitration. See Boyd Erman, "Islamic Law 
Course Hears Opening Arguments," Globe and Mail, August 6th (2005): p. M3. 
99 Anver Emon, "A Mistake to Ban Sharia," Globe and Mail, September 13th (2005): p. A2I. 
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autonomy and liberty.100 However, the narrowness of this way of thinking serves to 
endanger the women who seek religious arbitration. Emon maintains that by c10sing the 
door on a recognized form of arbitration, individuals may have access to unofficial 
arbitration services instead. Therefore, according to Emon, women could faH prey 'to 
the machinations of bad-faith husbands, uneducated imams [sic], and patriarchal 
traditions ifthey wish to remain a part oftheir community.,101 Allowing for faith-based 
arbitration in a regulated format would not only offer certain safeguards but could even 
create an opportunity for Muslims living in Canada to take up the time-honored 
tradition ofreformulating the Shaii'a, which would retlect 'the spirit ofIslamic law and 
the values they hold as Canadians.'102 For the most part, this kind of discourse was 
greatly lacking in the debates that surrounded arbitration. Rather, Emon pointed out 
that the media campaign in Ontario was one characterized by 'anti-sharia [sic] activists 
who reduced the discourse to Islamophobic poli tic al sloganeering.' 103 
CAIR-CAN also offered a more nuanced position on the matter, which avoided the 
pervasive Islamophobia that characterized much of the debate. For instance, the issue of 
the qualifications of the arbiters was a point CAIR-CAN frequently raised. In its 
submission to the Boyd Report, the group strongly advocated for the use of accredited 
arbiters who were trained in Islamic legal discourse but, even more importantly, in 
100 Kenneth D. Wald, Adam L. Silvennan and Kevin S. Fridy, "Making Sense of Religion in Political 
Life," Annual Review ofPoliticai Science, vol. 8, June (2005): pp. 121-143. 
101 Emon, "A Mistake to Ban" p. A. 21. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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Canadian law. 104 The demand for such arbiters was to avoid what Sheema Khan, the 
group's spokesperson, characterized as 'too many unqualified, ignorant imams [sic] 
making back-alley pronouncements on the lives of women, men and children.'105 
Furthermore, CAIR-CAN had no illusions that Muslims would stop using faith-based 
arbitration; rather, it was quite ad amant that the practice would continue. Recognizing 
that sorne 'Muslim women are ignorant about their own rights within Islam, schooled 
instead in cultural misogyny,' their position was one of reforming the unregulated 
system of underground arbitration by way of legitimizing the process through 
government oversight. 106 On the whole, the Boyd Report accepted this view; but apart 
from a few notable exceptions, such as the Globe and Mail's editorial board, it was 
mostly ignored. Finally, in lamenting the unsavory nature of the debate, Khan pointed 
out that 'sharia -phobia [sic] has skewed the debate over Ontario faith-based arbitration 
to such a frenzied level that lies were perpetuated as facts, paranoia as patriotism. Just 
as the neo-conservative lobby peddled the bogus threat of Iraqi WMDs [weapons of 
mass destruction], our own neo-secularists (including several Muslims) brazenly peddled 
Muslim family law as an existential threat to Western liberal democracy. As in the case 
104 Canadian Council on American Islamic Relations-Canada, "Review of Ontario's Arbitration Process 
and Arbitration Act," August 10 (2004): http://www.caircan.ca/downloads/sst-10082004.pdf. p.6. 
105 Sheema Khan, "The Sharia Debate Deserves a Proper Hearing," Globe and Mail, September 16th 
(2005): p. A.2D. Italies added for emphasis. 
106 Ibid. 
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with Iraq, the audience was a fearful public ready to accept its own biases coupled with 
sensational media accounts.' 107 
Throughout the debate, the majority of the public appeared to be pitted against the 
use of Islamic arbitration. A joint Environics/CROP poll, conducted during the latter 
half of September 2005, found that sixty-three percent of Canadians opposed the use of 
Islamic arbitration. Although sorne have charged that a double standard was in effect in 
regard to Islamic arbitration,108 the same Enviroics/CROP poll found that sixty-three 
percent of those polled voiced their opposition against aU forms of faith-based 
arbitration.109 In the end, the Boyd Report, despite its advocacy of faith-based 
arbitration, hinted that the government would adopt a 'patemalistic' stance on the 
matter.110 Speaking on the issue of where the government should draw the Hne in 
limiting its powers, Boyd concluded that this line 'is constantly in flux, its location the 
result of the ongoing dialogue between the government, the public and the COurtS.,111 
Banning Family Faith Based ADR and its Effects 
Following the public outcry that erupted in Ontario over the use of religious 
arbitration, Premier McGuinty decided to impose an outright ban on aU forms of family 
religious arbitration. On September Il th 2005, McGuinty phoned a representative of the 
Canadian Press and stated that 'l've come to the conclusion that the debate has gone on 
107 Ibid. 
108 Mohamad Elmasry, "Why was Shariah not Treated like Halachah?" Canadian Islamic Congress 
Opinions and Editorials, September 30th (2005): 
http://www.canadianislamiccongress.com/ar/opeds.php ?id=2531. 
109 Norma Greenaway, "63 Percent Oppose Faith-Based Arbitration," Ottawa Citizen, October 31 st 
(2005): p. A.3. 
II°Boyd, Dispute Resolution, p. 76. 
III Ibid. 
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long enough. There will be no sharia [sic] law in Ontario: ll2 McGuinty went on to say 
that '[t]here will be no religious arbitration in Ontario,' rather '[t]here will be one law 
for all Ontarians.' 113 Shortly thereafter, his govemment began the process of executing 
legislative changes to the Arbitration Act that effectively barred the use of faith-based 
arbitration in all family matters. 114 These changes, which were put forward in the 
Family Statute Law Amendment Act of 2005, stipulated that ail family disputes be 
settled 'only under Canadian law' and that 'resolutions based on other laws and 
principles - inc1uding religious principles - would have no legal effect and would 
amount to advice only:115 Despite this ban, binding religious arbitration is still 
permitted so long as the matters in question are not related to family law. The move to 
outlaw family based arbitration confirms Kymlicka's assertion that liberal society will 
not accept certain group-differentiated rights for cultural and religious communities. 
Furthermore, as Abu-Laban and Stasiulus contend, Canadian multiculturalism is one 
that seeks to de-Iegitimize real diversity in favor of creating a homogenized citizenry. 
This should not come as a surprise, as the move to ban faith-based arbitration falls in 
line with Trudeau's vision of multiculturalism - a unifying policy designed to bind 
112 Colin Freeze and Karen Howlett, "McGuinty Govemment Rules out use of Sharia Law," Globe and 
Mail. September 12 (2005): p. Al. This statement lends itselfto the general confusion surrounding the 
matter. Islamic arbitration would not apply Shaii'a law, a point seemingly missed by the Premier. 
Jl3 Ibid. 
114 Arbitration Act, sec. 32 (3) and (4). 
115 Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, "Backgrounder: the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 
2005," November 15 (2005): http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2005/20051115-
arbitration-bg-EN. pdf. 
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diverse elements of Canadian society c10ser together by downplaying their substantive 
concerns and differences. 
Although the decision delighted groups such as the MCC, CCMW, and the 
International Campaign, the move could potentially put certain Muslim women in 
danger. Underground arbitration and mediation performed by unqualified arbiters is not 
only currently taking place, but will in alllikelihood continue. The rulings made in these 
panels, which are not open to public scrutiny or any system of public monitoring, could 
very weIl produce decisions that would limit certain benefits women are entitled to 
under Canadian law. Because of the c10sed nature of these underground hearings, it is 
impossible to estimate how often they occur or the nature oftheir rulings. However, the 
following case, detailed in the pages of the Globe and Mail may shed sorne light on the 
dangers of unregulated 'back-alley' Islamic conflict resolution currently taking place in 
Canada.1l6 
In this particular case, an Ontario woman who the Globe identified as Shinaz (her 
real name was concealed) obtained a civil divorce from the Province of Ontario after her 
husband had abandoned her and returned to his native South Asia to marry another 
woman. Shinaz and her ex-husband, who had one child together, frequently argued 
during their marriage and there was at least one incident of reported conjugal violence 
prior to his departure. Four years following their official divorce, Shinaz, hoping to re-
marry within the Muslim community, sought a religious divorce from a local mosque. 
The type of divorce she was requesting was a fàskh, whereby the wife requests a court-
116 Marina Jiménez, "A MusIim Woman's Sharia Ordeal," Globe and Mail. August 9th (2005): p. A.I 
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granted divorce from a judge. This divorce would however be purely symbolic given that 
she had previously obtained an Ontario civil divorce. 
Under the guidance of the mosque's imiÎm, she was initially advised to offer her ex-
husband '$100,000 and all her gold jewelry' in return for his granting of the divorce. 
Although the sum was eventually reduced to $5,000, Shinaz agreed to the imiÎm'8 
recommendation that she 'must give a litt le to get something.' 117 In this case the 'judge' 
was an imiÎm, who, for whatever reason, appeared to be extorting money and jewelry 
from Shinaz on behalf of her former husband. What is also troubling in this case is that 
the same imiÎm advised her to give up her right to alimony payments (her husband 
owned a business in South Asia) as well as the child support payments she was entitled 
to and granted under Canadian law. Assuming that the Globe and Mail was correctly 
reporting on the matter, this case clearly demonstrates the dangers of obtaining 
unregulated and unqualified advice from an imam. 
Although Shinaz had access to legal council in obtaining her Ontario civil divorce, 
she appears to have gone to the mosque without the aid of a lawyer. Rather, she relied 
exclusively on the assistance of her male relatives in negotiating the terms of the 
divorce with the imiÎm. It is difficult to imagine a lawyer, representing their client's 
interests, forfeiting alimony payments and child support in this particular case. If the 
Ontario government had accepted the recommendations of the Boyd report, such a 
scenario may not have occurred, in part because Shinaz would have had the assistance of 
a lawyer during her arbitration process. Moreover, under the recommendations of the 
117 Ibid. 
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Boyd Report, the imam would have received a minimum amount of training informing 
him of the rights and duties inherent in Canadian divorce settlements. 
The Ontario government's decision to ban faith-based arbitration may have 
preserved the basis ofthat province's adherence to secular and liberal principles, but to 
argue that women's interests would accordingly be preserved would be to faH prey to 
the notion that unofficial arbitration will disappear altogether. On the contrary, sorne 
individuals will continue to seek Islamic arbitration owing to its traditional role within 
the Muslim world, and in accordance with their view that the secular legal system lacks 
the legitimacy to deal with their particular concems. However, by taking matters into 
their own hands and seeking out underground forms of arbitration, participants may in 
fact deny themselves certain rights and privileges they are entitled to under Canadian 
law. 
Aly Hindy, the outspoken imiim at the Salaheddin Mosque of Toronto, has made it 
abundantly dear that he will knowingly participate in activities that are contrary to 
Canadian law. In an interview he gave to Chatelaine magazine, he daims that '[t]he 
Qur'an [sic] says a man is limited to four wives. Canadian Law doesn't aHow it - God 
does, so l marry them myself .. .If your wife doesn't like sex, you can take another 
wife.'1l8 Ontario's ban on religious arbitration only covers the enforceability of 
decisions made in ADR panels. Although binding arbitration is no longer permitted in 
family matters, individuals can still access arbiters and mediators. In other words, there 
is no way of stopping individuals from seeking the advice offered by Aly Hindy. Nor is 
there a way of recording, regulating and canceling decisions that contravene Canadian 
118 Sally Armstrong, "Criminal Justice," Chatelaine, November (2004): p. 152. 
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laws and values. With no available form of govemment monitoring, and no effective 
means of registering any decisions that are made, the govemment of Ontario has 
effectively jettisoned the protection of women's interests in order to score political 
points with the electorate. This capitulation to societal pressures occurred in the wake 
of a media debate characterized by high levels of fear mongering, paranoia, 
sensationalism and Islamophobia. In this context, the integrative potential of a joint-
governance model of justice was thwarted. 
The contemporary Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has pointed out that certain 
individuals in Western societies are ostracized from the general population and denied 
rights that other citizens automatically enjoy. According to him, these individuals 
become 'homo sacer,' a term he borrows from Roman law, which designates someone 
who, although recognized by the state, is not protected by the laws of the state. In 
Agamben's words, '[h]e who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law 
and made indifferent to it but rather abandonedby it, that is exposed and threatened on 
the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is 
literally impossible to say whether the one [who] has been banned is outside or inside 
the juridical order.' 119 Agamben characterizes individuals held in refugee detention 
centers throughout Europe, as weIl as the 'enemy combatants' held by the American 
govemment, as homo sacer, individuals who are recognized by the law, yet not 
protected by it. Many of these people happen to be Muslims. Certain Muslims in 
119 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Lifè (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998): pp. 28-29. 
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Canada, who (for whatever reason) seek Islamic arbitration, have now been abandoned 
by the state. By subjecting themselves to unofficial forms of arbitration, which may be 
detrimental to their interests, they qualifY as Canada's homo sacer. By its calculated act 
of omission, the Ontario government, to the delight of many, has left these individuals 
at the mercy of untrained imiÎms while their bizarre rulings fly in the face of Canadian 
law. Rather than endorse a joint governance model of justice, whereby the state brings 
into its fold its minority concerns, the politicians, fearful of a public backlash, have 
opted for the arbitrary decision ofbanning all forms of religious family arbitration. 
Underlying the debates against the use of Islamic arbitration is the notion that 
Western society should be guided exclusively by the ideals of secular liberalism. When 
the eritics of faith-based arbitration portrayed the Sharl'a as illogieal, irrational and 
inflexible, they knowingly or unknowingly placed themselves within an Islamophobie 
diseourse that has always been very much in line with traditional liberal attitudes 
towards diversity. As we have seen, liberalism is not a neutral projeet; rather, as Taylor 
pointed out, it is a 'fighting ereed.' Sinee the time of the Enlightenment, liberalism has 
sought to foster 'personal autonomy, rational deliberation and civility.'120 However, at 
its core, liberalism remains wedded to the ide a of eliminating substantive differences in 
order to bring about these goals. Stanley Fish has questioned the neutrality of liberal 
societies. For Fish, liberalism is a form of fàith~ which has 'managed, by the very 
partisan means it claims to transcend, to grab the moral high ground, and to grab it from 
120 Stanley Fish, "Stanley Fish Replies to Richard John Neuhaus," Firsf Things, February (1996): p. 39. 
210 
".,...--, 
/ . 
a discourse - the discourse of religion - that held it for centuries.' 121 This new religion 
does not rely on a God or gods as its source of authority; rather, the primary moyer for 
liberalism is human reason, putting it (seemingly) at odds with religious faith. 
According to Fish, 'liberalism 'can only "cherish" religion as something under its 
protection; to take it seriously would be to regard it as it demands to be regarded, as a 
claimant to the adjudicative authority already deeded in liberal thought and reason.' 122 
This rationale seems to have been at play in the decision to ban faith-based family 
arbitration in Ontario. 
The proponents of Islamic faith-based arbitration, especially the Ile J, were clearly 
unprepared to provide the effective services that they had advertised, as evidenced by 
the lack of accredited experts amongst their ranks, as weIl as by the contradictory 
messages they put forward in their literature. It is fair to say that although, on principle, 
the use of Islamic faith-based arbitration appears to be a valid concem, practically 
speaking the institutional scope and depth required to put such a program in place is 
currently lacking. Meanwhile, Ontario's ban will not deter individuals from seeking 
faith-based arbitration via unofficial channels. Rather, the ban will simply leave 
individuals vulnerable to unregulated arbitration. Although the Boyd Report made it 
clear that this scenario would harm women in particular, the govemment and the public, 
inspired by Islamophobic, media-fueled rhetoric, demanded an aIl too predictable 
121 Stanley Fish, There is no such thing as Free Speech (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 
138. 
122 Ibid., p. 135. 
211 
recourse to a form of multiculturalism that seeks to silence real diversity and 
substantive differences in favor of cultural homogeneity. 
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Chapter7 
Islamic Marriage and Divorce in Canada 
Despite the failure to implement Islamic arbitration panels in Ontario, cases dealing 
with the Shaii'a have, and will continue to, appear before Canadian courts. They 
inc1ude, but are not limited to matters relating to the capacity to marry, the mahI; the 
validity of an Islamic marriage contract, and divorce. This chapter will argue that 
applying Islamic law in Canada is functionally difficult. What will become evident 
throughout this survey is that the provisions found in the Muslim world concerning 
marriage and divorce frequently violate Canadian law on structural and procedural 
grounds. 
Before assessing why many of these laws cannot be accepted in Canada, it should be 
noted that marri ages and divorces that have been confirmed in foreign countries will be 
recognized in certain cases following formulas established by conflict of law provisions 
within private international law. 1 For instance, in Subsection 1 (2) of the Ontario 
Family Law Act, a polygamous spouse is defined as someone who is in 'a marriage that 
is actually or potentially polygamous, if it was celebrated in a jurisdiction whose system 
of law recognizes it as valid.,2 This permits a polygamous partner living in Ontario 
access to the same rights enjoyed by non-polygamous individuals in matters such as 
divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Despite these rights, under Section 293 of 
Canada's Criminal Code, it remains illegal to enter into a polygamous marriage in the 
1 The manner in which marriage and divorce in Canada is regulated deserves sorne comment. Because of 
the federal structure of the country, legislation covering marital affairs is split between the provinces and 
the federal government. The celebration of marriage is a provincial concem as each province has its own 
legislation that covers who can be married and who can solernnize marriage ceremonies. Meanwhile, 
substantive legislation governing divorce is controlled by the federal government. Payne and Payne, 
Canadian Family Law, pp. 19-23. 
2 !talics added for emphasis. 
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country due to the bigarnous nature of the act. Thus, although sorne principles of 
Islamic marri age and divorce can be recognized in Canada if they were solemnized in a 
foreign jurisdiction, initiating practices such as polygamy and laliiq divorces would 
violate Canadian law. 
In what follows, sorne Islamic regulations governing marriage and divorce will be 
compared to examples from Canadian law. Far from exhaustive, this survey seeks to 
demonstrate sorne of the differences between the two systems. These disparities include 
the following: 1) the legal violations pertaining to matters of equality that would occur 
when applying certain principles of the Sharl'a in Canada; 2) the procedural differences 
in approaches to marriage and divorce; and 3) the desire by members of Canada's 
cultural elite to maintain social cohesion through a unified code oflaw that is predicated 
on liberal values. For matters of simplicity, three Canadian legal systems will be used in 
the following comparison. They include Quebec's Civil Code, the federal government's 
Divorce Act, and Ontario's Marriage Act. As weIl, sorne United Nations conventions 
concerning equality and marriage will be discussed to further shed light on Canada's 
position at the internationallevel. 
Violations of Equality 
The most obvious difference between the Islamic and Canadian systems of personal 
status law revolves around matters of equality between the sexes and the rights of 
children. For instance, although the Qur'an provided women in seventh century Arabia 
with new-found status, the text clearly prioritizes men over women.3 For instance in one 
3 Leila Ahmed has argued that there is a fissure between the spirit of the Qur'an and the manner in which 
male jurists in the early period ofIslamic history applied family law. While the former advocates a form 
of spiritual equality, the latter have maintained the cultural inequalities that were prevalent during pre-
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verse, the Qur'an states that 'Women have rights similar to those [men] over them; 
while men stand above them.,4 It is important to point out that while this verse suggests 
a clear gender division, social history has demonstrated that the distinction between the 
sexes was more fluid than the text of the Qur'an would suggest. However, when Islamic 
law was codified during the modem period, the social nuances which gave women 
certain privileges were replaced by rigid legislation that reflected a literaI interpretation 
of the Qur'an. For instance, the relative ease with which women living in seventeenth 
century Egypt had in accessing divorce vanished foIlowing the codification of Islamic 
family law in Egypt. Thus, owing to verses such as the one quoted above, women's roi es 
have become fixed at levels subordinate to men. 
This being said, not aIl countries with large Muslim populations have maintained 
structural inequalities in relation to gender. In the 2001 reforms of Turkey's Civil Code, 
the original provisions set out in 1926 which maintained that the husband was 'the head 
of the household' (Article 152) has been amended by Article 186, which states that 'the 
spouses shaIl manage the household together.' These reforms have come about in 
Turkey due to a number of factors, least of which was Turkey's process of 
secularization. Furthermore, the active participation of a highly motivated feminist 
movement that has been pushing for full equality since the 1960's as weIl as the move to 
harmonize Turkey's laws with those of the Continent in anticipation of the country's 
Islamic history. According to Ahmed, the male-dominatedjurists, or 'establishment Islam' as she calls 
them, represent a form of religion that is 'authoritarian, implacably andocentric, and hostile to women.' 
See Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): p. 225. 
4 It should be noted that values emanating from the West that calI for full parity between men and women 
are not always welcome by sorne neo-conservative Muslim women. These Muslim women articulate the 
.~" demands for rights using the discourse of a more literalist interpretation of the Qur'an while others calI 
for a full reinterpretation of the faith in order to provide a basis for full equality based on the Western 
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entry into the European Union have also contributed towards the equal status of men 
and women in Turkey. 5 
Other Muslim countries have not adopted such principles despite signing 
international treaties such as the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. For instance, although Morocco has signed this 
document, that country's definition of marriage, as discussed earlier, declares that a 
family is 'under the patronage of the husband.' Furthermore, the Tunisian Code of 
Personal Status, which recently underwent a number of reforms in 1993, declares in 
Article 23 that '[l]e mari, en tant que chef de famille, doit subvenir aux besoins de 
l'épouse et des enfants dans la mesure de ses moyens et selon leur état dans le cadre des 
composantes de la pension alimentaire.' In Canada, such clear statements prioritizing 
men over women would constitute violations of Section 15 of the Charter which 
determines that '[e]very individual is equal before and under the law .. .' In Quebec, 
Article 392 of the Civil Code states that 'spouses have the same rights and obligations 
in marriage.' Similarly, Article 393 of the same code maintains that, 'both spouses 
together take in hand the moral and material direction of the family, exercise parental 
authority and assume the tasks resulting therefrom.' 
Gender inequalities are also found in other provisions related to Muslim marriage 
and divorce in use in various Muslim societies. For instance, in many Muslim 
jurisdictions, the number of witnesses that are required to be present at a marriage 
mode!. See Rebecca Foley, 'Muslim Women's Challenges to Islamic Law: the case of Malaysia' 
Intemational Feminist Journal ofPolitics, March (2004): p. 59. 
5 Margo Badran, 'Two Heads are Better than One,' Al-Ahram Weekly Online, i h_13th March (2002): 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/576/fe4.htm. These reforms in the law do not always trickle down into 
the public sphere. For a review of the state ofwomen's rights in Turkey see Deniz Kandiyoti, 
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cerernony is determined by their sex. Meanwhile, traditional Islamic law allows 
Muslirn men to marry Jews and Christians, while the same right is not extended to 
Muslim women. The principle for upholding this unequal schedule of rights is the 
notion that religion is passed on through the lineage of the father. Therefore, to avoid 
losing offspring to other religions, Muslim women are denied the right to marry outside 
their faith. Furthermore, while the option of polygamy is made available to men in 
sorne Muslim societies, women cannot marry more than one man at a time. Meanwhile, 
women undergoing divorce are required to remain chaste during the 'jdda period, while 
their husbands are free to engage in sexual activity. Finally, the notion that women can 
not declare a unilateral !aJiiq while men can, clearly demonstrates a differentiation of 
male and female roles within Islamic laws of personal status in various states that 
practice modem forms oflslamic family law. 
Beyond the obvious disparities associated with different conceptions of rights 
between men and women, Islamic and Canadian laws differ on the rights of children. As 
discussed earlier, many Muslim countries such as Syria, Tunisia and Morocco have 
stipulated a particular age at which an individual is free to enter into a marri age without 
needing consent. Such provisions are certainly in line with Canadian laws. However, in 
sorne regions of the Muslim world, arranged marri ages of minors not only occur, but 
also are valid so long as consummation takes place after the child reaches puberty. 
Although a guardian or wall can compel either a boy or a girl to marry, in most cases 
"Emancipated but UnIiberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case." Feminist Studies, vol. 13 (1987): pp. 
317-338. 
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this practice affects girls.6 For instance, both Bangladesh and Pakistan permit guardians 
to contract their daughters into marriage without their child's consent. However, 
according to Section 2 (vii) of the Pakistani Dissolution ofMuslim Marnages Act, these 
girls can seek annulments before the courts through the so-called 'option of puberty' if 
they have not voluntarily consummated their union with their husband.7 Canadian law, 
as weIl as international treaties signed by Canada do not sanction marri ages of this kind. 
For instance, in Quebec's Civil Code, Article 10 states that '[e]very person is inviolable 
and is entitled to the integrity ofhis person. Except in cases provided for by law, no one 
may interfere with his person without his free and enlightened consent.' On the 
international scene, Canada has agreed not to permit arranged under-aged marri ages 
based on Canada's signing of the 1965 United Nations Convention on Consent to 
Marnage, Minimum Age for Marnage and Registration of Marnage. Principle l(a) of 
this document states that '[n]o marriage shall be legally entered into without the full 
and free consent of both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person, after 
due publicity and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage 
and of witnesses, as prescribed by law.'8 Finally, the 1981 Convention on the 
Elimination of AlI Fonns of Discrimination Against Women clearly states in Article 16 
(1.b) that men and women equally have the right to 'choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent.' Thus the different roles ascribed to men, 
6 Poulter, Ethnicity Jaw and Human Rights, p. 218. 
7 Case law from the Subcontinent shows that judges are willing to grant annulments for these marriages 
even if consummation has occurred. For instance in cases where it can be proven that consummation was 
forced on the woman, courts have often voided the marriage. See Sara Hossain and Suzanne Turner, 
'Abduction for Forced Marriage- Rights and Remedies in Bangladesh and Pakistan,' Intemational Family 
Law, vol. 15 (2001): p. 17. 
8 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration ofMarriage, G.A. res. 
2018 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 36, V.N. Doc. A/60141 (1965). 
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women and children make the application of Shaii'a in Canada a difficult proposition 
given the structural violations such activities would provoke in the law. 
Procedural Violations 
Procedural differences between the two legal systems also stand in the way of the use 
of Islamic law in Canada. As discussed earlier, marriage by proxy is a feature found 
within the Islamic tradition. Meanwhile in an Canadian jurisdictions both members of a 
couple are required to be present at the time of the marri age. For instance, Article 365 of 
the Civil Code of Quebec states that '[m]arriage shan be contracted openly, in the 
presence oftwo witnesses and before a competent officiant.' Later in Article 374 of the 
Civil Code, officiants are asked to confirm 'from each of the intended spouses 
personally, a declaration of their wish to take each other as husband and wife. He then 
decIares them united in marriage.' Meanwhile, Section 25 of the Ontario Marriage Act 
states that '[e]very marriage shan be solemnized in the presence of the parties and at 
least two witnesses who shan affix their names as witnesses to the entry in the 
. t ,9 regls er. ... 
In matters relating to divorce, procedures for dissolving a marriage found within the 
Shaii'a will also have great difficulty finding acceptance in Canada. For instance, the 
principles, found in sorne Muslim countries today, that allow men to initiate a divorce 
without registering it with the civil authorities would contravene Canadian law. Section 
3 (1) of the Canadian Divorce Act states that '[a] court in a province has jurisdiction to 
hear and determine a divorce proceeding if either spouse has been ordinarily resident in 
9 Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3, section 25. 
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the province for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the 
proceeding.' Meanwhile, Section (7) of the same act maintains that 'The jurisdiction 
conferred on a court by this Act to grant a divorce shaH be exercised only by a judge of 
h . h . ,JO t e court Wlt out aJury. 
In a traditional Islamic .faliïq divorce, the wife is able to daim the un-paid portion 
ofher mahr. However, in cases where the woman exercises her right to a khu1: this SUffi 
may be forfeited at the husband's behest in order to put the divorce into effect. Such a 
procedure entailing a financial sacrifice by the woman would not be acceptable in 
Canada on a number of grounds, the least of which is the fact that the Canadian Divorce 
Act gives the courts the power to determine the amount of compensation following the 
dissolution of a marriage. According to Section 15.2 (1) of the federal Divorce Act~ '[a] 
court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an 
order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or 
periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for 
the support of the other spouse. ,II 
Maintaining Social Cohesion 
Another reason that principles of Islamic law would have difficulty finding 
acceptance in Canada is that the Shaii'a represents a threat to the formation of a 
cohesive Canadian society held together under a unified legal system based on liberal 
values. 12 In this regard, the province of Quebec has recently taken dramatic steps 
10 Divorce Act, R.S., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). 
11 Ibid. 
12 PouIter, Ethnicity Law and Human Rights, p. 211. 
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towards curtailing any appearance of Islamic law within that province. In a vote taken 
in the National Assembly in May of 2005, the house unanimously passed a motion 
forbidding the use of Shaii'a in Quebec. This vote re-confirmed a preexisting ban on 
ADR in matters related to personal status that is covered in article 2639 of the Civil 
Code. J3 One of the reasons cited by members of the provinciallegislature for curtailing 
any use ofIslamic law in Quebec was the fear that by endorsing such a system, Muslims 
would find themselves segregated from the general population. 14 According to one 
Liberal member of the legislature who was instrumental in pushing through the vote, 
Fatima Houda-Pepin, '[t]he application of sharia [sic] in Canada is part of a strategy to 
isolate the Muslim community, so it will submit to an archaic vision of Islam.' She 
further maintained that '[t]hesé demands are being pushed by groups in the minority 
that are using the Charter of Rights to attack the foundation of our democratic 
institutions."lS Interestingly, like her counterparts in Ontario, Houda-Pepin's 
understanding of Islamic law was deeply flawed, a fact born out in the speech she 
delivered in the National Assembly prior to the vote.16 In her opinion the Shaii'a 
13 According to Section 2639 of the Civil Cod~ '[d]isputes over the status and capacity ofpersons, family 
matters, or other matters of public order may not be submitted to arbitration.' Civil Code ofQuebec, S.Q. 
1991, c 64. (C.C.Q.). 
14 Fatima Houda-Pepin, "Tribunal islamique - Implantation - Motion sans préavis," Assemblée National, 
Cahier no. 156, May 26th (2005): pp. 8716-8718. 
15 Canadian Press, "Quebec Rejects the Sharia System," Globe and Mail, May 261h (2005): 
http://www.theglobeandmail.comlservletistoryIRTGAM.20050526.wsharia0526/EmailBNStory/National/. 
16 Houda-Pepin's speech, repeats sorne of the Islamophobia that characterized the debate over the use of 
Islamic arbitration in Ontario. For instance, when she informs her colleagues that 'victims of shari'a have 
a human face, the face of Muslim women,' Houda-Pepin is effectively casting the entire history ofIslamic 
jurisprudence in a negative light. Moreover, like the Ontario opponents of Islamic arbitration, she 
succumbs to fear-mongering tactics. For instance, she warned the National Assembly that 
'[i]mplementing shari' a in Canada is a power grab aimed at undermining one of the comerstones of our 
democracy: our justice system.' In light of the fact that the Boyd Report made it very clear that Islamic 
law would only function on a symbolic level and that Canadian law would take precedence, Houda-Pepin 
overstates the manner in which the Sharl'a will function in arbitration. Fatima Houda-Pepin, "Can 
Canada Mford Two Justice Systems?" Inroads, vol. 18, Winter/Spring (2006): pp. 66-67. 
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represents a 'loi qui a été élaborée entre le VIlle et le XIIe siècle et qui porte sur des 
matières civiles, pénales, criminelles et internationales.' 17 
Meanwhile, other reasons exist which preclude the full recognition of Islamic Law 
in Canada. Unequal provisions found in the Shaii'a will not gamer recognition when one 
considers that the state is entitled to limit certain religious practices in order to 
safeguard equality. Thus, although the Canadian Charter offers individuals freedom of 
religion, these freedoms are qualifjed iIeedoms that, according to Section 1 of the 
Charter, are 'subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.' On the global front, the 1966 
United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Politieal Rights, to which Canada 
is a signatory, makes access to religion a fundamental right. 18 In Article 27 of the 
Covenant it states '[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shaH not be denied the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.' However, much like the 
Canadian Chartel; these rights offered in the Covenant are qualified and cannot infringe 
on the unqualified privileges of equality. Thus, Article 23(4) of the Covenant maintains 
that states 'shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities 
of spouses as to marri age, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of 
dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.' 
17 Houda-Pepin, "Tribunal islamique" p. 8716. 
18 IntemationaJ Covenant on Civil and PoliticaJ Right~ G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21nd Sess. 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, D.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 D.N.T.S. 171 (1976). 
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Thus, practices such as Muslim unilateral divorces and polygamy not only deny 
equality under the law, but also act as challenges to the dominant culture's world-view. 
In any society, family laws represent one of the paramount structures that govern life 
and organize society. Different conceptions of family law would effectively hinder the 
formation of a unified society in this regard. In a country that relies heavily on a steady 
stream of immigrants, Canadian policy makers are not at ease to forfeit family law to 
religious groups for fear of segregating segments of the population. The Quebec 
Minster of Justice, Jacques P. Dupuis, recently commented on this matter in an opinion 
piece he published in Le Devoir. In the article he claims that 'je tiens à réitérer que le 
principe d'égalité de tous devant la loi est fondamental dans les valeurs du Québec et 
qu'il n'est pas question de toucher à ce principe d'aucune façon. Le Code civil s'applique 
à tous les résidants du Québec, quelle que soit leur appartenance religieuse, et aucun 
système d'arbitrage ne sera toléré dans les matières qui concernent la famille et l'ordre 
public.'19 
Although there are a number of reasons to curb the use of Islamic law in Canada, 
shutting the door completely on the Shaii'a is analogous to the pattern of cultural 
chauvinism displayed throughout much of Canada's history. Given the advances in 
philosophical theories of multiculturalism, ignoring Islamic law represents a lost 
opportunity to create the 'simultaneous belongings' Shachar discussed in the fifth 
chapter. By offering a simple binary yes/no response, such as Quebec's refusaI to accept 
any form of Islamic arbitration in that province, society is forced to accept a singular 
/~-, 19 Jacques P. Dupuis, "Tribunaux religieux - pas question de modifier le code civil du Québec," Le Devoir 
15th _16th January (2005): http://www.ledevoir.com/2005/01115/72628.html. 
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model of justice that is predicated on the majority culture's discretion. For those who 
place a greater emphasis on culture and religion, such a monolithic legal system would 
carry certain burdens. This may in turn convince these individuals to avoid the civil 
authorities altogether and pursue unsanctioned avenues towards resolving matters of 
personal status.20 Clearly, given the importance Canadian society places on the Charter, 
certain elements of the Shaii'a cannot be sanctioned. However, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, a joint model of justice is not one that seeks complete convergence on 
aIl matters of law. Rather, using the principles articulated by thinkers such as 
Habermas, an effective dialogue between the government and minority groups could act 
as a bridge and better reflect the multicultural dynamics inherent in society. This 
possibility however has faced a serious set-back following the decision to outlaw faith-
based family arbitration in Ontario and Quebec. 
The above discussion has shed sorne light on the incompatibility of Islamic law 
within the Canadian system. Firstly, procedural matters that permit proxy weddings 
and child marriage in the Muslim world would not gain favor within the Canadian legal 
community. Second, the fact that many of the structural differences are predicated on 
principles of inequality will create Charter violations Canadian society is unwilling to 
20 The Islamic COlmcil ofhnams-Canada, a group based in Toronto, currently offers advice on their web 
page for initiating a faskh. In a document entitled 'Faskh Guidelines (Marriage C ancellat ion)' , the group 
acknowledges that no Sharl'a courts currently operate in Canada and therefore advises individuals to seek 
their faskhs 'in the presence of at least two Imams.' This advice is problematic because, as discussed 
earlier, a mskh is a divorce that is granted by the courts. The web page appears to suggest that two 
imiims can act as a Sharl'a court, a highly misleading statement given the traditional role played by 
imiims and the limited training they have in matters related to Islamic and Canadian law. Furthermore, 
the web page ail but adroits that Muslim marriages are taking place in Canada without being registered in 
the courts. The group explains that '[iJn the event of a marriage without a License or Baon, the above 
guidelines apply for Faskh .... ' Quoted from The Islamic Council of Imams-Canada, "Faskh Guidelines 
(Marriage Cancellation)" (2002): http://www.islamcan.com/websites/imamcouncil/faskh.shtml#faskhapp. 
224 
accept. Finally, the notion that Islamic law challenges social cohesion by dividing 
society into legal ghettos poses serious problems given the state's goal of maintaining 
the unit Y of the Canadian population through its multiculturalism policy. Although 
these barriers exist, Islamic law is recognized in the Canadian court system. 
Occasionally, Muslims approach the courts with matters relating to the Shaii'a. The last 
chapter of this work will trace a selection of these cases and analyze how Canadian 
judges have coped with the Shaii'a in rendering their decisions. 
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Chapter 8 
Islamic Law in Canadian Courts 
As discussed in previous chapt ers, a number of cases involving issues of Islamic 
marriage and divorce have recently come before the Canadian courts. This is a sign that 
within certain segments of the Canadian justice system some provision can be made to 
accommodate Sharl'a. Although many Shaii'a practices are not recognized by the 
courts, some Islamic provisions that do not conflict with Canadian laws have been 
respected. This chapter will uncover six phenomena that surround cases dealing with 
Islamic marri age, divorce and the payment of the dower or mahr. Obviously, this 
survey cannot be exhaustive; rather, the cases presented here will offer a glimpse at how 
Canadian Muslims and Canadian judges deal with matters relating to the Sharl'a when 
they appear in the courts. 
There are six points of interest that will emerge from this study. First, Islamic 
practices that violate Canadian law are never enforced by Canadian courts. Thus, cases 
dealing with polygamy, and divorce settlements that violate Canadian laws do not 
gamer any support from the justice system. Second, a number of cases will demonstrate 
the problems associated with entering into unofficial Islamic ceremonies solemnizing 
marriage and divorce. Third, cases that deal with matters relating to the Sharl'a have 
received inconsistent treatment by Canadian judges. As will be demonstrated below, 
certain Islamic practices will be honored by some courts and disallowed by others. 
Fourth, inconsistencies in matters dealing with the Sharl'a are not limited to 
discrepancies between judges; in a few cases, expert witnesses have offered conflicting 
or incomplete points of view on practical matters of Islamic law. Fifth, the cases that 
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will be discussed below reveal that Muslims-Canadian resort to Islamic law in marriage 
and divorce for a number of reasons that include cultural familiarity, adherence to 
religious faith and personal gain. Finally, many Muslims-Canadian have adopted a 
hybridized approach to personal status. In many cases, it will become apparent that 
while Canadian civil practices are respected and observed, the parties involved in 
marriage and divorce refer to Islamic tradition for guidance. In bringing these points to 
light, this chapter will first discuss the cases individually and then offer sorne analysis. 
Before turning to how judges have coped with issues of Islamic law, however, it should 
be pointed out that the actions discussed below on the part of those who bring Shan'a 
cases to the courts should not automatically be considered indicative of Islamic 
behavior. Rather, Bhabha's concept of hybridized personality should be recalled. 
According to Bhabha, understanding the reasons why individuals act in certain ways 
should be grounded in the 'enunciatory present' that includes different variables such as 
religion, economic background and social standing. l These factors are aIl in play, to 
varying degrees, when individuals bring issues related to the Shar1'a to the courts. 
Cases: Marriage 
In matters regarding marri age, judges are unwilling to recognize certain principles of 
Islamic law either because they violate equality rights or because they involve ad-hoc 
ceremonies which do not qualify as actual 'marriages' according to Canadian law. For 
instance, in R. v. Mous/afa, Ashraf Moustafa, an Egyptian man living in Ontario, was 
accused ofbigamy when his first wife discovered that her husband had married another 
) Homi Bhabha, Location of Culture, p. 178. 
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woman.
2 The defendant arrived in Canada as a tourist in September of 1989 and 
married his first wife, Debbie Moustafa-Nichoi in September of 1990 following a two-
week courtship. According to Mr. Moustafa it was 'love at first sight' which 
precipitated his marriage proposaI to Ms. Moustafa-Nichol.3 However, the police 
officer in charge of the case was of the opinion that the marriage was one of 
convenience in order to hasten the defendant's Canadian residency status.4 Although 
the couple was married, they did not reside togetheI. According to the judge's report, 
these living arrangements were the result of financiai difficulties encountered by Mr. 
Moustafa and his inability to find a well-paying job. 
Five months after marrying his first wife, Mr. Moustafa exchanged vows with a 
second woman in February of 1991. In March ofthat year, fiiends of Debbie Moustafa-
Nichoi infonned her of the second marriage. As Ms. Moustafa-Nichol was carrying the 
unbom child of MI. Moustafa and wishing to preserve her marri age with hi m, she 
informed the police of her husband's subsequent marriage whereupon he was arrested 
and incarcerated for thirty-one days while awaiting trial. In rendering his decision, 
Justice Cadsby did not take into consideration any religious or multicultural 
justifications for the defendant's bigamous behavior. Rather, he simply voided the 
second marriage in keeping with Canadian laws regarding bigamy and sentenced Mr. 
Moustafa to time served and three years probation.5 This case offers a c1ear-cut 
example of a judge simply applying the criminal code and its sanctions against any form 
2 R. v. Moustata(Ont. Ct. J. (Prov. Div.», 1991 CarswellOnt 1438. 
3 Ibid., paragraph 6. 
4 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
5 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
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of polygamy. What is more difficult is contending with cases that involve unofficial and 
unregistered Islamic marriage ceremonies that take place in Canada on an ad-hoc basis. 
Due to the fact that a traditional Islamic marriage is a contract between two parties 
and requires no official sanctioning, sorne members of the Muslim community in 
Canada, for various reasons, have participated in marri ages without informing civil 
authorities. In the Ontario case of Islam v. Islam, a Muslim woman, Munni Islam, 
arranged for a marriage ceremony to take place in her home between her daughter, 
Lumis Islam, and her non-Muslim boyfriend, John Serpa, in order to curtail the 
sc andalous rumors surrounding their re1ationship.6 Present during the Islamic marriage 
were a number of friends and family members as well as an imiim who conducted the 
service. Justice Conant explains: 'three witnesses attested that at the gathering at the 
house of Munni they observed a priest or holy leader perform a Nikkah [sic] or 
solemnization of marri age between Lumis and John; and that was done, from what they 
understood, by the leader asking the boy if he accepts the girl and the girl if she accepts 
the boy, which each said they did. Each of these witnesses understood, on their 
testimony, that John had converted to the Muslim faith.'7 
This marriage would likely have gone unnoticed had it not been brought before the 
courts when Hilal Islam, the daughter's father who had previously divorced his wife 
Munni, stopped remitting child support upon hearing of the marriage ceremony. This 
prompted Ms. Islam to petition the courts to force her former husband to resume his 
payments of $200 a month in child support. His reasons for no longer providing the 
6 Islam v. Islam (Ont. Ct. J. (General Division)), 1990 CarswellOnt 1301. 
7 Ibid., paragraph 10. 
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child support were based on his 1985 divorce agreement with his former wife that 
stipulated that payments would continue until Lumis left school before the age of 18, 
tumed 21, married or died.8 Thus, upon hearing that Lumis had married, MI. Islam 
understood that he no longer was required to offer financial support for his daughter. 
In deciding this case, Justice Conant was required to rule on the validity of the 
Islamic marriage that took place in the private residence of Ms. Islam. In arriving at his 
decision, Justice Conant turned to a number of expert witnesses, inc1uding an imam 
named Mr. Kabir, who testified that the nuptials did not meet the requirements of an 
Islamic marriage ceremony. According to the witness, in order for a proper Islamic 
marriage to be solemnized, the ceremony must be conducted in a language understood 
by both participants, the consent of the bride's father or wall is required~ and the 
marriage must be performed before a 'duly authorized Islamic officer.'9 Although a 
number of Muslim countries now require that a nikiiiJ take place before civil authorities, 
sorne Muslim countries do not require an official presence at the ceremony. 
Furthermore, tradition al Shaii'a practices never required any official sanction to 
solemnize a wedding. So, although the expert witness was correct in pointing out sorne 
of the requirements of an Islamic marri age, it is debatable whether an Islamic official 
must be present in order for the marriage to be valid under the Shaii'a. As demonstrated 
in a previous chapter, marriages and divorces that take place in the absence of civil 
authorities are in fact recognized in countries such as Pakistan due to their acceptability 
within the traditional Shaii' a. 
8 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
9 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
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Based on the evidence before him, which unbeknownst to him did not convey the 
subtleties or variety of CUITent day Sharl'a practice, the judge ruled that the ceremony in 
this particular case did not qualify as a marri age. Justice Conant states: '1 am satisfied 
that none of the noted conditions just listed were met; and that even ifthere had been 
words of acceptance, as evidenced by the three witnesses .... that even so, there was not a 
proper Islamic marriage.' JO Thus, he ordered the father to resume paying the child 
support payments. What is interesting in this case is that the judge did not appear to 
use Canadian law as a benchmark for determining the validity of the marriage. Nowhere 
in the judgment is there any mention that the couple did or did not obtain a marri age 
license as is required in the province of Ontario. Rather, in assessing whether or not the 
marriage was valid, Justice Conant was content to defer to the expert witnesses who 
claimed that the marriage did not qualify as an Islamic nikilJ since an Islamic official 
was not present during the ceremony. 
In Ali v. R., another case, involving an unofficial Islamic marriage, a Somali man, 
Ali Enow Ali, was appealing a decision rendered by the Tax Court of Canada 
disallowing a claim he had made for a tax deduction. ll Mf. Ali was claiming $6,000 on 
his tax return based on spousal support payments he made to his wife, Sacdiyo Adan 
Ahmned based on paragraph 118(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 12 During the legal 
proceedings, it became apparent that Mr. Ali had never lived with or met with his wife 
in person. Rather his marriage to her was arranged by his mother and celebrated over 
10 Ibid., paragraph 13. 
11 Ali v. R. (Tax Court of Canada), [2001] 2 C.T.C. 2655. 
12 Income Tax Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.». 
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the telephone in the style of an Islamic marri age. Although this practice may strike a 
Western audience as unusual, this kind of arranged marriage and alternative living 
arrangement is common for members of immigrant communities. According to Mr. Ali, 
the couple was married in 1994 while the groom was in Toronto and the bride was living 
in a Kenyan refugee camp as a result of the civil turmoil taking place in Somalia at the 
time. 
When the daimed tax deductions came before the Minister of National Revenue, the 
Minister accepted that Mr. Ali was indeed married to Ms. Ahmned based on a certificate 
originating from an official in Somalia testifYing to the legality of the marriage. 13 The 
judge hearing the appeal did not question the validity of the marriage. However, Mr. 
Ali's appeal to deduct $6,000 from his 1996-1997 taxes failed due to the lack of 
financial evidence supporting his daim that he had indeed remitted that amount to his 
wife who continued to reside in Africa. Based on bank statements produced by Mr. Ali, 
the judge determined that only $2,000 had been withdrawn for the alleged support 
payments. Accordingly, this was the amount of deductions permitted.14 This case is 
interesting in that an Islamic marri age ceremony that took place over the phone was 
recognized by Canadian officiaIs on the grounds that Somali officiaIs had attested to its 
validity in a manner consistent with the recognition of marri age provisions under private 
internationallaw.15 
In a related case, Ahmed v. R., which took place one year earlier, a Somali immigrant 
named Sadaq Ahmed (who, as it tums out, was an acquaintance of Mr. Ali), found 
13 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
14 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
15 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
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himself in a similar situation to the one discussed above. 16 Like MI. Ali, Mr. Ahmed 
also married a Somali refugee living in a Kenyan refugee camp over the phone in 1995 
and was also c1aiming tax deductions for funds he c1aimed to have sent to his wife. In 
1998, Mf. Ahmed divorced his wife by telephone by issuing a .faliiq. Neither the 
marriage nOT the divorce were registered with civil authorities in Canada, Somalia, or 
Kenya. During the two-year period during which Mr. Ahmed maintained that he was 
married to Ms. Yusuf, he c1aimed to have sent a total of $10,760 to his wife. The case 
appeared before the courts because Mf. Ahmed was appealing a decision made by the 
Minister of National Revenue to deny his c1aims to deduct this amount as alimony 
payments. 17 
What distinguishes this case from the previous one is the fact that the presiding 
judge, Justice Morgan, questioned the validity of the marri age and divorce as weIl as the 
credibility of Mr. Ahmed. 18 . During the course of the hearing, it became c1ear that the 
appellant was providing the court with contradictory information. For instance~ in an 
affidavit signed by his wife and notarized by a notary public in Nairobi, Ms. Yusuf 
c1aimed that she was still married to Mr. Ahmed sixteen months after he had c1aimed to 
have divorced her. 19 Furthermore, the same document maintained that Mr. Ahmed 
would be sponsoring Ms. Yusufs application to gain entry into Canada. Despite the 
affidavit stating that the two were married, the judge was not willing to accept the 
validity of the marriage. 
16 Ahmedv. R. [2000] 3 C.T.C. 2517. 
17 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
18 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
19 Ibid., paragraph 16. 
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In support of his case, Mf. Ahmed summoned the expert testimony of an imiim 
named Aslam Nakhuda who is currently a prayer leader at the Makki Masjid in 
Brampton, Ontario. According to this expert witness's testimony, an Islamic marri age 
can take place without the presence of an officiating party. AlI that is required to 
solemnize a marriage is, 'for the man and woman (ifthey were both of the Islamic faith) 
to be together in the presence of two Islamic witnesses.' Furthermore, according to the 
imam, a marriage could be solemnized over the telephone so long as both parties had 
witnesses on either ends of the line.2o 
What the imam did not mention was that under Somali law, a wedding must be 
registered with civil authorities within 15 days for urban residents and 40 days for rural 
residents.21 In the previous case involving Mr. Ali, the marriage must have been 
registered with Somali officiaIs since they issued a certificate testifying to the legality 
of the marri age. Based on that document, both the Ministry of National Revenue and 
Justice Conant recognized the telephone marriage of Mr. Ali. In Mr. Ahmed's case, 
however, no certificate was produced as both the appellant and his wife failed to register 
their marriage and divorce. Thus, on account of the ad-hoc nature of these ceremonies, 
the judge refused to recognize the marriage and did not award the appellant the right to 
deduct the funds he c1aimed on his tax return. In Justice Morgan's words, Mr. Ahmed 
'took no steps under the laws of Ontario to register his marri age or to certify that he had 
been married. There was nothing under the laws of Ontario which would have caused 
any court in Ontario to think that there would be a tribunal which could issue a decree, 
• 
. ~. 20 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
21 Emmy University School of Law, "Somalia,"(2002): http://www.law.emory.edulIFL/legallSomalia.htm. 
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order or judgment affecting the Appellant's marri age. In the absence of any such decree, 
order or judgment or a separation agreement, there is no right to deduct these amounts 
at all ... .'22 
Justice Morgan went one step further in discrediting Mr. Ahmed's daim when he 
asked to have the witnesses of the telephone marriage brought before him. When asked 
to produce the witnesses that were present at his marriage ceremony, Mr. Ahmed 
offered the name of his friend Ali Enow Ali and another man whose name was not 
recorded in the judgment. The whereabouts of both witnesses were unknown to Mr. 
Ahmed, and thus they could not testify whether or not he had in fact been married 
according to the Muslim tradition. 
Cases: Divorce 
Cases dealing with Islamic divorce frequently appear before Canadian courts. In 
Bazi v. Deschamps we see the pitfalls involved in obtaining a religious divorce outside 
the ambit of the Canadian Divorce Act.23 In this case, Abdul Mosen Mohammad Bazzi 
of Windsor, Ontario, divorced his wife of twenty-one years in 1994 after the couple 
separated in 1990. A religious divorce was initiated in a Windsor area mosque in 
August of 1994 but a civil divorce was never registered with the authorities pursuant to 
the requirements of the Divorce Act. On the 21 st of September of 1994, Mr. Bazzi and 
Ella Blanche Deschamps applied and received an Ontario marriage license and were 
subsequently married three days later at the same Windsor mosque that had issued the 
religious divorce.24 Although the ceremony was conducted by a mosque official who 
22 Ahmed v. R., paragraph 25. 
23 Bazi v. Dechamps (1995), O.J. No. 2461 (Ont. Ct. J.(Gen. Div.)). 
24 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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was registered with the Government of Ontario to solemnize marri ages, this case 
appeared before the courts due to the unregistered Islamic divorce proceeding in which 
Mr. Bazzi had participated. This unregistered divorce placed Mr. Bazzi in a polygamous 
relationship. 
In reviewing the facts of the case, Justice Cusinato determined that the marriage 
between Ms. Deschamps and Mr. Bazzi was void ab initio because the unregistered 
mosque divorce was not officially recognized. In arguing his case, Mr. Bazzi appealed 
to Section 22 (1) of the Divorce Act that allows for the recognition of foreign 
divorces.25 Mr. Bazzi was of the opinion that his mosque divorce would be recognized 
in Lebanon, the country in which he married his first wife. Justice Cusinato rejected this 
argument on the grounds that the Lebanese govemment would not have recognized the 
mosque divorce in this case since it fell outside that country's jurisdiction?6 The 
assumption on Mr. Bazzi's part that a mosque-granted divorce would be sufficient to 
terminate his first marriage was therefore erroneous. Also, Mr. Bazzi did not take into 
account the fact that under CUITent Lebanese law and traditional Sharl'a procedures, 
divorces are not granted by a mosque or an imam. Rather, as discussed in a previous 
chapter, ajudge or qiùflis delegated to perform this task according to the Sharl'a, while 
cUITent Lebanese law requires individuals to approach the civil courts for a divorce. 
Although this case was relatively c1ear-cut, not all cases involving Islamic divorce in 
Canada are as easy to resolve. 
In another divorce case, Elkaswani v. Elkaswani a number of complications 
25 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
26 Ibid. 
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emerged based on the cultural and religious assumptions beld by Mohamed Salah Saleh 
Elkaswani during bis bid to divorce his wife Camilia Mohamed Elkaswani.27 The 
divorce principles tbat Mr. Elkaswani invoked prompted Justice Wilson, the presiding 
judge, to comment tbat tbe case 'involves a clash of cultures' between Islamic and 
Canadian laws?8 According to Mr. Elkaswani, a newly divorced wife would be 'required 
to leave tbe matrimonial borne witb only ber own clotbes. She bas no rigbts witb respect 
to property of the husband, including the fonner matrimonial home, nor does he have an 
ongoing obligation to maintain her, unless there are children under the age of seven 
years. ,29 This case revolved around the question of whether or not Ms. Elkaswani had 
any claim to the matrimonial home. Complicating matters further was the fact that the 
only real financial asset the couple owned was their home. During the course of the 
couple's prolonged five-year divorce process, Mr. Elkaswani transferred the ownership 
of the house to his brother who subsequently attempted to evict Ms. Elkaswani once the 
divorce was made official under Canadian law. It is noteworthy to point out that one of 
Ms. Elkaswani's sources of revenue came from her catering business which she ran from 
the kit chen of her home; losing this space would put her under sorne financial burden. 
Thus, Ms. Elkaswani brought the case before the courts in the hopes of challenging the 
attempts to evict ber as weIl as secure sorne fonn offinancial compensation from ber ex-
busband. This case offers an interesting glimpse of how personal interpretations of the 
Shaii'a come into conflict with official Canadian law when both systems are used 
concurrently. Moreover, this case clearly demonstrates how women in particular can be 
27 Elkaswani v. Elkaswani, [2004] B.CJ. No. 745 (Sup. Ct.). 
28 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
29 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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disadvantaged when their husbands invoke what they believe to be princip les of Islamic 
law in settling marital disputes. 
Mr. and Ms. Elkaswani were married in Lebanon in 1967 in an Islamic marriage 
ceremony that included the signing of a nikiil; contract. In this contract the couple 
agreed to a mahr of 3,000 Lebanese pounds of which 1,500 was paid and the remainder 
was deferred?O For reasons not mentioned in the judgment, neither party wanted to 
honor this agreement. According to the judge's report, the couple's marriage began to 
fail in 1995. This precipitated Mr. Elkaswani to declare his first laliiq declaration. At 
this time, the couple began living in separate quart ers of the home with Mr. Elkaswani 
occupying the first floor and Ms. Elkaswani residing on the second floor while operating 
her business from the tirst floor kitchen. 
Although the couple did not take any steps to register this divorce procedure with 
Canadian civil authorities at that time, they did inform their families in the Middle East 
of their emerging marital breakdown. This news prompted Mf. Elkaswani' s brother, 
Mustafa Saleh Hussein Kiswani to come to Canada in an attempt to reconcile the 
couple's marri age? 1 As discussed in previous chapters, this style of family-based 
mediation is a predominant feature that appears frequently in marital disputes 
throughout the Muslim world. It was during this attempt at reconciliation that Mr. 
Elkaswani transferred the ownership of the home to his brother, Mr. Kiswani without 
infonning his wife. Although the home's ownership changed hands, both Mr. and Ms. 
30 Ibid., paragraph 18. 
31 Ibid, paragraph 39. This action follows the Qur'anic advice to reconcile a couple's dishannony with 
outside mediation before finalizing a divorce. 
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Elkaswani continued to live in the house, albeit on separate floors. When the attempt to 
bridge the differences between the Elkaswanis failed in November of 1996, Mr. 
Elkaswani uttered his second faliiq. Although the two divorce statements did not carry 
any official weight, a civil divorce was filed and came into effect in October of 2000. 
Once the divorce was granted by the courts, Mr. Elkaswani uttered his third and final 
faliiq. Despite the fact that the couple were now officially divorced according to 
Canadian law as weIl as under Mr. Elkaswani's incorrect interpretation of Islamic law, 
they continued with their living arrangements in the home, now owned by Mr. Kiswani. 
The home in question was one built by Mr. Elkaswani with money borrowed from 
his brother Mr. Kiswani. Upon arriving in Canada, and unable to find work as a 
refrigeration and air conditioning technician, Mr. Elkaswani decided to try his hand in 
the real estate market by building and selling houses. Mr. Elkaswani's wife, along with 
his seven children, would live on-site while assisting in the construction of the homes 
they planned to sell. This plan did not succeed given that only one house was ever built, 
and it was never sold but rather served as the primary residence of the Elkaswani family. 
Between 1988 and 1996, Mr. Kiswani gave his brother an estimated $146,965 for the 
building and upkeep of the home?2 When transferring the ownership ofthis home to his 
bother in November of 1996, Mr. Elkaswani did not consult with his wife on this matter. 
According to the judge's report, Mr. Elkaswani did not confer with his wife because it 
was his beHef that Muslim women should not be privy to the details of the family 
finances and income?3 Although the judge has remarked that this was a religiously 
/' 32 Ibid., paragraph 4l. 
33 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
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motivated decision, it is impossible to ascertain whether Mr. Elkaswani's refusaI to 
discuss this matter was actually based on his understanding of religion, or whether other 
factors were involved in this decision that were not recorded in the judgment. Whatever 
his motivation, there is no disputing the fact that Mr. Elkaswani kept this financial 
information from his wife. In court, he daimed that the transfer constituted repayment 
for the money his brother had invested in the building over the years. Thus he argued 
that this money was in the nature of a loan rather than a gift. Once the divorce was 
finalized, Mr. Kiswani began to charge Ms. Elkaswani a monthly rent of $700. When she 
defaulted on her rent payments, both Mr. Kiswani and Mr. Elkaswani sought to have her 
evicted. In deciding this case, Justice Wilson was asked to determine whether the 
matrimonial home was a family asset, which would enable Ms. Elkaswani to have sorne 
daims over the house, or whether the property belonged to Mr. Kiswani, giving her no 
daims on the home whatsoever. 
What is interesting in this case is that Mr. Elkaswani appears to be using a 
hybridized approach in his divorce by turning to both Canadian and Islamic law. 
Despite applying for a Canadian divorce, Mr. Elkaswani hoped to escape any financial 
obligations to his wife by invoking Islamic law. However, his use of Islamic law was 
flawed on two counts. First, the decision not to pay his wife the mahr is inconsistent 
with Mr. Elkaswani's religious convictions. Payment ofthis SUffi is part of the Sharl'a 
and failure to pay the dower constitutes a violation of law. The second flaw in the 
manner in which Mr. Elkaswani applied Islamic law is in the time he allowed to pass 
between each of the .faliiq statements he made. Rather than dedare his .faliiq statements 
in three successive months or uttering a irrevocable .faliiq which would have 
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immediately put the divorce into effect, Mr. Elkaswani allowed five years to pass 
between the first and last dec1aration of divorce. 
ln deciding the case, Justice Wilson ruled that the transfer of ownership of the 
matrimonial home did not take into consideration Ms. Elkaswani's rights to the home. 
He therefore overturned the agreement between the brothers. Justice Wilson decided 
that the funds transferred from Mustafa Kiswani to his brother Muhammad Elkaswani 
did not constitute a financial loan in the traditional sense. The judge explains that 
'although Mohammed [sic] may have had a moral obligation to repay Mustafa, 1 do not 
accept that he had a legal one. The funds advanced were by way of an investment in the 
business; Mustafa accepted that if the business was not successful, his funds would not 
be returned. ,34 Moreover Justice Wilson goes on to add that 'when there is a disposition 
of property in suspicious circumstances between family members, on the part of both 
the transferor and the transferee, 1 also find that Mustafa cannot be considered to be a 
"purchaser in good faith ... ".' Thus the judge conc1uded that the transfer was invalid.35 
The judge was relying on Section 66 of the British Columbia Family Relations Act 
which maintains that when someone transfers property to a third person 'for the purpose 
of defeating a c1aim to an interest in the property the other spouse may then or in the 
future have [the courts] vest aIl or a portion of the property in, or in trust for, the other 
spouse.,36 
Justice Wilson decided that Ms. Elkaswani and Mf. Elkaswani would share the 
home, the parties occupying their own separate quart ers and paying their share of the 
34 Ibid., paragraph 56. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Family Relations Act, R.S.B.e. 1996, c. 128. 
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home's expenses.37 This decision also included a provision for Ms. Elkaswani to use the 
kit chen in order to further her economic prospects. A restraining order was placed on 
Mr. Elkaswani since in the judge's opinion, 'he does appear to have a considerable 
amount of anger regarding Camilia's c1aims, which may weIl be increased as a result of 
this jUdgment.,38 Finally, in an interesting turn of events, Justice Wilson incorporated 
principles of Islamic law when pronouncing on the matter of the money Mustafa 
provided his brother for the building of his home. If the home is eventually sold, 
Mustafa would be entitled to c1aim $140,525 of the sale price. In keeping with Islamic 
law, Justice Wilson specified that 'in view ofMustafa's evidence that he does not collect 
interest, as contrary to his religious beliefs, there will be no such provision.'39 Clearly, 
the judge is ascribing to the Islamic regulation forbidding usury (ribii) in determining 
how assets will be distributed following the sale of the home. 
AJ-Hashemy v. Abu Gheddah, the final case of divorce analyzed here, involves a 
couple who divorced over the phone while the husband was in Saskatchewan and the 
wife was in Saudi Arabia.40 Raghed Mohammad Adel Al-Hashemy married Aiman 
Abdufattah Mahammad Abu Gheddah in an Islamic marriage ceremony in 1984 while 
the two were living in Saudi Arabia.41 In pursuing his medical education as a 
cardiologist, Dr. Abu Gheddah relocated to Saskatchewan with his wife and eventually 
settled in that province where the couple raised their two children. 
37Elkaswani v. Elkaswani, paragraph 67. 
38 Ibid., paragraph 66. 
39 Ibid., paragraph 60. 
40 Al-Hashemy v. Abu Gheddah) (1994),121 Sask. R. 62. (Ct. of Queen's Bench). 
41 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
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For reasons that remain unc1ear, Ms. Hashemy traveled to Saudi Arabia with her two 
children in October of 1991. According to Ms. Hashemy, she and her two children were 
sent there by her husband and were not allowed to return to Canada because Dr. Abu 
Gheddah refused to sign her exit visa.42 Saudi law requires that aIl dependents, 
including wives, must have the permission of their guardians or husbands to travel 
outside the country. Unable to secure Dr. Abu Gheddah's permission to leave the 
country, Ms. Hashemy claimed that she and her children were virtual prison ers in that 
country. In December of 1991, Dr. Abu Gheddah phoned his wife and uttered an 
irrevocable .taliïq.43 Under Saudi law, Ms. Hashemy would only be entitled to her mahr 
given the nature of the divorce put into effect by her husband. 
Ms. Hashemy approached the Canadian courts in order to secure certain privileges to 
which she was entitled based on her Canadian citizenship. These included spousal 
support, child maintenance and custody of their daughter, DalaI Aboguddah. What is 
remarkable about this case is that Ms. Hashemy was also demanding that her ex-
husband sign her Saudi exit visa in order to allow her to retum to Canada. Although it 
is not clear in the judgment, it appears that the proceedings took place while she was in 
Saudi Arabia and her former husband was in Canada. Dr. Abu Gheddah sought to have 
Ms. Hashemy's claims dismissed on the grounds that a Saudi divorce had already been 
issued, and thus Canadian courts did not have jurisdiction to deal with this matter as per 
his "1IDderstanding ofprivate internationallaw.44 
In determining whether Canadian courts had jurisdiction in this case, Justice Osborn 
i". 42 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
43 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
44 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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referred to Section 3(1) of the Canadian Divorce Act. This section reads as follows: '[a] 
court in a province has jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce proceeding if either 
spouse has been ordinarily resident in the province for at least one year immediately 
preceding the commencement of the proceeding. ,45 In rendering his decision, Justice 
Osborn maintained that Dr. Abu Gheddah was indeed a resident of Saskatchewan for 
one year prior to his divorce proceedings. Thus, on this basis, it was determined that the 
court had jurisdiction to hear the case.46 For addition al support, Justice Osborn turned to 
Saskatchewan's Children's Law Act that states in Section 15(1) that 'the court has 
jurisdiction where: (a) the child is habitually resident in Saskatchewan at the 
commencement of the application for the order ... ' .47 Based on the fact that prior to 
traveling to Saudi Arabia, the child was a resident of Saskatchewan for most of her life 
and that the child and her mother could not leave Saudi Arabia, the judge determined 
that the Canadian court did have jurisdiction in the case as both child and mother were 
residents of that province. Justice Osborn ordered Dr. Abu Gheddah to sign Ms. 
Hashemy's Saudi exit visa as weIl as pay $5,000 for her return trip to Canada. 
Furthermore, Dr. Abu Gheddah was ordered to pay Ms. Hashemy $1,270 monthly in 
interim spousal support and $1,129 monthly in interim child support respectively until 
the case could be heard on its merits.48 The parties presumably settled out of court in 
the end, since the case received no further treatment by the courts. 
45 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supplement), c. 3, s. 3(1). 
46 Al-Hashemy v. Abu Gheddah, paragraph 8. 
47 Children's Law Act, 1997, S.S. 1997, c. C-8.2. 
48 Al-Hashemy v. Abu Gheddah, paragraph 17. 
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Cases: Mahr 
The last series of cases that will be analyzed here concems the payment of the 
dower or mahrwhich, as we recaIl, is a gift given to Muslim, Christian and Jewish wives 
either at the start of their marri age or deferred for a later date. In the British Columbia 
case of Amlani v. Hirani an Isma'ilf couple who had participated in separate civil and 
Islamic marriage ceremonies were disputing the payment of the mahr following their 
divorce.49 Al Ayaz Mitha AmIani was disputing the claim his former wife, Amynah 
Alauddin Hirani, was making against him for failure to pay her dower upon the 
breakdown of their marri age of four years. SpecificaIly, Mf. Amlani argued that the 
Islamic marriage contract that the pair signed in 1998, ten months following their civil 
union, did not qualify as an official marriage contract.50 
In hearing the case, Justice Prowse first determined that a mahrwas an agreed upon 
sum ofmoney to be paid to the wife either during the marriage or upon its dissolution.51 
Based on the evidence which was presented to him, namely the copy of the nikiiIJ or 
Islamic marri age contract the couple signed, the judge was also able to conclude that 
Mr. AmIani had indeed agreed to pay Ms. Hirani $51,000 as a dower.52 According to the 
actual wording of the marri age contract, Mf. Amlani would 'pay the agreed sum of 
money by way of Maher [sic] ... without prejudice to and not in substitution of aIl of my 
obligations provided for by the laws of the land. ,53 The contract, signed in front of a 
group ofwitnesses and officiated by Isma'1li functionaries, stated that the couple, 'who 
49 AmIani v. Hirani, [2000] B.CJ. No. 2357 (Sup. CL). 
50 Ibid, paragraph 2. 
51 Ibid, paragraph 34. 
52 Ibid., paragraph 38. 
53 Ibid., paragraph 30. 
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of their own free will and volition have signed the foregoing Marriage Contract in our 
presence, are hereby dec1ared married in accordance with the Shia Imami Ismaili Tariqa 
[sic]. The said Contract has been signed by the said parties in our presence after they 
have accepted aIl the conditions therein. ,54 
ln detennining whether the nikiiIJ signed by the couple constituted an actual 
marriage contract, Justice Prowse referred to Section 61(2) of the Family Relations Act. 
This law describes a marri age contract as 'an agreement entered into by a man and a 
woman before or during their marriage to each other to take effect on the date of their 
marriage or on the execution of the agreement, whichever is later.' The purpose of a 
marriage contract according to this law is for the '(a) [m]anagement offamily assets or 
other property during marri age, or (b) [0 ]wnership in, or division of, family assets or 
other property during marriage, or on the making of an order for dissolution of marri age, 
judicial separation or a dec1aration of nullity of marri age.' Justice Prowse found that 
the agreement entered into by the parties during their Islamic marriage ceremony was in 
fact a marri age contract based on the Section 61 (2) of the Family Relations Act. The 
nikiiIJ was considered an ante-nuptial agreement, similar in nature to a pre-nuptial 
agreement, and was binding on both parties. Justice Prowse further determined that the 
mahrwas in fact payable upon the dissolution of the marri age based on its constituting 
'other property' stipulated in subsection (b) of the Family Relations Act. Thus, Mf. 
Amlani's appeal to the courts to prevent the mahr from being recognized as a binding 
component ofhis marriage contract was denied.55 
/~, 54 Ibid., paragraph 19. 
55 Ibid. paragraph 37. 
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Although the previous case demonstrates a willingness on the part of a judge to 
consider an Islamic marriage and any funds designated as a mahr as a valid contract 
under the law, not aIl cases have beenjudged in this manner. In Memisoglu v. Memiche, 
a couple married for 22 months was involved in a heated court dispute conceming the 
division ofproperty and assets following the breakdown oftheir marriage.56 The couple, 
married in Turkey in 1991, decided to separate and then divorce in the Summer of 1993 
while they were residents of New Brunswick. The couple originally met in Istanbul and 
married after a short courtship that consisted of ten chaperoned meetings. During the 
courtship, they discussed how Ms. Memisoglu would study for her Master's degree at 
the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies in Montreal, Quebec. Dr. Memiche supported 
this decision, although it seems that he was 'under the vague impression that she could 
somehow study athome [in New Brunswick] - and then go on to write exams' at 
McGil1.57 The marri age was terminated at Dr. Memiche's request when Ms. 
Memisoglu, in the company of her family, traveled to the United States and then to 
Montreal in order to begin her studies.58 
In the case that was brought before Justice Boisvert, Ms. Memisoglu was 
petitioning her former husband for $673,547 in marital property and a total of $145,000 
in monthly spousal support to be awarded for a 29 month period.59 In addition to 
various properties, financial assets and goods, Ms. Memisoglu sought the payment of 
her mahr. Based on the unwriUen pre-marital agreement made between the couple 
56 Memisoglu v. Memiche, 1994 N.B.J. No. 463 (Ct. Q. B.). 
57 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
58 Ibid., paragraph 20. 
59 Ibid., paragraph 78. 
247 
during their Turkish courtship, a dower of 50 gold coins, valued at $100, would be paid 
to Ms. Memisoglu.6o For reasons not discussed in the judgment, this amount was never 
paid.61 Dr. Memiche maintained that the promise to pay the mahr is a part of Turkish 
folklore and that nothing within modem Turkish law makes such a payment binding.62 
To sorne extent this is true; Turkey's use of a secular legal code makes the payment of a 
dower a matter of personal choice enforceable with a written contract. Thus it is not an 
essential requirement of a marriage as per a traditional Islamic marri age. Justice 
Boisvert concluded that the question of the unpaid dower did not 'faU within the 
parameters of the Marital Property Act.'63 He further maintained that Ms. Memisoglu 
should take up the matter of the unpaid dower with Turkish courts if she wished to 
pursue the matter further. Justice Boisvert did not recognize the mahr because, unlike 
the previous case, no documentation was brought before the courts suggesting that a 
contract between the two parties had ever been signed. An oral contract between the 
parties might be enforceable in certain CÎrcumstances. If there were witnesses, and there 
probably were since their meetings were chaperoned, there may have been sufficient 
evidence to enforce the contract (the witnesses would have to provide an affidavit or 
come to testify). Ms. Memisoglu would have to have brought evidence of this, but the 
$100 dower probably wasn't worth the effort. This case is interesting given that the 
presiding judge did not give any credence to the religious component of the marriage 
contract. 
60 This figure is the one that is reported in the judgment, though its accuracy is suspect. 
61 Ibid., paragraph 53. 
62 Ibid., paragraph 54. 
63 Ibid., paragraph 55. 
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In Kaddoura v. Hammoud, the last case that will be analyzed in this chapter, a 
couple, married for 18 months, appeared before the courts in a matter relating to an 
unpaid mahr.64 Mr. Kaddoura petitioned the court for divorce and Manira Harnmoud, 
his former wife, counter petitioned the payment of the $30,000 promised to her as part 
ofher dower. Only the counter petition was at issue in the present case. In her counter-
petition, Ms. Harnmoud was also seeking $50,000 from her former husband for 
'exemplary damages for breakdown of the marriage.'65 It seems that the couple were 
often at odds with one another during their short marriage and in one incident Mr. 
Kaddoura had 'come close to physical violence' but did not carry out any such act.66 
Justice Rutherford of the Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the claim for exemplary 
damages, finding that both parties were responsible for the marital breakdown owing to 
their 'incompatible personalities. ,67 
Turning to the matter of the unpaid dower, Justice Rutherford was required to 
determine whether the mahrwas enforceable by the civil courts as a marriage contract. 
The couple had been married in an Ottawa-area mosque in a ceremony that was 
conducted by an imim who was duly registered to solemnize marriages.68 Two expert 
witnesses were brought in support of Ms. Harnmoud's counter petition: Dr. Jamal 
Mannaa Alisolaiman, an Ottawa area imiïm, and Mufti Abdul Majitkhan, the Director of 
the Institute of Islarnic Learning in Ajax, Ontario. These two witnesses testified to the 
effect that an Islamic marri age is dependent on 'three fundamental elements': the 
64 Kaddoura v. Hammoud(1998) 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)). 
65 Ibid., paragraph 6. 
66 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
67 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
68 Ibid., paragraph 18. 
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couple's capacity to marry, their willingness and consent to marry, and that a mahr be 
agreed upon and paid at least in part.69 The two witnesses also testified that Muslim 
women have an unequivocal right to receive the mahrfollowing a laliiqdivorce.7o 
The Ottawa wedding ceremony between Mr. Kaddoura and Ms. Hammoud was 
conducted in both English and Arabic and inc1uded the signing of an Ontario marriage 
license as weIl as an Islamic marriage contract. The Islamic marriage contract, written 
in Arabic, provided for a $35,000 mahr. At the time of the wedding Mr. Kaddoura had 
paid $5,000, the remainder being deferred for payment at a later date.71 The couple used 
the $5,000 to fund their honeymoon to Jamaica. According to Mr. Kaddoura's 
testimony, he never expected to pay the deferred portion of the mahrbased on his belief 
that it constituted an Islamic custom and was not part of the civil process.72 Ms. 
Hammoud, for her part, asserted that their Muslim marriage contract was indeed a 
component of the overall marriage contract according to Section 52 (1) of the Family 
Law Act. This section provides that '[t]wo persons who are married to each other or 
intend to marry may enter into an agreement in which they agree on their respective 
rights and obligations under the marri age or on separation, on the annulment or 
dissolution of the marriage or on death ... ,73 
Justice Rutherford held that the mahr constituted a purely religious issue and thus 
was not a matter that should be decided by the civil COurtS.74 Justice Rutherford 
69 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
70 Ibid., paragraphs 13-14. 
71 Ibid., paragraph 19. 
72 Ibid,. paragraph 16. 
73 FamjJy Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter F.3 
74 Ibid., paragraph 29. 
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explained:'[b]ecause Mahr [sic] is a religious matter, the resolution of any dispute 
relating to it or the consequences of failing to honor the obligation are also religious in 
their content and context.'75 He compared the enforceability of the mahrto the notion 
of forcing a couple married under the auspices of the Church to love, honor or cherish 
one another.76 Accordingly, Justice Rutherford reasoned that the only body that should 
rule on a case dealing with the mahrwas an 'Islamic authority' who could appreciate the 
'principles derived from the Holy Qur' an [sic], the words of the Prophet and from the 
religious jurisprudence.' 77 In the Canadian context this proposition is somewhat 
problematic. Although sorne forms of Islamic conflict resolution exist in Canada, they 
lack effective enforceability given that religious tribunals have no official powers of 
compulsion in cases where ahusband is ordered to pay the mahr. The inconsistent 
treatment of this issue by Canadian courts is also problematic. In the case of Am/ani v. 
Hirani, discussed above, it was determined that the mahr could be considered as part of 
a marriage contract and thus could be dealt with in a civil court. In this particular case, 
however, it is not considered a valid contract. 
Six Observations 
After discussing these cases of marriage, divorce and the payment of the mahr, a 
number of observations can be presented conceming the manner in which Islamic law is 
dealt with in Canadian courts. First, where Canadian and Islamic laws come into 
conflict, courts are unwilling to enforce Islamic law principles. This is the case, for 
75 Kaddoura v. Hammoud, paragraph 25. 
76 Ibid., paragraph 25. 
77 Ibid., paragraph 27. 
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example, when polygamy and unfair divorce settlements are concerned. Furthermore, in 
cases that deal with inter-jurisdictional issues, Canadian courts are inclined to assure 
jurisdiction if the parties have a sufficient connection to Canada. In this manner, even if 
the parties have a significant connection to another jurisdiction, Canadian laws will 
govern them as long as the criteria establishing their links to Canada set out in the 
legislation are met. For instance, in Al-Hashemy v. Abu Gheddah, although Dr. Abu 
Gheddah had obtained a valid Saudi divorce, Canadian laws were applied since both he 
and Ms. Al-Hashemy had resided in Saskatchewan and were thus governed by the 
provisions of the federal Divorce Act. This approach ensures that aH those who have 
sufficient connection to Canadian jurisdiction will benefit from the protections offered 
by its laws. The fact that Canadian laws prevail should not be interpreted as a victory of 
liberalism over Islam or Canadian law trumping Saudi law. Rather, the decision to 
award Ms. Al-Hashemy spousal and child support was based on principles of private 
internationallaw relating to the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts. 
A second interesting observation emerging from the above survey is that the use of 
unofficial and ad-hoc Islamic ceremonies to solemnize marriages and divorces carries 
certain risks. Specifically, benefits available to individuals who have recognized civil 
unions and separations can be denied to those who have unregistered marri ages and 
divorces. In Bazzi v. Deschamps, Mr. Bazzi's second marriage was annulled as a result 
of the unofficial divorce he obtained from a Windsor area mosque. Similarly, in Ahmed 
v. R. the appellant was denied the deduction he was claiming on his tax return for 
spousal support payments because his alleged marriage and divorce were not registered 
with any civil authority in Canada or elsewhere. 
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A third point of interest is the inconsistent treatment that Shaii'a law issues are 
given by the Canadian courts. For instance, in Amlani v. Hirani, the judge was willing 
to accept the mahr as a valid part of the marri age contract. In contrast, the judge in 
Kaddoura v. Hammoud, refused to enforce the mahr as a marriage contract on the 
grounds that the court did not have jurisdidion to deal with religious disputes. In both 
cases there was a written contract and there were no factual differences between the 
cases. The presiding judges simply differed in their conclusions as to the enforceability 
of such a contract. The latter case demonstrates the risks of refusing to acknowledge 
Islamic law principles in the Canadian context. While many commentators have warned 
of the dangers that will be perpetrated against Muslim women if religious law is 
validated in Canada, this case demonstrates how a woman was denied a financial benefit 
that was promised to her in an Islamic marriage contract. Arguably, inconsistencies of 
this kind could be a result of the unfamiliar territory judges have to venture into when 
dealing with Islamic law. Presumably, as more cases dealing with Islamic law appear 
before the courts, precedents will emerge which will in turn lead to greater consistency. 
Inconsistencies in matters dealing with the Sharl'a in Canadian courts are not limited 
to the judicial treatment of these cases. A related observation emerging from this 
review concems the contradictory information provided to the courts by expert 
witnesses. For instance, in the matter of what constitutes a valid Islamic marri age, a 
number of witnesses offered divergent views. In Ahmed v. R., Aslam Nakhuda, an 
imam who was serving as an expert witness, claimed that an Islamic marriage requires 
no official presence whatsoever. Rather, an that was required for the marriage to be 
valid was a willing couple who were of the Muslim faith and the presence of the 
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requisite number of witnesses. This testimony is incomplete given that a valid Islamic 
marriage can exist when a Muslim man marries Jewish or Christian women. This matter 
aside, we can see the inconsistencies that arise during the testimony of different expert 
witnesses when we compare Mf. Nakhuda's view with another expert who appeared 
before the court in Islam v. Islam. During the course of that hearing, Mr. Kabir 
maintained that a proper nikiil;. requires sorne official Islamic presence. Clearly, these 
two views contradict one another on the matter of whether or not an official presence is 
required in solemnizing an Islamic marriage. 
The discrepancy in the se testimonies is perhaps a result of the diversity inherent in 
Islamic law. It could also be due to the fact that imiims and other so-called experts may 
lack sufficient training in Islamic law. Finally, as we have seen, sorne countries have 
implemented reforms that necessitate official sanction and notification of marriages 
while other countries have not taken this step, or do not apply these requirements 
rigorously. These witnesses may be presenting ideas derived from modem Islamic 
practices found in the specific countries with which they are familiar. The 
inconsistencies in what constitutes a valid Islamic marri age represent one of the 
challenges associated with the use of Islamic law in Canada. Namely, divergent 
conceptions of the Sharl'a held by different experts who are brought before the courts 
make it difficult for judges to discem what is part of the Sharl'a and what is not. 
The fifth observation that emerges from this study is that people will invoke Islamic 
law for various reasons. Although it is difficult to assess an individual's motivation for 
using Islamic law, sorne cases discussed above offer hints as to why individuals tumed 
to the Sharl'a in regulating their personal affairs. In Elkaswani v. Elkaswani a c1ear 
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indication is given in the judge's report stating that Mr. Elkaswani wished to use 
Islamic law because ofhis strict adherence to the faith. Justice Wilson explains that Mf. 
Elkaswani 'wished to retain the traditional Muslim ways, and opposed Camilia [his 
wife] adopting Canadian ways.'78 Interestingly, in his quest to follow Islamic law, Mr. 
Elkaswani invoked incorrect interpretations of the Shan'a. In other cases, custom and 
tradition appear to dictate the motivations for the use of the Shan'a. In aIl of the cases 
dealing with the mahr, the appearance of the dower in the marriage contract is part of a 
typical Islamic marriage ceremony. In these instances, the mahrhas been described as a 
customary formality used in finalizing a marri age. Finally, self-interest seems to have 
motivated sorne individu aIs to invoke Islamic laws to resolve their personal affairs. 
This was clearly the case in Al-Hashemy v. Abu Gheddah where the husband was 
shirking his duties to provide his wife and child with financial support by hiding behind 
the veil of an Islamic divorce put into effect while she was stranded in Saudi Arabia. In 
the mahrdispute in Kaddoura v. Hammoud, Justice Rutherford comments that although 
the pair 'are Muslim as far as religion and religious home-background is concemed', 
their Islamic identity, he also goes on to suggest, is not that integral to their lives; he 
states that 'neither is what might be called "orthodox" Muslim.'79 Thus we Can 
speculate that Ms. Harnmoud's motivation for claiming her dower was not based on 
religious convictions but rather on a desire for her husband to fulfill his financial 
obligations towards her, as provided in their marri age contract. 
The final observation to come out of this survey is that a hybrid system of law is 
f~ 78 Elkaswani v. Elkaswani, paragraph 37. 
79 Kaddoura v. Hammouct paragraph 7. 
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emerging whereby Canadian law is being complemented with elements of the Sharl'a. 
For instance, in Canada, a typical Islamic marriage conducted by a recognized imam 
will incorporate both civil and religious rituals in solemnizing the union. More likely 
than not, an Islamic marriage contract will inc1ude sorne mention of a mahr. This is 
evident in Kaddoura v. Hammoud where the couple agreed to a $35,000 dower as part 
of their marriage contract. As Islam continues to flourish in Canada, it is conceivable 
that many within this community will continue to use both Canadian and Islamic 
personal status laws in regulating their affairs. Ignoring the use of Islamic law in 
Canada is extremely shortsighted. Quebec and Ontario's move to outlaw Islamic 
arbitration can certainly be seen as secular-liberal victories against individuals who wish 
to govem their lives according to non-mainstream convictions. The effects of these 
decisions may have grave consequences as people tum away from civil law altogether 
and seek 'underground' justice. Furthermore, govemments who neglect the spiritual 
realities of segments oftheir populations run the risk of delegitimizing themselves in the 
eyes of certain members of these religious communities. Rather than push Islamic 
arbitration out of the official justice system, govemments should draw in these voices 
and regulate their decisions so that they meet principles of equality found in the Charter. 
The dangers of unregulated Shan' a procedures are c1early illustrated by the facts in 
Elkaswani v. Elkaswaniwhere the husband attempted to deny his wife a portion oftheir 
matrimonial home on account of his convictions. Similarily, Al-Hashemy v. Abu 
Gheddah offers a glimpse of how one individual used Islamic law in order to avoid 
paying his wife alimony and child support, aIl the while stranding his wife and child in a 
foreign country. Mr. Bazzi's confusion regarding the procedures involved in issuing a 
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valid divorce in Bazzi v. Deschamps offers an indication that Muslims in Canada require 
sorne capable legal expertise in addressing their need to use Islamic law alongside the 
civil system. AlI these cases demonstrate that the intervention of the Canadian courts 
can be important to protect the parties involved. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated 
that imiims and other individuals who take up the task of interpreting Islamic law do not 
always have the qualification to do so. Thus in addressing people's needs for Islamic 
law, these unqualified individuals may offer incomplete or incorrect rulings. Ultimately, 
if forced to accept underground justice, vulnerable members of society may be subject to 
a form ofIslamic law that falls outside Canadian law as weIl as the Shar1'a. 
Permitting members of the Muslim community to settle their family disputes 
outside the spectrum of the law may lead to injustices for women like Camilia 
Elkaswani and Raghad Al-Hashimi. In both cases, the judges correctly determined that 
denying these women the benefits of a Canadian divorce would be unfair. Ifthese cases 
never appeared before the courts, their husbands' wishes to deny them any financial 
compensation may weIl have come to fruition. Given the emergence of a hybrid system 
oflaw in Canada, it is too simplistic to discount the Shar1'a completely on account ofits 
religious nature. Rather, creating a dual track approach to justice, as suggested by 
Habermas and others, may have better served those individuals who wish to maintain 
their religious convictions within a secular legal system. Unfortunately, following the 
recent debates in Ontario and Quebec, such a move seems very unlikely at present. 
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Conclusion 
Diversity has posed a constant challenge to Canada. The strategies employed by 
the predominantly Anglo-Canadian elite in addressing ethnocultural communities have 
shifted from policies of assimilation to those of integration. The overt nativism of the 
past has given way to a measure of tolerance designed to create a unified society based 
on liberal-democratic goals. Yet traditional means of coping with .diversity may no 
longer be responding to the rapidly changing dynamics of Canada's population. In 
particular, the desire on the part of some segments of Canada's Muslim population to 
utilize elements of the Sharl'a in matters related to marriage and divorce presents a 
challenge to the traditional framework of dealing with diversity. 
Over the course of the past 30 years, Canada has become home to millions of non-
European immigrants, refugees and their offspring. Not aIl of these individuals will fully 
buy into the Canadian mainstream predicated on Anglo based hegemony. When 
Canada's multiculturalism policy was hatched some thirty-five years ago, non-European 
minority groups had limited access to their ancestral homelands. To some extent, the 
distance between Muslim immigrants and their places of origin helped integrate these 
individuals into Canadian society. Today, the digital age has shattered this integrative 
too1. For example, pirate satellite providers offer members of the Iranian-Canadian 
community channels ranging from religious programming originating from the city of 
Qom to stations featuring the latest Persian hip-hop coming out of Los Angeles. 
Meanwhile, Muslim-Canadians who have concerns related to marriage and divorce can 
r visit internet sites such as Islamoneline.net and seek advice from legal scholars from 
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around the world. Those individuals who have yet to find spouses can surf the numerous 
Muslim nuptial web pages and meet potential partners online. Modem technology has 
served to increase the links that Muslim-Canadians maintain with Muslim communities 
world-wide. This phenomenon, combined with local social networks bound together 
through cultural centers, mosques, schools and businesses, have enabled sorne Muslim-
Canadians to lead lives that, more than ever before, are focused exclusively within their 
own communities. Although remaining aloof from the mainstream is not a particularly 
new phenomenon in North American society (Montreal's Hasidim come to mind here), 
advances in telecommunications and travel afford individuals deeper ties to counter-
cultural ideas, lifestyles and values. 
The call for the recognition of Islamic law in Canada represents a lit mus test for 
assessing how Canadian society is currently meeting these post-national challenges. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the court system has had the opportunity to 
address Islamic law issues to sorne extent. When cases involving Islamic law appear 
before the courts, judges are required to acknowledge, and in sorne instance, make 
rulings on matters related to the Sharl'a. The cases examined in this work highlight that 
Islamic law principles are generally invoked due to the desire of certain Muslims to 
abide by religious law or custom. In a minority of the cases, however, it appears that 
Islamic law is used as a me ans to obtain personal gain. In every case discussed in this 
work, Sharl'a principles that were found to violate equality rights or other fundamental 
elements of Canadian law, such as the prohibition of bigamy, were not permitted. In 
cases that involved unofficial or ad-hoc marriage or divorce ceremonies, we have seen 
that the individuals involved often forfeited benefits that would have been available to 
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them under Canadian law. Furthermore, our survey of cases has uncovered some 
inconsistencies in the manner Canadian judges ruled on issues such as the mahr. In one 
judgment the dower was regarded as a contract, while in another case it was seen as a 
religious dut Y that was unenforceable. Inconsistencies in the application of Islamic law 
were also found amongst individu aIs who served as expert witnesses before the courts; 
these experts frequently gave conflicting statements concerning the procedures involved 
in Islamic marnage and divorce. Ultimately, this study has demonstrated that a grass-
roots hybrid system oflaw, combining Islamic and Canadian practices, is emerging. This 
reality brings to light the need for the legislative branch of government to appropriately 
address the growing presence of Islamic law within Canadian courts and within 
Canadian society as a whole. 
One way in which Western governments can respond to the substantive needs of its 
population is to offer citizens a joint-governance model of conflict resolution. Such a 
model is in keeping with the theories articulated by Habermas, Sachar and Benhabib 
who endorse this strategy in a bid to ensure that legal systems remains flexible and 
adequately reflect the changing needs of society. However, if recent decisions taken in 
Ontario and Quebec to ban faith-based family arbitration are any indication, elected 
officiaIs have missed a significant opportunity to address the emerging demographic 
challenge posed by multicultural populations. Rather than endorse a joint governance 
model of justice that would inc1ude a recognized form of Islamic family arbitration, the 
Quebec National Assembly and the Premier of Ontario chose to follow a static and 
'color-blind' approach to justice. The unanimous vote taken in the Quebec National 
Assembly was an especially cynical measure considering that an existing provision 
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within the Civil Code (article 2639) aIready bans the use of arbitration in aIl family 
matters. Given its redundancy, this vote served no other purpose but to single out the 
Muslim cornrnunity and chastise their attempts to legitimize arbitration panels within 
the Canadian justice system. 
Slarnrning the gate on lslarnic arbitration in Canada will ultimately have negative 
consequences for the Muslim cornrnunity. Ajoint-governance model oflaw would have 
helped draw unheard and previously marginalized voices into the mainstrearn justice 
system. The fact that the government will no longer recognize faith based farnily 
arbitration agreements will not deter certain individuals from subrnitting to unofficial 
forms of faith-based ADR. As demonstrated in this work, the quality of justice offered 
by these underground panels is often suspect owing to the presence of untrained 
individuals serving as arbiters. Because this form of conflict resolution now faIls 
outside the governrnent's oversight capacity, the abuses of justice that occur during 
these proceedings will mostly go unnoticed and unchecked. Furthermore, the de-facto 
exclusion of certain segments of the Muslim cornrnunity from the mainstrearn legal 
system will serve to further alienate this group and may weIllead to the formation of the 
types of ghettos the opponents of faith-based arbitration warned against. 
lronicaIly, the lIeJ, the principal group advocating for the use of faith-based 
arbitration, was not seeking isolation from the mainstrearn - rather they were seeking to 
integrate themselves within society on their own terms. The panels they were attempting 
to establish in Ontario would have operated within pre-existing legal processes governed 
by the Arbitration Act. Moreover, the implementation of the recornrnendations made in 
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the Boyd Report would have enabled additional government controis such as the power 
to override arbitral awards that were made in bad faith. 
Despite the integrative potentiai such a joint system of justice would have produced, 
there existed a number of shortcomings in the proposaIs put forward by the I1Cl that 
called into question their ability to offer the services they advertised. The most glaring 
problem was a lack of expertise in the practice of Islamic law. Successfully applying 
provisions of the Sharl'a ·in Canada will require a cadre of specialists trained in specific 
Islamic schools of law as well as in Canadian jurisprudence. At present, these 
individuals are in short supply, leaving the articulation of Islamic law in the hands of 
untrained members of the Muslim cornmunity who sometimes follow incoherent 
interpretations ofthe Shaii'a. 
Rather than highlight this particular shortcoming, opponents of faith-based 
arbitration chose instead to embark on a fear-mongering campaign that shed little light on 
the dynamics of Islamic law or how it could be applied in a joint-governance modei of 
justice. Rather, Isiamophobic rhetoric was employed as a means of discrediting faith-
based arbitration. This tactic follows traditional patterns of cultural chauvinism that have 
typified liberalism in general, and Canadian attitudes towards diversity in particular. 
Cultural practices that fall outside the mainstream are considered threats to social 
cohesion and are labeled and dealt with as such. This line of thinking served to demonize 
the Muslim community by amplifying negative stereotypes currently in vogue amongst 
Western audiences. 
The reductive logic of the debates over Islamic ADR failed to take into account the 
checks and balances that Canadian procedural and constitutional law would have 
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imposed on the decisions rendered by these arbitration panels. Limits would have been 
imposed on the ADR process that would have kept any excess of power in check. 
Moreover, the legal issues that would have been subject to arbitration are very limited in 
scope - meaning cases that dealt with child custody for instance could not be settled via 
arbitration. Given these limits, arbitration would have established a symbolic system of 
conflict resolution that would nevertheless have pennitted members of the Musli'm 
community to' access cultural and religious nonns they regard as important to theii 
cultural and religious identity. Such a compromise would have no doubt left sorne 
individuals dissatisfied. Conservative members of religious communities would see 
Divine law being eut short, while those wanting to separate religion from the public 
forum would feel threatened by the infiltration of Islamic principles into the ostensibly 
secular matters of the state. A certain amount of dissatisfaction is, however, part and 
parcel of any system of justice which attempts to cater to a heterogeneous liberal 
democracy. An expectation of complete cultural convergence is untenable given the 
diversity inherent in multicultural societies. The opening years of the twenty-first century 
clearly suggests that religious belief and adherence to non-mainstream culture are not 
waning in Western democracies; rather these forces are playing an increasing role in the 
public forum. In failing to grant a measure of legitimacy to religious influences in 
dispute resolution, the Canadian govemment is not responding to the substantive 
concerns of a large segment of the population. In the long run, this lack of integration 
risks undennining the legitimacy of the Canadian judicial system in the eyes of the 
population governed by it. 
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